

***CHAPTER – II***  
***POLITICAL RELATIONS***

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India's image among its neighbors is not at all sober in nature and its relations are not smooth in its entirety. There is perhaps no other bilateral relationship which has attracted such intense global scrutiny for over six decades as the India-Pakistan relationship. The relations between India and Pakistan always determine the situation of tranquility in the South Asian region. In this case of India and Pakistan, given the historical divide between Hindus and Muslims, it is Understandable for a certain amount of acrimony and distrust to have an impact on their relationship. This resulting quarrelsome mindset has prompted three wars so far, which have resulted in both the countries diverting huge and precious financial resources to defense unfortunately.<sup>1</sup> The reasons for such an interest, which often encouraged direct and indirect interference by various powers, are not difficult to identify. The relationship, for one has been, acrimonious, and also viciously violent, causing death and destruction of several thousand people in four military conflicts and has potential of bringing the world to perhaps its first nuclear confrontation.<sup>2</sup> Pakistan's obsession with India began when the subcontinent got independence in 1947. The partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan came with a record brutal violence, deaths, and damage after the All India Muslim League (AIML) declared on the Direct Action Day (DAD) on August 16, 1946, to divide India or destroy India. At the time of the partition the world's worst migration of people, who cross borders in Punjab and Bengal, was more than ten million and genocide of communal carnage of almost one million in the subcontinent. The demand for Pakistan was not an ideological revolution but an extremism to set up a new land for Islamists that stoked and fomented communal hatred and bloodshed. The Hindu

and Muslim who revolted together in 1857 against the British were killing each other in the 1940s.<sup>3</sup> At the time of partition the rulers of the nearly 500 odd princely states that were directly under the British were advised to join either India or Pakistan, keeping in mind proximity, their demographic profile and other factors. Most states were integrated into either India or Pakistan. However there were a couple of states that had a problem. Hyderabad (Deccan), which was ruled by a Muslim Nizam, had a large, mainly Hindu Population, but geographically it was completely surrounded by India. Likewise the state of J&K had a Hindu Maharaja, but the majority of its population were Muslim and, unlike Hyderabad, both India and Pakistan had contiguous borders with it. While both these states set on the fence for quite a while before opting for India or Pakistan, the issue of Hyderabad was settled by a short and swift police action that resulted in its merger with India. J&K was attacked by a large number of tribesmen supported by regular Pakistani troops in 1947-48, while their ruler set on the fence. When Pakistani regulars and tribesmen were within gunshot of Srinagar, he sought India's assistance in exchange for acceding to it. Subsequent events resulted in a ceasefire that over the years and despite two and a half wars has more or less remained in place. One part of the west and north is under Pakistani control and eastern part including the valley, is under India's control. The divider is called the Line of Control (LOC), which was delineated soon after the Simla Agreement was concluded in 1972. Pakistan's attempt to integrate the erstwhile state of J&K by force in 1947, 1965, and 1999 failed each time, and has left the issue unresolved to this day. It is the primary cause for conflicts between the two countries.<sup>4</sup>

### **South Asia: Regional Order:**

South Asia can historically be seen as a contiguous civilized area which is bound on the south by the seas and in the north by the Himalayas. The eastern and the western boundaries of the region can be

found in the inhospitable Karakoram and the Hindu Kush ranges in the west and the tropical forests and the Arakan Yomas in the east. The region gained unity and legitimacy over centuries through the various empires in the South Asia demarcating its geographic and civilizational reach. The British Colonial Empire (BCE) in India was probably the most hegemonic and successful in bringing this vast swathe of land under a single sovereign space.

India's defense policies and strategic vision since Independence has been tied umbilically to the legacy of the British Empire in India. However, there were remarkable spatial differences in the post Partition Indian state and BCE and for that matter in South Asia. The strategic unity that the British gave to the subcontinent was broken in the east and the west. Second the ancient Chinese empire found its feet and, by the early 1950, was knocking on the doors of Tibet. These two factors are most crucial to understanding the challenges to the defense of India in the new geo-political world. With the Chinese integration of Tibet, the strategic insulation of South Asia from the China had changed forever.

Despite these differences with the BCE, India is the largest power in South Asia in terms of size, population and resources. India is also bigger than the rest of the South Asian states combined together. Moreover, none of the South Asian states have common boundaries with each other and India borders all the states in the region. Apart from its sheer size, the geographic constraint makes India the most important state in the subcontinent. In a region, the dominating power is expected to define the configuration of regional order according to its own ideology and identity.<sup>5</sup> The political elite in India has always believed that the country should aspire to be ranked among the great powers of the world with that belief anchored in its superior attributes including its geo-political status, hegemonic presence in South Asia, the perception of its potential economic and military capabilities, and civilizational ethos. In the past half a century,

India has been obsessed with security concerns within the region and especially so in the smaller states like Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. In the steps towards the elusive great power status, it is very important that India manages its neighborhood to achieve its ends and secure the region for itself.

Regional order can be maintained in two ways. The first is when the pivotal or the dominating power acts as the security manager for the entire region. The dominating power draws its legitimacy by providing public goods for the other members of the system. Such power has the potential to dramatically exacerbate the contours of conflict if disputed or challenged. In the absence of consensus and challenges to its legitimacy the region will suffer from chronic instability. In simple terms, the pivotal power gives a region cohesiveness, provides a sense of security and keep interfering external power out. The second path to regional order stems from equal powers contending with each other to maintain stability by checking each other's ambition. The Situation in South Asia is that none of these conditions holds true. Neither has India succeeded in dominating the entire region nor has the Pakistan challenge managed to countervail India's superiority. This gap between the two positions is what is responsible for the instability in the region which precludes predictable behavior or successful resolution of disputes. India's position in the region has been variously described as that of 'weak unipolarity' or 'arrested unipolarity'. The contested unipolarity has been as much a result of an underdeveloped economy as much as it has been a result of the challenge from Pakistan.

### **Why India-Pakistan Partitioned? :**

The root causes of India-Pakistan rift can be traced back to the days before the division of the subcontinent. Until the arrival of Muslim traders, missionaries, and armies in the late seventh and

early eighth centuries, the population of South Asia was primarily Hindu and Buddhist. By A.D. 1100 a number of Indo-Muslim states had been established and by the sixteenth century the Mughal Empire dominated northern India. The British formally disbanded the empire in 1858, at which time about one quarter of India's population were Muslims. They were concentrated in East Bengal, the Northwest Frontier, Punjab, Sindh, and Baluchistan, with large Muslim minorities in present day Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. Indian Muslims slowly adapted to British rule yet maintained their identity, establishing the Aligarh Muslim University (1875) and the Muslim League (1906). The latter, dominated by wealthy landowners and Muslim professionals, was largely secular in orientation; through a basic concern was the fate of Muslims in mainly Hindu political order. There was no suggestion of a separate Muslim state until 1930, when the Punjabi poet-politician Mohammed Iqbal raised the idea. Three years later a group of Indian students at Cambridge proposed naming it Pakistan. As the prospects of British withdrawal from South Asia increased, the Muslim League, led by the lawyer-politician Mohammed Ali Jinnah, declared its support for the idea of Pakistan in its historic address in 1940 Lahore session that set forth the logic of Pakistan.<sup>6</sup>

*The Hindus and the Muslim belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures. They neither inter-marry, nor inter-dine together and indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap.*

Jinnah turned the “two-nation” theory into an effective political movement by trying to weld together disparate elements of the Indian Muslim community. Another reason behind the partition, a separate status for India’s Muslim was became an important milestone on the road leading to Pakistan. Despite the increasing support for Pakistan—whether as a separate entity within India or as a state—many distinguished Indian Muslims rejected the idea, choosing to be loyal to the politically dominant Indian National Congress. What percentage of Indian Muslims favored an independent Pakistan is still unclear, but there is no doubt that the most prominent community leaders wanted a separate state—or at least staked out a claim for Pakistan in the hope of winning concessions in the final round of negotiations. The third towering figure of this group was Allama Iqbal, who in his own way propelled the idea of Pakistan forward as effectively as Jinnah or Sir Syed.<sup>7</sup>

Pakistan has been on the roller-coaster of democracy and dictatorship and a war against India always meant a change in Pakistan. An adventure against India is necessarily the outcome of compelling domestic circumstances. Therefore, Pakistan has always been conscious of its leadership role in Islamic world. This goes much beyond the two nation theory, which fulfilled itself with the partition of India (1947).<sup>8</sup> On the eve of partition both parties created images of each other which continued to be major elements of the entire conflict. The Indian National Congress maintained that old India continued to exist as an entity, though the secession of some areas was agreed to in the conviction that what remained would be integrated into a strong unified state. On its part the Muslim League stressed that the Muslim majority areas in the northwest and east India constituted into a separate state, would grow into a strong, strategically vital Muslim state. There are two major reasons for the persistence of this kind of conflict, the antithetical nature of Hinduism and Islam, and the other, consequences of Britain’s ‘cut and run’

departure from the subcontinent. Besides the conflict between the competing visions of Islam and secularism, sharp differences could be found in the history and policies of the two major political parties, The Muslim League and The Indian National Congress. To begin with, the issue of separate electorates demanded by The Muslim League was vehemently opposed by the Congress. This type of environment leads the subcontinent towards partition.

Thus, since 1947 both states have enduring divergences over a number of issues in which their perceptions and images have played a decisive role in shaping their overall policies.<sup>9</sup> Formal partition was only the beginning that implemented on 14 August, 1947, the actual separation between the people of India and Pakistan was a slow process spreads over several decades. Few people in India and Pakistan care to remember that things were very different in the early years. Initially there were no passports or identity papers, and no visas. People could easily travel to the other side of the new border; some lived in one country and worked in the other. There were regular train and ferry services in India and Pakistan. Films from one country were freely shown in the other, and film songs were aired by national radio stations without regards to nationality. Cultural exchange like Urdu mushairas (poetry recitals) were quit common because Urdu was still a thriving language in the northern and other parts of India, and was held by Pakistanis as there national language. Indian publications were freely available in Pakistani markets, and vice versa. For a while even Pakistan's currency was printed in India. Until the late 1950s, Pakistani Universities benefited from Indian professors by inviting them to examine students in Pakistan. Some Indian professors would take a night train to Lahore conduct the examination and return by the next night train. Text books written by the Indian scholars were widely prescribed and used in Pakistani colleges and universities.<sup>10</sup> Partition and separation were accompanied by state and national identity building, conflicts, crisis and wars. The 1965 war was a turning point in terms



of the openness of the countries to each other. Indian films and songs were banned from cinema houses and national radios. Borders were closed, train and ferry services were discontinued, and visa became difficult to obtain. The celebrated India-Pakistan mushairas quickly became extinct. Books, magazines and newspaper from the other country were disappeared from shelves. People and cultures were sealed off from each other. Today more than sixty five years after independence, the common people as well as the elite of India-Pakistan are questioning the wisdom of maintaining a state of confrontation, and are leaning towards establishing conditions for permanent peace. The power of the old mindset is declining; the momentum for peace is growing. Ordinary citizens in large numbers, peace activists, parliamentarians, cricketers, actors, artists, theater groups, intellectuals, journalists, women, soldiers and professionals are making a mighty contribution to peace effort. Further the India-Pakistan peace process can be categorized in three parts like, in the first part the two governments were principle actors. They talked for peace but never reached to a permanent solution. In the second part the intelligentsia in both countries started working for peace. In the third part people of the Pakistan became active

### **State and Nation Building in India and Pakistan:**

The process of state formation and nation building in India and Pakistan were shaped by an act of surgical Partition of the Indian subcontinent. Looking back at the post second world war years, it becomes evident that the process of Partition assumed two predominant forms. The first form was related to the outcome of the Second World War as also the Cold War that eventually led to the Partition of Germany, Korea and Vietnam. The second type of partition was related to decolonization. The partition of Indian subcontinent fell into the latter category. With partition, India and Pakistan had to socially reconstruct and imagine their respective and distinct notions of national identities over the territorial states legitimized by the post partition map.<sup>11</sup>

After partition, there have been two dominant versions of imagining India. Out of these, the first version that upheld the notion of secular India was dominant for almost four decades after Independence. It must be that the term 'secular' appears rather vague in the Indian context. It can imply either a religion neutral state or equal respect to all religions. In fact Nehru worked tirelessly to translate their notion of secular India at the level of praxis. For instance, through memorable writings like *The Discovery of India*, Nehru emphasized the socially plural, inclusive, composite and tolerant character of the people and civilizations that flourished in India. He consistently reconstructed the map of India so that over 3,000 - 4,000 communities would be able to visualize the geopolitical space of India under the comprehensive umbrella of secular nationalism. Under the Nehru regime (1947-64), the immediate post partition bitterness between the Muslim and Hindu communities was overcome rather smoothly and the country plunged into the project of nation-building and modernization. As a part of social and political engineering, Nehru endeavored to deploy the resources and manpower in India to promote gigantic developmental activities including the building of large dams like the Bhakra Nangal and steel plants like the one built at Bhilai. Simultaneously, a plethora of scientific research institutions such as the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and universities were built to provide trained manpower for developmental projects.<sup>12</sup>

With the demise of Nehru in 1964 and the end of the one party dominant system in 1967 the notion of secular nationalism began to face increasing challenges. The Congress regimes led by Indira Gandhi (1967-77) and (1980-84) and Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89) that succeeded the Nehru regime, did support secular nationalism, but not as convincingly as the Nehru regime. The covert support of Mrs. Gandhi to fanatic religious leaders like Bhindranwale in Punjab, for short term tactical purposes, and the susceptibility of the Rajiv Gandhi regime to the pressures of

fundamentalist Muslim groups in the case of Shah Bano, a Muslim divorcee fighting for the right to receive alimony under the secular law of the land, are examples of this trend. In the process, the congress regimes could neither evoke sympathy from the Hindu majority nor retain the support of Muslim and Sikh minorities. This paved the way for the rise of Hindu nationalism.<sup>13</sup>

In fact, Hindu nationalism constitutes the second important version of imagining India. The high priests of this version, such as Savarkar and Golwalkar, and their followers stood for making India a Hindu *rashtra* (nation). They wanted to give Hinduism a privileged position over any other religion and integrate India from the Indus to the seas on the basis of the dominant Hindu ethos. However capitalizing on the deficiencies of the secular nationalist forces led by the Congress, the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) and its allied parties the *Sangh parivar*—began to grow after the mid 1980s to contest and unmask the pseudo secularism of the secular nationalists. Events like the demolition of the Babri Masjid (1992), the rise of BJP as the single largest party in the ruling coalition in the central governments (1998-2004), the growing strength of the *Sangh Parivar* and the forces of Hindu nationalism, have by now transformed the complexion of the political process in India. Moreover, as a consequence of the clash between the secular and fundamentalist forces, especially after the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the meanings as well as modes of executing secular policies have become an intensely contested area among the major political parties. Likewise, separatism in Punjab in the 1980s and ongoing separatist movements in Kashmir have once more brought home the role of religion and ethnicity in constructing modern nation states. In a word, since secularism had become a contested concept within India diverse Political forces are imagining India as an entity in different ways. Perhaps the only silver lining is that India's vibrant liberal democracy has provided a space for diverse political forces to

work out the meaning and status of secularism in the changing political context. The defeat of the BJP led coalition in the 2004 General Elections, in a way, can be viewed as unwillingness on the part of the people to subscribe to the narrow agenda to the Hindutva as propounded by the BJP. Hence they voted for the forces that were closer to secular nationalism.

In contrast to India, the so called two nation theory has consistently haunted Pakistan's political evolution. In more ways than one, the birth of Pakistan was remarkable in the history of the formation of the nation states. Like Israel, Pakistan was constituted fundamentally on the basis of religion. Obviously, the diverse linguistic communities were brought under the umbrella of Islam while constructing the notion of the nation state in Pakistan. Moreover, the areas which had a predominantly Muslim population sprang up as neutral candidates to form Pakistan. Initially the founding fathers of Pakistan conceived of it by separating the western, eastern, and Southern parts of the subcontinent. The plans to carve out the southern wing of Pakistan through the state of Hyderabad were buried when Govt. of India under the Sardar Patel's stewardship integrated the state of Hyderabad, ruled by Nizam, with the Indian Union.<sup>14</sup>

Pakistan, unlike most contemporary nation states, came up as a geographically non contiguous state. Its western and eastern parts were separated by around 1400 km and these had little in common other than religion. Owing to the obvious linguistic and cultural differences between these two parts, it was difficult to bring about the national integration of Pakistan. The lack of internal cohesion virtually pushed the ruling elite in Pakistan to unite its population against an external enemy, India. The so-called inimical state of India was constructed in Pakistan through active propagation of the myth of aggressive designs of the Hindu majority in India over Pakistan. Thus, anti Indians became one of the important planks to keep Pakistan together. By constructing the notion of Hindu India, it was also easier to invoke the bond of Islamic affinity to

unify Muslims of the two wings of Pakistan. However, Pakistan's failure to keep the two wings together eventually led to the birth of Bangladesh in 1971. Owing to its bifurcation, anti Indian sentiments became more acute in Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike India, Pakistan alternated between civilian and military rule. The instability of political regimes in Pakistan further induced insecure rulers in Pakistan to invoke anti Indian stances to deflect the attention of the people from their poor performance.<sup>15</sup> Despite the importance of religion in daily life, urban Pakistanis overwhelmingly support the secularization of politics, the curbing of extremism, the reforms of madrasahs, and the building of relations with the west. Further in national votes, extremist parties have tended to receive negligible support. This does not mean that Islamic radicalism has no future in Pakistan. It relies primarily on the army to survive, being insufficiently popular to influence state policy through political parties or popular agitation. The army has supported it when it needed a tool to wedge its way into power but has suppressed it otherwise.<sup>16</sup>

### **India- Pakistan Peace process:**

Ever since 1947, peace between India and Pakistan has been challenged by territorial disputes and competing state narratives. With the Kashmir issue at the heart of their mutual animosity, India and Pakistan fought three wars in the first quarter century of their existence. Pakistan tried to achieve its objective in 1947 by supported a tribal invasion of Kashmir, which resulted in the Kashmir war 1947-48. Pakistan tried to same objective through 'Operation Gibraltar' in 1965 and then in 1971 but failed to wrest Kashmir from India. After these invasions both India and Pakistan signed couple of agreements like Tashkent Declaration (1966) and Simla Agreement (1972) respectively to establish peace in the region. India Pakistan relation can be uncompleted without understanding the Simla Agreement which is the benchmark of relations between these nations.<sup>17</sup>

**Tashkent Declaration:**

The second Indo-Pakistan war broke out on September 1965 over Kashmir. UN intervention brought the war to close, but the Security Council remained unable to sort out their differences. The deadlock provided an opportunity for mediation to the Soviet Union. Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin had his good offices to both India and Pakistan. Both accepted this offer to end of war. Kosygin succeeded in brokering a peace agreement, as the two parties met in Tashkent in January 1966. Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistan president Ayub Khan held meetings from 4 to 10 January. Kosygin stayed away from discussions for the first two days, and intervened only when he saw the summit heading for a deadlock. He held separate talks with the both leaders and finally was able to remove their differences. In an agreement signed on 10 January 1966 , both India and Pakistan declared that ‘all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966, to positions they held prior to 5 August 1965 and both sides shall observe the ceasefire terms on ceasefire line’.<sup>18</sup>

**The Simla Agreement:**

It is the simla agreement which defines the basic parameters according to which Indo-Pakistan relations have been conducted in the past and it will be hopefully be defining the parameters in the future as well. It is therefore necessary to take a brief look at the provisions of the Simla Agreement.

The Simla Agreement desired that, the sanctity of the Line of Control (LOC) was to be maintained by the both sides and both sides agreed that ‘neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations.’ Also there was a commitment by both countries to respect each other’s ‘territorial integrity and sovereignty’ as

well as to solve problems between the two countries by peaceful means. The two countries also agreed, 'That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UN) they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.' The New Delhi and Islamabad also agreed that the LOC would be converted into an International border in due course. In another important clause of the Simla Agreement, both India and Pakistan, agreed to 'settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. While the Simla Agreement can be regarded as having maintained peace between the two countries for a period of nearly two decades that peace was broken by the Pakistan's proxy war in 1989.<sup>19</sup>

Relations between India and Pakistan are going through one of the worst phases ever since the signing of Simla Agreement in 1972. Indo-Pakistan relations have seen more low points in 1990 than high points in the last three decades. The political leaders of the both sides, reiterated their willingness to resume talks over the next couple of years, the atmosphere between the two countries only became conducive for such an exercise in March 1997, when Pakistan and Indian foreign secretary level talks were held in New Delhi after a long gape. Real breakthrough came in May 1997, when Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral met Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at Maldives. They took to number of decisions like agreeing to release prisoners from each other's countries, agreeing to hotline between both of them, and most importantly, agreeing to establish working group to address various outstanding issues upon which the two countries disagreed. Indo-Pak interaction acquired a new context with the nuclear tests of May 1998 when relations hit a new low. Pakistan tried to project the South Asian region as a nuclear flashpoint in the aftermath of the tests and sensitized the Kashmir question by linking it with the nuclear tests. The extreme bitterness and tension between India and Pakistan in the period after the nuclear

tests did bring with it the realization on the both sides that things could not continue in the same manner indefinitely and that a meeting ground to be found. Things started looking up again as Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee met Pakistani Prime minister Nawaz Sharif at New York in September 1998. It was decided that foreign secretary level talks would be held between India and Pakistan, and a direct bus service between Lahore and Delhi was proposed.<sup>20</sup>

### **Dialogue Process in the Post Nuclear Phase:**

It becomes important to take a look at the impact of the nuclear tests on the process of dialogue between the two states. In a climate of newly created tension and suspicions in the wake of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, both countries felt the need to talk to each other at sufficiently high levels to find a meeting ground and to instill mutual confidence. The earliest opportunity available after that was at the SAARC Summit in Colombo which held in end July 1998. Both Prime Minister Vajpayee and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated that they would like to utilize the opportunity to hold a meeting on the margins of the summit to have a candid exchange of views on the post nuclear security situation and if possible agree on a framework of official level talks in the near future. The deadlock in Indo-Pakistan relations was finally broken when Vajpayee met Nawaz Sharif at New York on September 1998 during the UN General Assembly session. It was agreed that two foreign secretaries would meet in Islamabad from October 1998 to focus on Kashmir and peace and security, including confidence building measures, following this there would be a series of meetings in November to discuss the six other items on the agenda. The New York meeting also resulted in a telephone hotline between two prime ministers were to be restored, trade and people to people contact were to be enhanced, the railway link between Kokrapar (Pakistan) and Munnabo (India in Rajasthan) was to be



restarted and a direct bus service between Delhi and Lahore was proposed, visa rules were to be relaxed, and efforts were to be made to stop cross border firing.<sup>21</sup>

The October rounds of talks in Islamabad did not achieve any major breakthrough, except that the process of dialogue received an impetus. India and Pakistan reiterated their known positions on Kashmir, but agreed to meet again and carry forward the dialogue at the next round of talks between the two foreign secretaries. The Indian side proposed a no first use of nuclear weapons agreement, ensuring reliable communication links and greater transparency between the two sides through extending the hotline between the two Directors General of Military Operations to divisional and sector, reviving the hotline between the two foreign secretaries, giving advance notice of missiles tests of over 200 km range and extending the existing agreement on non attack on each other's nuclear installations to cover economic and population centers, renewal of the invitation to Pakistani Army chief to visit India and exchange of officers between the two National Defense colleges. The Pakistani side spoke of a non aggression pact, mutual nuclear and ballistic restraint while it remained cool to the no first use proposal.<sup>22</sup> The new Delhi round of talks held in November 1998, including six issues which were Tulbul navigation project, Siachen, Sir Creek, trade, terrorism and drug trafficking and cultural exchanges. During the talks, Pakistan rejected India's proposal for a ceasefire in Siachen, wanting instead to address the question of troop disengagement in the area. It was suggested by India that both sides could establish a 'bilateral monitoring mechanism'. New Delhi did not agree with the Pakistani proposal of placing an 'international monitoring mechanism' to supervise the ceasefire in the Siachen area.<sup>23</sup> The November round of talks became bogged down due to the usual accusations and counter accusations hurled by India and Pakistan towards each other. In situations they were not able to move beyond their often stated positions. However the efforts from both sides to

discuss a wide range of issues were itself commendable. There was some amount of progress in the November talks which can be measured by a number of positive developments. Both countries set up technical committees on the supply of surplus power to India. Certain proposals by India to avoid double taxation were under consideration. The Pakistani proposal for setting up mechanism for quick information flows on trade and investment was agreed to by India. Pakistan agreed to ensure that visas were issued to Indians within six weeks and that there would be no delay. Both nations agreed to set up a mechanism for regular meetings and exchange of operational information between Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Federal Investigating Agency of Pakistan, for expeditious assistance to each other for combating various kinds of crimes including counterfeiting of currency and cyber crimes.<sup>24</sup> Also there was a progress on the proposal for introduction of a bus service between Delhi and Lahore. Both countries agreed to release fishermen in each other's custody.

### **Lahore Bus Diplomacy:**

The next landmark in Indo-Pak relations was the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Lahore on February 20-21, 1999 on the inaugural run of Delhi - Lahore bus service. There was an increasing realization on the part of both Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee that improvement of relations between the two countries had to be a priority. The momentum for Vajpayee's visit was generated when the two governments went ahead with the cricket test Series despite right wing opposition in both countries. Also the delegation of Indian MPs to Islamabad for a parliamentarians meet organized by the Jung Group of newspaper did a fair share to promote confidence between the people of India and Pakistan. The Lahore Summit led to the signing of the Lahore Declaration by the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India on February 21, 1999, the issuing of the Joint Statement by India and Pakistan, and the Memorandum of Understanding

signed by the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan. Both the Lahore Declaration and the MOU referred to mutual adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, as also contained references to the implementation of the Simla Agreement.<sup>25</sup> Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif, at the end of their summit announced a number of steps including nuclear confidence building measures, for 'prevention of conflict' between the two states. They also agreed that their respective governments reaffirmed their condemnation of terrorism and their determination to combat this problem. The two governments agreed to give advance warning to the other when conducting ballistic missile flight tests. Seeking to minimize the potential of freak nuclear accidents, the two countries agreed to alert the other immediately in case of any 'accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident' on the other side. The level of bilateral talks was raised to the Foreign Minister level and the composite dialogue between the two countries, foreign secretaries was to continue. While hopes were high after the summit both sides had to come down to earth soon. Nawaz Sharif could not be seen to be softening his stance on Kashmir in undue haste. The happenings in Indo – Pak relations after Vajpayee's visit give an idea of existing contradictions present in relations between the two nations. Nawaz Sharif brought up the Kashmir issue when he made a statement that Mr. Vajpayee had agreed with Islamabad's view's that the people of Kashmir should have the right of self determination. This statement was refuted by the Indian PMO. Again at Dhaka, where Nawaz Sharif had gone for the summit, he stated that 'a solution of Kashmir is a must for achieving peace in nuclear capable South Asia'.<sup>26</sup>

While the Lahore process was the culmination of Nawaz Sharif's efforts towards taking Indo-Pak relations to a new high, it is known that the army in Pakistan was even then uncomfortable with this event, and had in the meanwhile been planning the Kargil adventure. It was reported in July 1999, that 'Highly placed sources confirm that the decision to take over the Kargil posts was

taken in October last year and preparations started immediately after that'.<sup>27</sup> Afzal Mahmood, in his article asks the question, 'Why did Pakistan fail to give the Lahore process a good try- which means reasonable time and opportunity to prove it worth as a conflict resolution mechanism? First accept the concept of bilateralism, glorify the Lahore process and take pride in opening a new chapter in Indo-Pak relations and shortly thereafter embark upon a course of action—ill thought out and rash—that brings us to an eyeball to eyeball confrontation with India'.<sup>28</sup> The feeling of euphoria created by the Lahore Summit was completely shattered due to Pakistan's aggression in Kargil which marked an unanticipated downturn in Indo-Pakistan relations.

### **Kargil War:**

At the onset of summer in 1999, the Pakistan Army took the initiative in the Kargil Sector to start yet another war – the fourth since Independence – with India. Initially, it tried to pass it off as an extension of the ongoing proxy war in other parts of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Intruded in the Kargil sector were actually Pakistani regular soldiers with ambitious military objectives of (a) cutting off National Highway 1A joining Zojila to Kargil and Leh, (b) isolating and capturing Turtuk, (c) occupying part of Indian Territory south of the LoC, and (d) rejuvenating militancy in the Valley which had started withering after J&K Assembly and Parliament elections. Due to inadequate intelligence and poor surveillance at the local level, it took time for the initial fog of war to clear. However, when the Indian military juggernaut got moving, it took little time to expose Pakistani lies, its operational and strategic weaknesses, and its wrong assumptions about the Indian military. Despite a self-imposed national strategy of restraint and to keep the war limited to the Kargil sector, the Indian armed forces rose heroically to the challenge and responded with a firm resolve and daring that few believed was possible. Operation Vijay was launched in May 1999 with a well-coordinated politico-military strategy. With great

determination, high morale, and brilliant junior leadership, Indian forces performed gallantly. The forward movement of the Indian soldiers on the mountain tops of Kargil, one of the most difficult terrains in the world, became unbeatable and Pakistani positions fell one after another. India was able to beat back Pakistani forces on the ground and at a time of its own choosing. The Kargil war came as a great surprise and thus became a greater politico-military victory! Most of the credit for victory in Kargil will no doubt always go to the grit, determination, and dedication shown on the battlefield by our Jawans and young officers.<sup>29</sup> As in the crisis nuclear clouds appeared to hover over the two states and intensified the tension in the region. It was feared that Pakistan would launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack. This fear was heightened when Pakistan's foreign secretary Shamshed Ahmed dropped hints of the war escalating to a nuclear confrontation. Meanwhile in the first week of July, Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, under pressure from the US, promised to restore the sanctity of the LOC as per the Simla Agreement of 1972 and to re-engage in the bilateral dialogue begun in Lahore a few months earlier.<sup>30</sup>

The Lahore Summit would have been one of the greatest achievements throughout the history of the peace process between India and Pakistan since 1947. But in the same year (1999), India and Pakistan fought their 'fourth war' in Kargil that brought large scale violence in the region since 1971, the crisis was managed with the involvement of the US.

### **Agra Summit 2001:**

India and Pakistan experienced the worst state of their relations after the Kargil flare-up. The two countries were back to square one and withdrew their diplomatic staff from respective High Commissions. India insisted that no dialogue would take place until Pakistan stopped supporting

'cross border infiltration'. General Pervez Musharraf was not a reliable negotiator as it considered him the, 'The architect' of the Kargil war. Throughout this military deadlock, Pakistan kept on offering India negotiations at "any level, anywhere, and anytime". India rejected Pakistan's peace initiative on the basis of the Kargil conflict as well as internal political situation of Pakistan. According to an Indian analyst, "General Pervez Musharraf's capture of power in a military coup in 1999 had prompted India to declare that no India-Pakistan dialogue to resolve differences would take place till the time democracy returned to Pakistan". President Musharraf proposed a "reciprocal action plan" to implement by both countries as a first step to defuse tension and to promote peace. In May 2001, India extended an official invitation to Pakistan to revitalize bilateral contacts. In response President Pervez Musharraf accepted the invitation from his counterpart and a meeting was held between the two leaders in Agra on July 14-16 2001. The brought higher hopes to the region as it were a major breakthrough after two years stalemate. President Musharraf assured the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, "I have come with an open mind and looks forward to my discussions with Indian leaders on establishing peaceful, tension-free and co-operative relations between our two countries". The summit despite a euphoric beginning did not produce the desired results and was generally considered a failure.<sup>31</sup> But Scholars and political leaders of both the states say that the summit has not failed. At this stage the best option would be to continue bilateral negotiations with each other. In the future both the governments should try to find some meeting ground in order to pursue measures to enhance interaction and co-operation between the both nations.<sup>32</sup>

### **Attack on the Indian Parliament:**

But this is evident from the fact that despite Pakistan's rebuffing of Prime Minister Atal Behri Vajpayee's Lahore peace initiative through the Kargil perfidy in 1999, he took yet another bold

peace initiatives by implementing a unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir in the Islamic holy month of Ramzan in November 2000. Besides, he invited the Pakistan President, General Pervez Musharraf, for talks in the historical town of Agra in July 2001. Unfortunately, Islamabad responded to these peace initiatives by engineering attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly on 1 October, 2001 and on the Indian Parliament House on 13 December, 2001. Being a mature and responsible nation having an understanding of the implications of war between two nuclear-armed neighbors and its international ramifications, New Delhi however rightly decided to give diplomacy one more chance even while preparing for the exercise of the last option, i.e., war. But New Delhi did give priority to diplomatic offensive, including recalling of its High Commissioner in New Delhi, terminating the New Delhi –Lahore bus service as well as Samjhauta Express, withdrawing permission to Pakistan to fly its aircraft through the Indian skies, and demanding the extradition of 20 persons accused of committing various terrorist acts in India.<sup>33</sup> As the Vajpayee government did not expect any voluntary action on the part of Pakistan. It banked on the moral indignation of the international community, apart from mobilizing its military forces. It held intensive consultations with leaders of important countries such as the US, Britain, Russia, Japan, and China, etc. This three- pronged Indian strategy— military build-up, mobilizing international pressure, and mounting bilateral pressure on Pakistan produce certain result. These moves not only obliged the Pakistan President, General Pervez Musharraf , to condemn religious extremism in his open address to his country on 12 January 2002, but also to ban certain terrorist outfit including Lashker-e- Toiba(LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed(JeM).<sup>34</sup>

### **Peace Process back on Track:**

As time move forward, Vajpayee in his speech in Srinagar on April 2003 offered the ‘hand of friendship’ to Pakistan and get positive response from Islamabad. The sharp transformation can be sensed in the policies of president Musharraf, who showed remarkable flexibility and innovative thinking in offering different proposal that could fulfill the aspirations of the Kashmiri people while keeping in mind the sensitivities of both India and Pakistan. For instance, the Joint statement signed on 6 January 2004 was a serious step towards the conflict resolution between the two countries. In this statement, both states agreed to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented. On his part Musharraf reassured Vajpayee that he would not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner. He further emphasized that a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results.<sup>35</sup> The Two side also took steps to appointment of high commissioners, the resumption of the Delhi –Lahore bus service, ceasefire along the LOC and along the Actual Ground Position Line(AGPL) at the Siachen glacier as well as the resumption of air links and over flights.<sup>36</sup> In a press conference after the release of the Joint statement, Musharraf stated: “History has been made as Pakistan and India have reached an agreement to take the process of normalization of relations forward. We have never reached the point we have reached now.” Soon after the composite dialogue agreement, general elections in India led to the replacement of the NDA by a Congress-led coalition government at New Delhi in May 2004 with Dr. Manmohan Singh as the Prime Minister. Although the change in government at New Delhi was not expected to wreck the peace process, there were concerns regarding its continuity even though the Congress had backed the peace process when it was in the opposition. Moreover, Musharraf advocated a four-stage formula for the resolution of Kashmir that included, recognition of Kashmir as a dispute, initiation of a dialogue, shedding of mutually unacceptable



solutions, and securing a win-win situation for all parties to the dispute. In October 2004, he proposed a three phase formula. In the first phase ethnic geographic line would be identified in Kashmir between India and Pakistan, the above regions would be demilitarized in second phase and their legal and constitutional status decided in the third and final phase.<sup>37</sup> In another proposal floated in 2005, Musharraf suggested “demilitarization” and maximum “self-governance” and “joint management” for Kashmir. The rationale behind these proposals was to secure a creative resolution based on concessions by all sides, yet meeting the aspirations of the Kashmiris. India rejected Musharraf’s seven region proposal maintaining that it envisaged a division of Kashmir on religious lines. India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: “Any proposal that smacks of a further division of our country on the basis of religion is not going to be acceptable to us.” Moreover, India did not respond favorably to Pakistan’s proposal on ‘self governance’ and ‘demilitarization’ and reaffirmed that there would be no redeployment of security forces while violence, terrorism and ‘infiltration’ continued. So the differences of opinion regarding any issue which one country considered a priority have underlined the basic dichotomy of their approaches that persists to date.<sup>38</sup> In April 2005, a bus line between Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Muzaffarabad, the Capital of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) part of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir was re-established, allowing divided families to meet for the first time since 1956. After the October, 2005 earthquake in AJK region of Pakistan, India and Pakistan agreed to open the LOC at five points to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance as well as meetings between divided families.<sup>39</sup>

But in the immediate past, there have been two incidents that threatened to disrupt the peace process— the first was the attack on the make shift temple at Ayodhya on July 2005 and other was the serial blast in Mumbai on July 2006. The Indian establishment regarded both of them as

'major incidents' capable of disrupting the peace process. During the interaction with press, Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh made it clear that the success of the peace process depended on public opinion and support and that an incident like the Ayodhya attack would seriously undermine the Indian government's ability to carry the people's support.<sup>40</sup> The Havana statement is an important marker as it came after the devastating Mumbai blasts in July 2006 which led to the postponement of the secretary level talks. New Delhi suspended the peace process and demanded that Pakistan demonstrate its commitment to the various assurances it had given to India since January 2004. The year 2006 saw constant interaction over the working groups on the various issues agreed to in the composite dialogue process. There was a hiccup due to the Mumbai blasts but the talks continued after some damage control exercise by both countries.<sup>41</sup> The peace process was resumed in September 2006, when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met General Musharraf in Cuba during the Non Aligned summit where came the proposal of 'joint anti – terrorism mechanism' a non starter and produced nothing substantial for India. Further in May 2008 meeting between foreign ministers and foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan to review the 'composite dialogue' and the 'peace process' between the two adversarial South Asian neighbors appears to be reassuring. To keep the momentum of cooperation and confidence-building, especially across the LOC, the sides agreed to increase the frequency of movement of people and goods across the border through rail, road and air. Working and expert groups to explore more confidence-building measures were also to be facilitated, including in the nuclear and conventional fields. The question of trade volume and imbalance were also considered and it was agreed that railway officials from the two sides would meet in June 2008 to remove technical difficulties experienced in freight movement. To expand economic engagement, the two sides agreed to open the branches of each other's banks and agreed to work

through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to promote South Asian regional cooperation and development. Both sides also agreed seriously and sincerely to address the humanitarian aspects of persons of one country detained in another. An agreement was signed in Islamabad during the meeting of consular access to such detainees. There would also be release of such detainees by both the countries. The liberalization of visa regime between the two states was also reiterated.<sup>42</sup> November 2008 a terrorist attack on Mumbai, India blamed Pakistani based militants and freezes talks with Pakistan and Islamabad initially denied any involvement in the attacks, but in 2009 acknowledged that the assault had been partially planned on its territory and that Ajmal Qasab, the lone surviving member of the attack team, was a Pakistani citizen. It was the first time India and Pakistan have cooperated across border in the trial of terror suspects and Pakistan agreed to send a Judicial team to India during home secretary level talks but the team's arrival was delayed for some time.<sup>43</sup> Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari met on the sidelines of an international gathering in Russia in 2009 and discussed on the issue of Mumbai terrorist attack mr. singh want him to ensure militants cannot operate from Pakistan. Indian foreign Minister SM Krishna and the newly appointed Pakistani foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar held talks in New Delhi in July 2011. This was a part of a series of high level meetings aimed at normalizing relations between the two states and bringing the relationship back on track.<sup>44</sup> They announced new Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and expected that these will expand the scope of people to people contacts and humanitarian issues. The CBMs include increasing cross-LOC trading days and expanding travel to include tourism and religious aspects, apart from relaxing permit conditions for travel by people of Jammu and Kashmir to the other side of LOC by having a system of Six

month multiple entry, To move forward and forge a cooperative relationship though they stuck to their known positions on key issues such as Kashmir and terror.<sup>45</sup>

In April 2012, after a long period of 7 year Pakistani president landed in Delhi for the highest level visit to India for their religious place in Ajmer (Rajestan). The tour raised hopes that long chill in relations between the two could be close to ending because the last Pakistani leader to make the journey was President Prevez Musharraf in 2005. They agreed to move forward by liberalize trade between the nuclear neighbors and boost confidence by increasing cooperation against terrorism. Although the flying visit resulted in nothing more solid than warm words and invitation for Singh to visit Pakistan, western diplomats described it as ‘good news after a lot of grim news’ and said it held out the prospect of a real breakthrough in relations between the nuclear armed neighbors.<sup>46</sup> In August 2012 they met again on the sideline of 16<sup>th</sup> NAM summit in Tehran discussed that CBMs would help to bridge the trust deficit between the two nations. Pakistani President also reportedly invited Dr. Singh to visit Pakistan but after one day of this meeting the Indian Supreme Court upheld Ajmal Kasab’s death sentence in the Mumbai terror attack case.<sup>47</sup>

After a long breakdown the newly elected prime minister of India Narendra Modi invited his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in his oath taking ceremony with all the SAARC countries leaders and despite the immense pressure of ISI, Military Nawaz Sharif accepted the invitation from New Delhi and he came with his team in Oath ceremony of Narendre Modi and get warmed welcome from New Delhi and as well as from media of all over the world and describing this moment as ‘new beginning’, ‘historic opportunity’ ‘Landmark Talks’ and many more by the experts and media all over the world. Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif talked near about 50 minutes in a meeting in Hadrabad House in New

Delhi on 26, May 2014 and describing the meeting ‘good and constructive’ and both leaders agreed to pick up the threads of the Lahore declaration, referring to a pledge both countries made in 1999 to cooperate more closely to ease tensions.<sup>48</sup> They also talk about terrorism and Indian Prime Minister asked that his country ‘abide by its commitment’ to prevent terrorism against India arising there and to speed up investigations into the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. They also discussed increasing trade and other exchanges. Sharif told reporters and said that the meeting should be ‘a historic opportunity for both countries’ and both leaders were elected with popular mandates and could succeed in ‘turning a new page’ in their countries often hostile relations and both nations shared the goal of economic development, which could not be achieved without peace and stability in the region. Both leaders agreed to change confrontation into cooperation and increase trade and people- to people contact and the foreign secretaries will stay in touch and explore how to move relationship forward.<sup>49</sup> They also agreed that the foreign secretaries of Pakistan and India would meet in near future. Raza Rumi, a policy analyst at Jinnah Institute in Islamabad, said Pakistanis viewed the visit as an icebreaker between the two leaders and were not expecting much more concrete progress. Although 26 May 2014<sup>th</sup> meeting was a milestone, political analysts say it is too early to say how talks between the two countries will progress. However, they say Modi’s initiative in calling the Pakistani leader, and Sharif’s decision to come to New Delhi, shows that both sides are willing to break the deadlock. The two rivals, who have fought three wars, have not held official talks for nearly last two years.<sup>50</sup>

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End Notes

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