

CHAPTER – III
STRATEGIC RELATIONS

Chapter III

Strategic Relations

The South Asia has major strategic importance in the world due to rise of India and Pakistan as nuclear power in 1998 and these nations have a large volume of rising middle class in their respective regions. South Asia has come full circle in its political place in the sun by 1980 and in our understanding of its strategic environment. When the British ruled the subcontinent they recognized three area of external threat like the northeast region, the northwest region and the Indian Ocean. But after independence India rejected the kind of geostrategic logic which was developed by the British. After independence, Nehru sought to deflect India's important neighbors with good-will; while Pakistani leaders proclaimed their support of the 'great game' their concerns were primarily against India. The tragic and unnecessary misdirection of India and Pakistan stood these nations against each other. A number of factors rest upon the boundary between region and the broader international system. These are by far of greatest importance to outsiders worried about India and Pakistan's relationship to the 'arc of crisis' although not necessarily within India. Indeed China supports Pakistan with weapons propaganda and possibly nuclear technology and the US supports China economically, but in both case it is India that must face the unintended consequences. Of course, Indians argue that India is the target of a so-called US- China- Pakistan axis, but one need not subscribe to this view to reach the conclusion that the actual effect is nearly as bad, from an Indian perspective. The former president of Pakistan Zia Ul Haq was very much interested to restore normal relations with India. Further it must be recognized that a weak Pakistan is no less a threat to India than a strong Pakistan, many Indian are coming to acknowledge this point. There are areas where the major outside economic powers can make useful contributions to regional stability. There are

a number of joint river and water projects that could be pursued by India and one more of its neighbors. There is room for expansion informational and educational programs.¹

Pakistan political fate will also shape the regional order. If the country continues down its present pathway of violent internal discord, political turmoil, and institutional collapse, it may emerge as a greater challenge to India than the one that it currently poses. A nuclear armed neighbor and adversary facing institutional collapse can pose security challenges on an unimaginable scale because of question related to the safety and security of its nuclear arsenal. Even if the dire issues of the safety and security of its nuclear arsenal do not rise, a steady erosion of the Pakistani state may lead to the flight of refugees across a porous ,if highly militarized, international border. Such population could be transfers could be very serious demographic challenges for India and not merely in terms of sheer numbers. Instead, they could well provoke ethno religious tensions (Hindu Vs. Muslim) in extremely fraught border states that have had a history of ethno religious discord and violence. On the other hand, if democratic consolidation with Pakistan proves viable, the country may at long last be able to shed the embrace of periodic military rule. In turn, the emergence of a consolidated democratic regime may lead to the beginnings of a political rapprochement with India, there by steadily easing the long-standing hostility and competition that has characterized the relationship.²

India is risk-averse was amply demonstrated by India's refusal to take actions against Pakistan after the 13 December 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament by terror groups operating from Pakistani territory. India responded to this event with the largest military mobilization in its history. However, being risk-averse owing to uncertainty about its operational successes, as well as the presence of nuclear weapons, India did not launch military actions against Pakistan. Additionally in the wake of the most audacious terror attacks in Indian history in Mumbai during

26-29 November 2008 by terror groups operating from Pakistani territory, India responded with immense restraint by giving diplomacy a chance.³ After the 1998 nuclear test, it was initially felt that a deterrence equation might have evolved between the two countries, forcing them to abstain from full-fledged conventional wars. India – Pakistan deterrence is premised on ‘existential deterrence’ by which both countries are assumed to be mutually deterred by their nuclear arsenals, though neither side has declared the strength of their arsenals, thus placing their adversaries in constant doubt about their strength.

US President Obama in his very first articulation of his world view, he argued: “I will join our allies in insisting, not simply requesting, that Pakistan crack down on the Taliban, pursue Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants, and end its relationship with all terrorist groups. At the same time, I will encourage dialogue between India and Pakistan to work towards resolving their dispute over Kashmir and between.”⁴ Obama appears to be offering U.S. diplomatic activism on Kashmir in return for Islamabad’s cooperation in fighting al Qaeda and Taliban. His argument was simple: the comprehensive normalization of Indo-Pak relations will stabilize and accelerate India’s own rise as a great power.

Kashmir Issues:

Kashmir has been a bone of contention for India and Pakistan since the partition of the sub-continent in 1947. Despite the stalemate having proven costly, the two countries have failed to cooperate. Managing Kashmir militarily has been a huge burden on the economy of both countries and is also one of the biggest hurdles in their economic and social development. The Kashmir conflict is not a simple inter-state territorial dispute, which involves two clearly defined parties with two choices. Along with India and Pakistan, it involves intra-state and international

actors whose role is also very important in the final outcome. The United States, China, freedom fighters, Kashmiri governments in the two parts of Kashmir, and the people of the state are the other stakeholders.⁵

Pakistan, once a part of India, is now its important neighbor but their relation has been always revolved around Kashmir. In the post cold war era the situation has become more intense. The Kashmir Dispute is the center of gravity for Pakistan's Cold War with India which brought India and Pakistan very close to a third war in 1990. Many consider Kashmir the most probable nuclear flashpoint in the world today. It is worth giving a brief historical background of the dispute to understand its intractability and why an accidental nuclear exchange could erupt from it. Its origins can be traced to 1947, when subcontinent was partitioned upon the British colonial withdrawal and two independent states, India and Pakistan were created. The British succeeded in settling most territorial disputes except Kashmir. Since then, Indo-Pakistani relations have remained hostage to this problem. Immediately after independence, a war broke out between India and Pakistan over Kashmir as both wanted to take control of the territory. The war ended through a UN- mediated cease-fire agreement, but Kashmir became divided with two-thirds under Indian control and the rest under Pakistani control.⁶

India and Pakistan fought a third war in 1971. In that conflict, Pakistan lost its eastern wing, which emerged as independent Bangladesh. Following the war, the two countries signed the Simla Accord in 1972 which placed India in an advantageous position in regards to the Kashmir issue. Under the terms of the treaty, both parties agreed to settle all outstanding disputes 'peacefully through negotiations'. This, according to New Delhi, provided a new formula to settle the Kashmir dispute which fundamentally replaced the UN resolution. The Accord, in New Delhi's interpretation, ruled out extra-regional involvement in the resolution of the Kashmir

dispute. Since 1972, New Delhi has used the Kashmir Accord as the main reference point to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Since 1947, New Delhi has consistently maintained that Kashmir is an Integral Part of the Indian Union. The inclusion of Kashmir within India was legitimized by the treaty of accession signed by the ruler of Kashmir Maharaja Hari Singh and New Delhi on 26 October 1947.⁷

In the India – Pakistan context, Islamists argue that Kashmir is a symbol, not the root cause of India- Pakistani conflict. They Point to General Parvez Musharraf’s statement made as the chief of army staff in April 1999: “Even a settlement of the Kashmir issue will not usher in peace in the region. Low intensity conflict against India will continue because India is a large hegemonic power.” This reinforces the view that the India-Pakistan conflict is rooted in history, religion, culture and politics of revenge. There cannot be peace in the region as long as anti state actors subscribe to the Islamic caliphate and Pakistan to the two-nation theory and political power in Pakistan is exercised by the army, the mullahs and the feudal lords in the name of jihad, Islam, and Kashmir. In his book ‘The Shade of Swords’ a noted author and commentator, M.J. Akbar, concedes that Pakistan’s anger against India is larger than the problem over Kashmir.⁸ From Lahor Agreement in 1999 until the restoration of civilian rule in Pakistan in February 2008 and Mumbai attacks in November 2008, much water has flown down the Indus. There is a perception within as well as outside Pakistan that Lahor Agreement marked the beginning of a process that led to a perceptible shift in Islamabad’s approach towards Kashmir. Pakistan official policy towards Kashmir has been centered on the 47th resolution of the UN Security Council. Pakistan derives its stance from its own perception of history like (a) Kashmir is the core issue, (b) the Muslim majority princely state of J&K should have naturally formed part of Pakistan, (c) India has occupied this territory by force and fraud against the wishes of its people,(e) The Un

resolutions recognize the Kashmiri people's right to self determination and etc. however there are other important elements that are left unsaid or under-emphasized, which indicate the limits of the Kashmir policy like (a) the territory to be negotiated may not include Northern Areas (Gigit, Baltistan, Huzan and Nagar), which were part of the princely state of J&K at the time of partition. (b) The term 'Kashmiri' is also not clearly defined as to whether it includes the populations from the whole of the J&K state, as it was obtained during the rule of Hari Singh, or denote only the people of Kashmiri valley, (c) the Kashmir's will exercise their 'right to self determination' only to determine Kashmir's accession to either India or Pakistan. They do not have the right to independence and etc.⁹

The Pakistan had also counted once again on internationalizing the Kashmir issue through their intervention in Kargil. Unfortunately for them, their plan backfired. The international community reacted adversely to their Trans LOC adventurism and called for an immediate pullback of their forces. During their G-8 summit at Cologne in June 1999, the world leaders stopped just short of calling Pakistan an aggressor and reiterated that India and Pakistan should respect the LOC and must resolve their problems bilaterally through dialogue. The G-8 statement amounted to strong indictment of Pakistan's transgression of the LOC. What came as an even greater shock to Pakistan was that China, a long-time ally, chose to adopt a strictly neutral position on the Kargil intrusions and steadfastly refused to back Pakistan despite personal visits to Beijing by the Pakistani prime minister, foreign minister and chief of army staff. Once the major world powers expressed their support for India, by tacit implication even if not in a forthright manner, India has categorically stated that there can be no political negotiations with Pakistan till the intrusions in Kargil district are completely eliminated. The world is gradually coming around to accepting this justifiable Indian view.¹⁰

Kargil crisis put the international community on a sharp alert, particularly due to the prospects of nuclear conflagration. Fearing that the situation could spin out of control, western governments, the UN, Japan and Russia urged caution and appealed to the two sides to pull back. International concern focused on protecting the fledgling confidence building measures, which were set up in Lahore Summit.¹¹

In an unending conflict, players cannot be sure when the last interaction between them will take place. In such a situation, cooperation is quite probable. Kashmir also appears to be an unending conflict. For over 60 years, both India and Pakistan have mostly adopted the defection strategy, playing the PD game as a chess game. However, the realization has recently dawned upon the leadership of India and Pakistan that if they continue fighting over Kashmir in the same manner, it will lead them nowhere. It appears from the developments in the last decade or so that the leadership in both countries has realized that total victory is not possible, even in a distant future and they cannot run away from the dispute either.¹²

Kashmir is obviously a potential tar pit for U.S. diplomacy, Obama mused about a fundamental change in the regional dynamic. He said “working with India and Pakistan to try to resolve the Kashmir crisis in a serious way” is one of the “critical tasks” for his administration. Obama lays out the kind of reasoning the special envoy could use in New Delhi and Islamabad. According to the new US president, the envoy needs to ask the Indians why do they “want to keep on messing with Kashmir” when they are on the brink of becoming an economic superpower? To the Pakistanis, the envoy could say, “look at India and what they are doing, why do you want to be bogged down with Kashmir.” An Indian hesitation regarding Obama’s appointing a special envoy on South Asia and Kashmir, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukharjee in New Delhi was compelled to reject any mediatory effort by the United States. According to one analyst,

Lisa Curtis, “more effective approach would recognize that Pakistan’s focus on Kashmir is a symptom of border issues, including the impact of India’s emergence as a global power and the Pakistan Army’s continued domination over the country’s national security policies.”¹³

The Indus water treaty and dispute:

In the 19th century, the British constructed most of what is today the world’s largest contiguous irrigation system in the Indus Basin. However, the boundaries between the two states drawn in 1947 paid no attention to hydrology. Seeing that India and Pakistan were unable to resolve this issue, the World Bank offered its help. After 10 years of intense negotiation, in 1960 the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) was signed by then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistani President Ayub Khan and the World Bank.¹⁴ The treaty consists of a Preamble, 12 articles and 8 annexures of a technical nature. There are four essential elements to the treaty. The first relates to the division of the waters. The waters of the three major western rivers (the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab) were allocated to Pakistan, and the waters of the three eastern rivers (the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej) were allocated to India. The second main feature of the treaty is that two countries would regularly exchange data, regarding the water flow withdrawal. Other main feature was financing plan for the Indus Basin Development for irrigation and other related works.¹⁵ The fourth element of the treaty is the dispute resolution mechanism, which sets up rules whereby first recourse is for the Indian and Pakistani IWT commissioners to resolve potential problems. If this fails then there are provisions for external arbitration, either through a neutral expert appointed by the World Bank, or through an International court of arbitration.¹⁶ The first conflict regarding IWT emerged in 1970, when India proposed to construct a Salal Dam over river Chenab, Pakistan protested project of Salal Dam. It objected to the design and storage capacity of the Dam. The Indian side showed flexibility in reaching an understanding and decided

to alter the design of Dam. Finally an agreement was made and the acceptance of each other's problem could also be seen in this agreement. It shows a high level of understanding from both sides.

The Baglihar Case:

The different views of Islamabad and New Delhi first came to head after the India started constructing the 450 megawatt (MW) Baglihar project in 1999 on the Chenab River. Pakistan believes that Indian design violated the IWT because the dam included gated spillways which mean that the manipulable storage was larger than that allowed under the IWT. Indian view was that if they were unable to operate the reservoir more flexibly, it would rapidly fill with silt. As happened earlier in the Salal Project. The Indian and Pakistani IWT commissioners were unable to resolve the difference with Pakistan asking the World Bank to appoint a Natural Expert (NE) in 2005. Turn towards the finding of the NE on the Baglihar differences. The NE gave precise answer in 2007 to the specific question put to him, based on the existing treaty provisions. He accepted the design flood proposed by India, considered gated spillways necessary in the circumstances of the case, upheld the placement of the gates, slightly raised the placement of the water intake, made a small reduction in the capacity of the poundage, correspondingly raised the dead storage level, and slightly reduced the freeboard. The one new element that the NE introduced was his stress on the need for periodical flushing of the reservoir for desalting purposes.¹⁷

In August-October 2008, a huge controversy erupted over the initial filling of the completed Baglihar reservoir. Major deviations from the treaty provisions were alleged, the general impression was created that India had stopped the flows of the Chenab and caused serious harm

to Pakistan, and mala fides on the part of India were implied if not explicitly attributed. There was genuine bewilderment and dismay in India early in 2009 when the water issue was projected by Pakistan as a major one between the two countries, and given the same salience as Kashmir. In the Past, official Pakistani criticisms about particular Indian projects such as Baglihar had found echoes in the media and even in civil society, but no one attributed water shortage in Pakistan to Indian wrongdoing, and no one side “India is stealing Pakistan’s water.” This is a new very recent phenomenon, and it has rapidly spread and now forms the general climate of opinion in Pakistan, undoing years of patient work in both countries to promote goodwill and understanding.¹⁸ This is now a closed issue. At a recent meeting of the Indus Commission, Pakistan is reported to have said that it would not pursue the Baglihar filling issue any further, and India is reported to have said that it would evolve a proper consultation procedure to obviate such controversies in the future.

Pakistani worries about a present or impending water scarcity and the readiness to believe that India has something to do with it, and its apprehensions about the cumulative impact of planned Indian projects on the western rivers, may be well founded or baseless, but they have the potential of causing serious strains in the relationship between the two countries at every level. India needs to dispel misperceptions, if any, reassure Pakistan that it has no intention of harming that country, and if necessary, undertake some joint studies. Those efforts have to be made at both official and non official levels.

The Siachen Glacier dispute:

Siachen Glacier, the highest battle field in the world, is one of the most unfriendly and glaciated regions of aggression. Originating in the Karakoram Ranges, the glacier is 76 kilometers long

and varies in width between 2 to 8 kilometers. Hostile weather conditions bear serious consequences for the troops in the area, as only 3 percent of the Indian casualties have been caused by enemy dismissal. The rest 97 percent succumb to altitude, weather, and terrain. Fortunately, guns have been silenced in the area since the ceasefire was affected in 2004. India and Pakistan were close to an agreement in 1989 but eventually failed to sign it, largely due to India's domestic political compulsions. Elections were round the corner and Rajiv Gandhi's Congress regime was opposed to troop withdrawal in an election year. Since then adverse slides in Indo-Pak relations, primarily due to militancy in J&K, has lowered trust levels between the two parties negating any compromise solution in the dispute. Proposals on prospective solutions have ranged from demilitarization, joint monitoring, to turning it into a peace park. The basic dispute at present hinges on India insisting on authentication of the current troops positions before any withdrawal is undertaken and Pakistan refusing the proposal fearing that it may amount to a formal acknowledgement of India's occupation of the current positions. In recent years, back channel diplomacy has renewed hopes of a compromise. India of late has begun consider a withdrawal, unlike before, subject to assurances that vacated positions would not be preoccupied by Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan has moved away from its claim on an unconditional withdrawal and started to accommodate India's concern without undermining its own official stand on the dispute¹⁹. The talks on Siachen restarted at the Defense Secretary level in August 2004 which proved comprehensive, apart from agreeing to hold further talks on the dispute. The Foreign Secretaries of Indian and Pakistan met on 4 September 2004 in New Delhi again to discuss the eight baskets of issues including Siachen. These review talks were focused more on the progress made so far rather than discussing the technicalities involved in them. The ninth rounds of discussions were held between Defense Secretaries level at periodic intervals in 2005

in which the two sides failed to produce anything substantial on Siachen²⁰. In 2006, Defense Secretary level talks on Siachen were held on 22_23 May in New Delhi again with no substantial progress made besides agreeing to continue with the ceasefire and holding further talks. The issue was again up for discussion during the Foreign Secretary level meetings on 14_15 November 2006 in New Delhi. Again the basic contention over the confirmation of troop positions on the glacier hampered any progress. In a recent significant development, Pakistan proposed a “middle way”. It offered to “acknowledge” the current position of the Indian troops rather than “authenticate” it, which suggested a unspoken acceptance of India’s claim over Siachen²¹. The proposal is insincere with the Indian government which is giving it serious consideration and discussing the technicalities involved in detail.

The Sir Creek dispute:

Sir Creek, an unpredictable tidal channel, is a sixty-mile-long estuary in the swamps of the Rann of Kutch between the Indian state of Gujarat and the Pakistani province of Sind. Originally an extension of the Arabian Sea, The Rann area was closed off and got converted into a salty marsh.²² It forms part of the once disputed Rann of Kutch Area in the Western Sector of India, which was settled through the Indo-Pakistani Western Boundary Case Tribunal’s Award on 19 February 1968. The Tribunal excluded the Creek saying that it was out of the purview of the Tribunal. The present dispute areas on the demarcation of the boundary from “the mouth of Sir Creek to the top of Sir Creek” and from “the top of the Sir Creek eastwards to a point (on land) preferred as the Western end.” The boundary thereafter has been fixed. The determination of the boundary in the Creek area remains under dispute due to differences over whether the creek falls under the ‘Thalweg’ principle, which provides for making the mid-channel as the boundary. India argues it’s a navigable creek which is disputed by Pakistan. Pakistan says that the boundary

lies on the eastern side and therefore the creek is Pakistan's which is disputed by India claiming that the boundary lies in the middle of the creek. Determination of the boundary in the Creek area enlarges the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of either side by 250 sq. miles making it a territorial-cum-resource dispute, and that's why the deadlock. Pakistan also insists that the boundary in the Creek first be delimited in order to establish the point on the land from which a sea boundary can be delimited. India's concerns centre on the delimiting of the maritime boundary first and then moving towards the land. Both sides are keen to settle the dispute which would enable them to undertake oil and gas exploration. Several rounds of talks have been held since 1989 to settle the matter but with little success. In recent years both sides have shown seriousness in settling the matter to escape the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) which would declare the area as international waters should the two sides fail to determine their claims for respective maritime zones by 2009²³. Following the revival of the peace process, the first round of talks were held on 6_7 August 2004 led by Indian Surveyor General Prithvish Nag and Pakistan's Additional Secretary of Defense Admiral Ahsan ul Haq Chaudhary to apprise each other with the ground situation and respective views on how to resolve the dispute²⁴. As a part of the peace process, technical level talks on Sir Creek were held on 22_23 December 2006 in Rawalpindi and the decision was taken to hold a joint survey of the Sir Creek and adjoining areas by the hydro graphers and also simultaneously undertake discussions to determine the maritime zones of both countries. The Joint Survey was complete by mid- March 2007 to verify outermost points of coastlines using the equidistance method. Following the joint survey, talks were held in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on 17_18 May 2007 which proved inconclusive. The difference persisted over whether the boundary lay in the middle or on the eastern bank of the Creek. The two sides agreed to hold further talks to settle their

differences.²⁵ The Sir Creek dispute too, like the Tulbul/Wullar dispute is very much a tractable matter and can be resolved through a compromise. The basic problem is that those at the centre of the dispute on both sides and the decision-makers appear unwilling to make any compromises which are not very cordial and friendly at the moment.

Wullar Barrage Storage/Tulbul Navigation Project:

India and Pakistan deviate even on the name of this dispute. India refers to it as Tulbul Navigation Project whereas Pakistan calls it the Wullar Barrage. The basic dispute is over a barrage that is to be constructed by the government of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir on the Jhelum River just beneath Wullar Lake situated about 25 kilometers north of Srinagar on the river Jhelum at about 5,180 feet above sea level.²⁶ The name Wullar derived from the Sanskrit word “woll” meaning “obstacle”. Pakistan’s contention is that the Wullar Lake site is not suitable for a dam of any size as it would flood Srinagar and the Valley. India argues that it would be used to maintain navigability in the Jhelum River during lean months. India vacated the construction work until a contract was reached through direct talks and discussions. Ten rounds of talks have already been held to resolve the issue but with little progress. The talks restarted at the secretary level between the India Ministry of Water & Power and the Pakistani Ministry of Water Resources on 29_30 July 2004 in which the two sides looked at the issue in light of the provision of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. The talks were cordial but failed to yield any breakthroughs. In 2005, the next round of talks between the two ministries looked into the clash, laying down future courses of action but like the previous round no concrete solution emerged. It is important to highlight that the term ‘Storage Project’ has been added to the arrangement at Pakistan’s perseverance, making the technical name read as ‘Wullar Barrage & Storage Project/Tulbul Navigation Project’. In June 2006 secretary level delegations from both sides looked into

the clash using the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty as the guiding principles for their exercise. There was no progress made and the dispute awaits further talks.²⁷ The dispute is mainly a resource issue, but due to its location in J&K, it becomes a politically sensitive issue for both sides. Technically speaking the dispute is not difficult in nature and it is the connection with the Kashmir issue perhaps which delays any progress on the matter. This dispute can be resolved if it can be de-linked from the larger issue of Kashmir and be taken as purely a resource dispute.

Terrorism Issues:

The origins of state sponsored terrorism in Pakistan could be traced to Soviet Military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan weakened the US presence in the region. In these circumstances Saudi Arabia and Pakistan became US allies in its mission to repel the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The US provided technology and sophisticated weapons, Saudi Arabia provided money and Pakistan became a hub for recruiting and training Mujahedeen groups.²⁸

In December 1999, an Indian Airlines flight was hijacked and taken to Kandahar, Afghanistan, then under Taliban rule. Buckling under domestic pressure, New Delhi agreed to free three Pakistani terrorists in exchange for the passengers and crew aboard the aircraft. One of the three, Mulana Masood Azhar, later founded Jaish-e- Muhammed, the Pakistani based terrorist outfit which claimed responsibility for the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. Another Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, was later arrested for the slaying of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. The third, Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, runs military training camps in Kashmir. In July 2000, a summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf ended with the latter walking away in a huff. In December 2001, Pakistani terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament. India responded by

mobilizing for war, but stood down in June 2002 after intense international pressure. In 2003, the two sides agreed to ceasefire along the LOC. The July, 2006 Mumbai train bombings killed 207 people and injured over 700. That bombings also like bear a connection to the intractable Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan: though a group calling itself Lashkar-e-Qahhar claimed responsibility in an email to a local television station.²⁹ In November, 2008 Pakistani terrorist struck India's financial capital, Mumbai, Killing 166 people in multiple locations. Investigations into Mumbai's 26/11 attack made startling revelations about the militant training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK). The Mumbai perpetrators started from Baitul-Mujahideen in Muzaffrabad, the capital of so-called 'Azad Kashmir', and headed for Mumbai via Karachi. They underwent specialized training in POK for an extended period before the attack. Over the years, POK has become a safe haven not only for terrorist operating in Kashmir but also for those linked with international terror outfits like Al Qaeda. At least 55 training camps are said to be located in the region and their cadre numbers close to 5000. Muzaffarabad and Kotli are known epicenters of such camps. There are reports that these terrorist camps recruit women cadres to deceive the Indian security forces as they pass off as locals. They tactic was adopted after the Indian forces foiled a number of infiltration attempts by these groups. The women cadres undergo tough training in the handling of arms and guerrilla warfare in the POK region.³⁰

The proliferation of militant camps in POK could also be attributed to the absence of socio – economic development. These clandestine activities thrive on the small economic incentives which terrorist groups provide to lure the people. An appalling fact that emerged during the interrogation of Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving terrorist of the Mumbai carnage, is that his family, which is very poor, was given Rs. 1 lakh in exchange for his inclusion in the

group. Militants in training camps are paid as Rs. 1000 per month along with food and clothing. Problems in POK are multi-dimensional; there is poverty, unemployment, and an acute sense of alienation amongst the people. Most significantly, there is a lack of political will in Pakistan for the betterment of POK because there has been a titular political structure which is totally ineffective.

In India the mood was ugly. Well connected Indian former officials who informally advise the government made clear that they supported the government's decision not to take military action after Mumbai, but that "another Mumbai" might tilt the decision in the other direction. Indian across the board is convinced that ISI backed the Mumbai attacks, and that the distinction between current and former ISI officers is meaningless. The former GOP reply, which did acknowledge that Pakistani soil was used, came as pleasant surprise, and reduced the calls for vigorous counter action.

Indian calling for a more muscular reaction to the attacks on Mumbai lack good military options. Former military and intelligence officers grumble that India needs better capabilities and options. The nature of these options remains imprecise. One retired senior official spoke of a strategy of "keeping Pakistan guessing" in which India would move troops but not tanks along the India-Pakistan border, rev up intelligence operations in Balochistan, fly military aircraft close to (but not over) the border in short, keep Pakistan off balance without impelling it to respond militarily. The assumption behind this thinking is that India knows exactly how far it can push Pakistan.³¹

Drug Trafficking:

Pakistan has become a part of the Golden Triangle notorious for poppy cultivation and illegal traffic in drugs along with Iran and Afghanistan. Although the Zia ul- Haq regime declared the

use of opium illegal in Pakistan in 1979 but drug related farming still continue there in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The ISI (Inter Service Intelligence) actively indulged in drug smuggling for laundering money to meet the expenditure on war fronts in Afghanistan and India. The Indo-Pak border became vulnerable to transactions in arms and drugs. The drug barons in Pakistan rooted these items through the states of Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat. With the fencing of the border in Rajasthan and Punjab the ISI had to shift the bases of its operations. By now it has been able to establish bases in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal through narcotic funds. The drug dealers have opened many other different through Central Asian Republics (CARs) and become a global network.³² Hence apart from the states on Indo-Pak border such as J&K, Punjab and Rajasthan, India's north eastern states including Assam, Manipur, and Nagaland have become vulnerable.³³

Missile Programs of India-Pakistan:

Over the Past decade India has pursued an active missile programme with the help of the United States, Israel and Russia. It also develops the system indigenously. India's decision to acquire missile defenses was based on its viewpoint on nuclear weapons and deterrence. It already has an advanced and well- developed ballistic missile programme, as well as nuclear warheads to arm the missile. At present India has missile capability which can target not only all of Pakistan's territory, but also able to target all of Chinese territory and beyond. On the other side Pakistan too has a well developed missile programme based on its viewpoint on security threat comes from India. The prime objective of Pakistan's Ballistic missile force is to provide a reliable delivery system for its nuclear warheads in order to India's conventional or WMD (weapons of Mass destruction) attack. Pakistan's ballistic missile play an important role in its deterrence strategy, though its ability to produce its own missile system is extremely limited both for the

technological and economic reasons. At present the ratio of India's superiority over Pakistan is probably 2 to 1 in nuclear warheads and 3 to 1 in ballistic missile.³⁴

India: Ballistic missile capabilities:

India has developed a ballistic missile production capability. India's missile programme has benefited from both direct and indirect assistance from nations like France, Germany, Russia, the United States and Israel. India has placed high priority on creating an independent military missile programme which will ultimately make it self sufficient in the design and production of a full range of missiles, from anti tank and surface to air missile, and perhaps even through intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). It has developed a short and medium range capability, which includes Prithvi and Agni series. India has developed SRBMs and IRBMs not only to deter a potential nuclear strike from Pakistan but also to counterbalance the nuclear threat from China. The following is a summary of India's current ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programmes and provides an assessment of the missile that nation could be developing.³⁵

Prithvi Series: Prithvi is the nuclear capable surface to surface missile is built by Bharat Dynamic Ltd.(BDL),the single stage liquid fuel missile. In India has Prithvi I It can carry a 1000 kg payload up to 150 Km., Prithvi II a 250 Km version it can carry 500 kg payload. Both the version currently in services with the Indian armed forces. According to the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), four different types of warhead have been developed for Prithvi. India has reportedly also planned the development of the Prithvi III, a 350 Km. boosted liquid fuel system. **Agni Series:** In 1994, the United States persuaded India to suspend testing of the 2500 Km Agani missile after three test flights. The missile used an Indian SLV 3 booster for its first stage and solid fuel for its second stage. India claims that this missile will be

used only to carry a conventional warhead; the cost of warhead cannot be justified unless used as a nuclear delivery vehicle. In April 1999 India tested Agani II , an intermediate range nuclear capable ballistic missile. The missile is based on powered by entirely by solid fuel and have a mobile launch capability. It also equipped with a Global Positioning System (GPS). The 20 meter long missile can carries a 1000 kg payload 2000 Km. Agni II was design to carry a nuclear warhead if required. Further India is moving ahead with aimed at improving range and efficacy if it. India last tested the Agni III's 3500 Km range in 2007, which effectively brought distant Chinese cities and infrastructure within range for the first time, alternating the balance of power in the region. The Agni IV, missile is at the design stage and work is in progress with a 6000 Km rang, would effectively bring China's capital Beijing and also European continent into rang of Indian missile. **Surya:** India could be developing a 5000 Km range Surya (meaning Sun in Sanskrit and many other Indian Language) ballistic missile capable of striking targets in the continental United States. The Surya is an unconfirmed programme that has been mentioned in the Indian press. It was started in 1994 and the missile is modeled on Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle(PSLV). India has continued to produce and all test all five of the missile being developed under its Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP). **Dhanush:** A naval version of the Prithvi, 8.5 meter Long Dhanus was tested in 2000 from a ship anchored 20 Km offshore in Bay of Bengal. **Sagarika:** The New York Times reported in April 1998 that Russia was helping India build a nuclear capable sea launched missile called Sagarika (Oceanic). Both India and Russia denied cooperating on the project, but India reportedly confirmed latter that its Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) was developing a 300 Km cruise missile. It is possible that Sagarika will be deployed on the Advance Technology Vessel (ATV), India's nuclear power submarine, which is under development with Russian assistant.³⁶

India's ballistic missile defense options:

At present, India's ballistic missile defense plans have revolved around the evaluation of three distinct systems: the Israeli Arrow, The Russian Ante 2500/ S-300VM and the Russian Almaz S 300, PMU 1/ 2 Moreover, India has made tentative requests for information on the American Patriot PAC 3. The American Patriot system has been initially designed as an anti-aircraft system. As discussed earlier, India has adopted two ways for the acquisition of missile defense system, first acquiring from abroad and second to develop the system indigenously. In this effort the developments are as following:

Trishul: Trishul is a short range, quick reaction, all weather surface to air missile designed to counter a low level attack. In fact Trishul was one of the long running DRDO missile developments programme. It can also be used as an anti sea skimmer from a ship against low flying attacking missile. The missile can engage targets like aircraft and helicopters, flying between 300-500 m/s by using its radar commando line of sight guidance. Powered by a two stag solid propellant system similar to the ones used in the Patriot. Trishul with its advance technology providing considerable advantage to the Indian armed forces. **Akash:** The Akash system is a medium range surface to air missile with multi target engagement capability. It can carry 55 kg multiple warhead capable of targeting five aircraft simultaneously up to 25 km and is said to be comparable to the US Patriot as an air defense missile.³⁷ **Nag:** Another missile under IGMDP is the Nag, an anti - armor weapon employing sencer fusion technologies for flight guidance. The Nag is third generation 'fire and forget' anti tank missile in India with a range of 4-8 km. Nag uses imaging infra red (IIR) with day and night capability. Nag was successfully test fired in 2008 marking the completion of the development test.

It would be apposite to conclude by stating that India's missile programme represent an iconic image demonstrating sovereignty and self reliance vis-à-vis its technological achievements. Result of nearly three decades of research, India's guided missile programme has assumed a self sustaining character and become fundamentally crucial to its proposed deterrent.³⁸

India's Cruise Missile:

India is expected to significantly enhance its long range strike abilities with the **BrahMos** supersonic cruise missile, jointly developed by New Delhi and Moscow. It derives its name from the Brahmaputra and Moscow rivers in both countries- has a range of almost 300 km with warheads up to 200 kg in weight and designed for use with land, sea and air platforms. The missile can fly at 2.8 times the speed of sound and it is highly accurate and can be guided to its target mainly with the help of an onboard computer. Both army and navy are inducting the BrahMos missile. While army had ordered two BrahMos regiments with 134 missile and navy had ordered 49 BrahMos firing units and ordered 240 missiles.³⁹ Yet another cruise missile, the **Nirbhay** was announced in 2007- a subsonic missile with a range of 1000 km. capable of being launched from multiple platforms on land, sea, and air. Nirbhay will be a terrain hugging, stealth missile capable of delivering 24 different types of warhead depending on mission requirements and will use internal navigation system for guidance. In fact, Nirbhay will supplement BrahMos in the sense that it would enable delivery of warheads farther than 300 km range of BrahMos.

Delhi has also taken steps towards achieving submarine launched ballistic missile capability, with the first test of K-15(Sagarika) taking place in 2008 from a submerged barge with a range of 750 km., the Sagarika missile is being integrated with India's nuclear powered **Arihant** class submarine that began sea trials in 2009. According to an Indian official "Every modern military

needs to have missile options. The requirements for Nirbhay were projected by all three armed forces to fill a gap in Indian missile programme. He said would weigh around 1000 kg and travel 0.7 mach (nearly 840 km/h) and would be capable to 24 different types of warheads.”⁴⁰

Pakistan’s ballistic missile programme:

Pakistan’s missile development programme is like its nuclear programme has been driven entirely by its security concern vis-à-vis an increasingly militaristic and bellicose India, which seeks, without any pretence, a regional and global power status. Pakistan has been a reluctant entrant into the missile club and reiterated on a number of occasions that it has no intention of matching India for missile and has deliberately eschewed a nuclear / missile arms race with India by embracing a policy based on “Minimum Nuclear Deterrence”. Pakistan has a well developed ballistic missile programme. However, unlike India, who’s developments of missile based power projection capabilities reflects both regional and extra regional security concern, Pakistan ballistic missile effort is largely Indo-centric. Pakistan embarked on indigenous ballistic missile effort with the launch of the Hatf programme in early 1980s. The Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) undertook then programme. The existence of the missile was publically disclosed by Pakistan’s then army staff General Mirza Aslam Beg in 1989.

Hatf-1, 1A, & Hatf-2 missiles:

The **Hatf-1** is a single stage solid motor missile capable of delivering a 500 kg payload over a maximum range of 60-80 km. A subsequent version, **Hatf-1A**, was tested in 2000 and is believed to have an extended range of 100 km., the **Hatf-2 (Abdali)**, is a two stage solid motor missile that reportedly has a throw weight of 500 kg over a maximum range of 290-300 km. All version of the Hatf, 1, 1A, and 2, are capable of delivering conventional high explosive warheads. Some

analysts speculate that the Hatf, 1, 1A and 2 use an internal guidance system. But the US government sources contend that the missiles are essentially inaccurate battlefield rockets.⁴¹

Hatf-III(Ghaznavi) is a short range , solid propellant, road mobile, single warhead ballistic missile. The Pakistan Army conducted a launch of the Ghaznavi in 2003 and again tested in 2006 to validate the missile's various designs parameters. Subsequently in 2004, the then president Pervez Musharraf formally inducted the missile in to the Army's Strategic Forces Command.

Hatf-IV(Shaheen-I) is a single stage, solid propellant, road mobile, short range ballistic missile. It can deliver a 500 kg warhead over a range of 600 km. Other reports suggest that with a smaller warhead, the missile could have a range of 800 km. Pakistani government's statements suggest that the missile in Pakistan's Possession have a maximum range of 700-800 km., but the missile's payload capacity at that range remains unclear. Since then, then the missile has been in possession of the Army's Strategic Forces Command (ASFC) even as the routine test of missiles has been conducted. **Hatf-VI(Shaheen II)** is a two stage solid fuel missile with a range of 2000 km. Development flight test of the missile began in march 2004 when a 26 ton missile was launched from Pakistan's Sonmiani Flight Test Range on the Arabian sea. According to the Chairman of Pakistan's National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM), Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, the missile covered a distance of 1800km during the test. The missile was tested in 2005, 2006, 2007 and in 2008, Pakistan tested the Shaheen II twice in three days.⁴²

Ghauri-I & Ghauri-II, III : Pakistan's liquid engine ballistic is spearheaded by the Khan Research Laboratory(KRL) and built on collaboration with North Korea. Ultimately, Pakistan flight tested a North Korean missile Nodong, which was re named Ghauri in 1998. Pakistan has come a long way in its missile development efforts and has acquired the capability to produce short and medium range ballistic missile of both liquid and solid fuelled varieties. The test firing of the

liquid fuelled Ghauri, with the range of 1500 km contributed significantly to enhancing Pakistan's deterrence and providing it with a capability to match India's Agni missile which has tested several year earlier. In response to the India's Agani II it was designated as Ghauri-II with a range of 2500km. Pakistan is also developing Ghauri III version in response to the Indian Agani III, which will have a range of 3000km.⁴³ However, as a result of a conscious decision and acting in a responsible and restrained manner, Pakistan has broken out of the action reaction syndrome, which earlier characterized the relations between the two South Asian neighbors.

Pakistan's Cruise missile:

Babur: named after the first Mugal Emperor Zaheerud Din Babur also designated as **Hatf VII**, is the first land attack cruise missile to be developed by Pakistan. Launched from ground based transporter erector launchers, warships, submarines and aircraft, Babur can be armed with a conventional or nuclear warhead and has and has a reported range of 700km. the missile is designed to avoid radar detection and penetrate enemy air defenses. Serial production of the babur started in October 2005. It has been reported that babur is based on the American BGM 109 Tomahawk cruise missile. The Babur's airframe is made up of a tubular fuselage, with a pair of folded wings attached to the middle section and it has maximum speed of about 550mph. More advance version of the Babur is under development. Latter version are planned to have a range of 1000km and capable to being launched from submarines.⁴⁴ Two year after the first testing Babur , Pakistan test fired a new air launched cruise missile, the **Ra,ad(Arabic for Thunder)**, on July 2007, from a Mirag III EA aircraft of the Pakistani Air Force(PAF). This nuclear capable missile reportedly has a 350 km range along with stealth capabilities. Although the first test of the Ra,ad took place from Mirage aircraft, one analyst opined it was probable that Ra,ad would be deployed on the F-16 and F-16C fighters.⁴⁵

Nuclear issues:

While many strategic analysts in India adopted a hopeful view that the addition of offsetting nuclear weapon capabilities might stabilize relations with Pakistan. The term nuclear strategy is used here in the broad sense of exploiting nuclear weapons for both political and military purposes. It includes component strategies for deterrence, crisis bargaining, and employment. In addition, in the case of India and Pakistan, both of which are not genuinely autonomous actors in the nuclear field, there is an important component of strategy that is aimed at influencing global opinion. The nuclear strategies of both countries emphasize the deterrence, but there is a fundamental difference between the two in that Pakistan's strategy is aimed at deterring a conventional threat from India, while India's aimed at deterring a nuclear one from Pakistan. Since a conventional confrontation is easier to develop and must almost invariably precede a nuclear one, Pakistan's deterrence has to function much more actively than India's. The India-Pakistan nuclear balance has argued India has been ahead of Pakistan for several decades. This may or may not be correct today. Because three possibilities exist for the Indo-Pak nuclear balance. India and Pakistan may be approximately equal. India may be ahead by as much as 60 to 100. Alternatively, Pakistan may be ahead by as much as 100 to 60. Important conclusions can be drawn from this assessment. If India is ahead of Pakistan or Pakistan is ahead of India in quantitative terms, the differences are relatively small. They are insignificant in terms of military power or deterrence impact. This has an impact on the force structure, the force posture, and the relationship between conventional and nuclear strategies.⁴⁶

India exploded its first nuclear device, code-named 'Buddha Smile' on 18 May 1974 at Pokhran. New Delhi claimed it was a 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) with no military implications. But Pakistan and Western countries disputed India's claim. The latter imposed punitive sanctions

on India in reaction to this explosion. Islamabad, meanwhile, considered the 'Buddha Smile' as a threat to its very survival and an instrument of 'blackmail'. The Pakistani prime minister Bhutto described India's explosion as part of an Indian effort to intimidate Pakistan and solemnly pledged that 'It (Pakistan) would not accept under any circumstances India's hegemony over the subcontinent'. New Delhi was well aware of the type of political fallout that its nuclear test would generate. Shortly afterward, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wrote a letter to her Pakistani counterpart and assured him that the explosion had no military, political, or foreign policy implications.⁴⁷

The stability and instability of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan also has been a major issue of concern since 1980s. Proponents of nuclear deterrence in South Asia who argue that the introduction of the nuclear weapons has prevented the outbreak of a large-scale conflict between India and Pakistan, generally belong to the "State-as-a-rational-actor" school of thought. Other worry about the new threat against the stability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia posed by the intrusion of non state actors, or perhaps, more accurately "anti state actors." Non state or anti state actors have brought nuclear- armed Pakistan and India to the Brink of war, which could have escalated to the nuclear level, twice since 11 September 2001. Despite recent efforts at de-escalation, the danger of war remains high because Islamist militants in Kashmir and elsewhere have the potential and reasons to re-ignite tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad by doing something so outrageous and provocative that India would feel compelled to retaliate.⁴⁸

India and Pakistan's past behavior shows that there is little or no danger of either side firing a nuclear weapon in anger or because of miscalculation. In all three wars, both sides avoided wars of attrition or deliberate targeting of population and industrial centers. The leaders from both capitals insist that nuclear weapons are only for deterrence and are not weapons of war. It is

conceivable that Pakistan could use nuclear weapons if faced total defeat by India. Indians argue, however, that they have no interest in destroying the Pakistan state and incorporating another 140 million Muslims into the Indian state. If New Delhi goes for war with Islamabad, the war will be over Kashmir, not the existent of Pakistan. Policymakers in New Delhi and Islamabad have sound understanding of each other's capabilities, intentions, policies and more important red lines which they are careful not to cross. New Delhi and Islamabad believe that nuclear deterrence is working to prevent the war in the region. They point to fact that neither 1999 Kargil conflict nor the post September 11 military standoff escalated beyond a limited conventional engagement due to the threat of nuclear war. So the stability argument based on the reasonable conclusion that nuclear weapons have served an important purpose in the sense that India and Pakistan have not gone to an all out war since 1971. Just as nuclear deterrence maintained stability between United States and USSR during cold war, so it can induce similar stabilizing effects in South Asia.⁴⁹

The preceding analysis of the perspective of anti state actors shows that deterrence in South Asia may not work in the context of asymmetric and unrestricted warfare based on surprise, shock, and deception and waged by those who have little or nothing to lose, particularly when suicide is used as a weapon. The instability argument points to the following reason:⁵⁰

The history of four wars; the intensity, duration, and complexity of the animosity; and growing domestic pressure in each country for action against the other make nuclear deterrence unstable. The war on terrorism has encouraged brinkmanship on both sides with both India and Pakistan seeing the US presence in the region as a safety net. The next nuclear confrontation could be even more dangerous if the two sides follow the cold war era, US Soviet standoff model with nuclear missiles on alert, aimed at each other, and ready to launch on warning. As Lee Butler

former head of the US Strategic Command, has said, it was “no thanks to deterrence, but only by the grace of God” that the US and Soviet Union survived there crises. India and Pakistan may not be lucky the next time.

Whereas the cold war was ideological, the India – Pakistan conflict is historical and religious. More than disputed borders, India – Pakistan share disputed histories. The US and Soviet Union never engaged in direct military conflict with each other. Nor did they have a history of military conflict or animosity prior to the 1940s. Nonetheless they still came close to war more than once.

The sharing of a border and their territorial disputes are rooted in a deep religious divide, going back one thousand years – such as the desire to reestablish Islamic or Hindu supremacy over the entire subcontinent. Indians and Pakistanis have bitter memories of highly emotional issues too long to list: invasions, partition, three wars, religious and border disputes, volatile political cultures, inflammatory media and two decades of low intensity conflict. None of these factors existed as potential fuses to light the nuclear powder keg during the US – Soviet nuclear standoff.

Neither Pakistan nor India Possesses accurate intelligence or warning systems, nor do they have the ability to assure a second strike. The fear of a decisive first strike “use it or lose it” option with short distances, poor warning systems, and small stockpiles amidst the talk of “nuclear jihad” make deterrence very unstable. As a result, the possibility of a nuclear conflict in South Asia, by design or accident, cannot be ruled out entirely because of their (1) weak, untested command and control system,(2) relative inexperience in managing nuclear weapons, and (3) lack of knowledge about each other’s military processes make it possible to cross a “line in the sand” unintentionally.

In contrast, Pakistan publicly has flexed its nuclear muscles on four occasions in recent history (1987, 1990, 1999 and 2002). India also repeatedly has warned that it would survive a nuclear war, but Pakistan surely would disappear from the world map. (The world has not heard such a threat since the 1950s when Mao Zedong argued that enough Chinese would survive a nuclear confrontation with the United States to usher in a communist revolution.) In short, neither periodic threats of nuclear annihilation nor nuclear blackmail bode well for stable nuclear deterrence.

The freelance factor of terrorism changes the situational context completely in the sense that anti state actors may have vested interest in provoking a war between India and Pakistan. With relatively little radioactive material obtained from low-level waste from a power plant or medical facility, terrorists could easily construct a 'dirty bomb' using simple explosive. Such devices, hidden in a truck or ship borne cargo container headed for Karachi or Bombay, could inflict considerable casualties followed by widespread radiation poisoning.

The China factor further adds to the unpredictability, complexity, and instability of the sub - continental nuclear power balance. China long has been the most important player in the India-Pakistan -China triangular relationship. The Sino-Pakistani military alliance(in particular, the nuclear and missile nexus) is aimed at ensuring that the military balance of power in South Asia is neither pro India nor pro Pakistan but pro china. Most war gaming exercise on the next Indian-Pakistani nuclear war end in Chinese military intervention to prevent the collapse of Beijing's most allied ally in Asia.

Nuclear deterrence works through the minds of not only those who are connected with the two NCAs but also those of the articulate public in two countries. The contest to influence them in strategically favorable ways is just only beginning.

External Environment:

While examining Pakistan's management of its external security environment, the underlying geo-strategic compulsions stand out, more so in the light of Freud's saying of "territory being destiny". Pakistan's geography and location present its security planners with serious, almost insoluble strategic and tactical problems. It borders a powerful India, an ambitious Iran, a three decade old strategic ally China, and Afghanistan, which Pakistan has transformed in less than a decade as a client state that is perceived as a gateway to its commercial-strategic ambitions in Central Asia. Besides their obvious repercussions in Central Asia and Afghanistan, these struggles could have potentially spill-over effects on India and China. In the overall geo-economic and strategic configuration, involving west Asia, central Asia, China and Afghanistan, Pakistan will continue to find its relevance to American and Chinese interests in Southern Asia and would increasingly seek to astutely balance India in strategic terms.⁵¹

China-Pakistan Axis:

In geo-political terms, the decades long convergence of strategic interests between China and Pakistan is inherently India centric with China seeking an added bonus in of a toe –hold in West Asia and possibility of egress into the Arabian Sea through the Trans Himalayan road highway.

Their friendship is often described by Pakistanis and Chinese as "Loftier than the Himalayas and deeper than the Indian Ocean". Peculiarities of geography and history have linked the two in the India-China strategic friction and territorial dispute. China would for decades remain India's

strategic challenge. Pakistan got from China not only a range of nuclear capable missiles—M-11, M-9, and D-F 21/21A, meant specifically to counter India. Beijing willfully fuelled Pakistan's ambitions to be a regional influential, a development which may one day boomerang on it. By way of a delicious irony, china's intensified support for Pakistan's nuclear- delivery missile programme. Thus when china's bilateral relations with India were thawing makes one inference clear Beijing willfully introduced an adversarial impulse in India-China relations by encouraging and endorsing Pakistan's ambitions to be a regional influential. That means adopted were to equip it with ballistic missiles having ranges well beyond those needed to balance India. From among developing countries, Pakistan economic and military value lies as much in its being the foremost importer of China's nuclear and weapons technology as in its serving as an excellent source of hard currency earnings. These linkages are expected to be sustained over the years. Today about 70 percent of Pakistan's military hardware is of Chinese origin. A trend of significant military consequence to India is that the on-going military modernization in China, including induction of forces multipliers, would provide Pakistan a siphon-off technological benefit through access to these systems apart from Su-27s, MBTs, kilo class submarines and other equipment. Armed with these capabilities and nuclear- tipped Chinese-supplied ballistic missiles, Pakistan may well perceive itself as a lynchpin of China's grand design for South Asian security in 21st century⁵².

American Role:

America's role in Pakistan's geopolitical transformation as a regional influential, notwithstanding its extant internal and economic travails, need to be addressed briefly. During the concluding Cold war years, Pakistan was cultivated as a "frontline" state in America's sustained drive to reverse the former Soviet Union influence in Afghanistan. As a quid pro quo,

Pakistan's determined and often clandestine attempts to become a nuclear power were conveniently overlooked. These supportive influences largely facilitated Pakistan in acquiring the necessary capabilities from China. Lamentably, the global non-proliferation regime, so assiduously created by the West over the years, has been powerless against China's repeated successes in flouting the same through missile transfers to Pakistan. The United States leadership has consistently chosen to turn a blind eye to such sales even when these transgressed the Missile Technology Control Regime, Sino-American agreements and solemn Chinese promises.

Despite claims to the contrary from both the United States and China, their implicit strategic congruence on the latter's nuclear missile assistance to Pakistan has been palpable. Yet it is ironic that many influential sections in Pakistan's top leadership, particularly the military elements, do not consider America a trustworthy ally. It would be instructive to recall the mindset of Islamic solidarity that prevailed within the Pakistani leadership just prior to the Gulf War in 1991. The anti-American perception would appear to have gained further momentum after American attacks on the Saudi fugitive and terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan. However at the official level, the country's leadership continues to perpetuate the myth of Pakistan being the only reliable bridge between the US and many areas of strategic interest to Washington. During Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's 1998 meeting with President Clinton at New York, the former has reportedly projected Pakistan as one nation with the ability to defuse the tension between Taliban and Iran. The United States would need to relook at how an unintended consequence of its support to the Taliban could well result in eventual "Talibanisation" of Pakistan itself with dreadful consequences for the region, particularly India. Pakistan should be encouraged to go along with the broad trend in Islamic countries towards moderation and promotion of dialogue between civilizations as part of a cooperative paradigm of

security. This would demand Pakistan having to throttle back on its religious extremism driven support for militancy in the region.⁵³

Central Asia and Afghanistan

Notwithstanding Pakistan's endemic internal turbulence, it seems seriously engaged in re-orienting its foreign policy goals to play a wider role. The preoccupation to exploit the central Asian option is self evident, for the United States, the importance of this area of potential strategic advantage, given the vast natural resources and untapped oil and gas in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, has been extensively documented in the media. Pakistan looks at Central Asian Muslim states as the future arena for its diplomatic and economic initiatives as it can offer these republics the shortest outlet to the sea. Besides, instabilities in the domestic and interstate politics of these countries make it hard for Pakistan to devise a coherent approach. They are also wary of Pakistan's parallel agenda for Islamic resurgence and seem to give the impression of preferring a more moderate line.

Taliban's capture of Mazar-e-Sharif and most of the northern areas and its being in occupation of nearly 85 percent of Afghan territory has doubtless created a new situation. The aggressive Islamic fundamentalist ideology that the Taliban espouses has worrisome implications for Central Asia, India and China. Ever since the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Islamabad has been unwavering in its resolve to establish a Pakistan dominated government in Kabul that obtaining strategic depth against India. For India, there is the added danger that the Islamic mercenary elements who participated in the Taliban's sweep across Afghanistan may now turn their attention towards India, and particularly the state of J&K. This would place an even greater strain on the Indian Army, paramilitary forces and central police elements who are employed in

counter militancy operations. But the regional implications of trans-border Taliban incursions are far more serious and need careful consideration. For India and Pakistan there is a path of peace and cooperation in this 21st century era of compelling change would offer no other alternative.⁵⁴

Confidence-Building Measure (CBMs):

CBMs are state practices that are intended to increase the level of trust and to lower the likelihood of conflict. It is believed that through communication, constraints, transparency and verification, and CBMs, the behavior of state became more predictable. These measures have usually followed crisis events. These agreements are scattered over the 13 year under consideration and have been concluded by governments articulating both the secular and religious culture national identity⁵⁵.

Military CBMs:

India and Pakistan completed the ratification process of Indo-Pak agreements on prohibition of attacks on each other's nuclear installations and facilities in 27 January, 1991. Since then, as stipulated in the agreements, India and Pakistan have exchange list of nuclear installations and facilities every year. This agreement has been undertaken irrespective of the degree of tension prevailing between the two countries. In fact, this stipulation has been met even when diplomatic engagement with Pakistan was severed during the crisis triggered by the events of October and December 2001. However the effectiveness of this agreement remains in doubt since it is not clear whether Islamabad and Delhi have forwarded the complete list of all the nuclear installations in their respective states. This agreement was signed on the basis of the previous talk on advance notice of military exercise and prevention of air space violations. It was decided that India and Pakistan would avoid holding major military manoeuvres in close proximity, and

if held, these exercise would not be directed towards the other side. These agreements were ratified in 1992 when Narashimha Rao was the Prime Minister of India. In, fact several other agreements were arrived at as well. These two countries signed a joint declaration on the complete prohibition chemical weapons, and agreed that Directors General Military Operations (DGMO) of the two countries should speak to each other every week on a hotline.⁵⁶

In 1994 India proposed the following CBMs: extending the agreement on prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations to population center and economic targets; no first use of nuclear weapons are even the threat of it; upgrading links between DGMOs; and setting up of institutional mechanism to implement agreements arrived at. It was the Lahore agreement that the issue of military CBMs was raised again. In fact soon after the test in May 1998, India and Pakistan held foreign secretary level meetings in June and November of the same year. No doubt these were also the result of intense international pressure. Eventually, at Lahore, the MOU signed by the foreign secretaries on 21 February 1999, stipulated that ‘the two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concept and nuclear doctrines.’⁵⁷ It was agreed that two states would provide advance notification of ballistic missile tests, seek to prevent accidents at sea, review implementation of previous CBMs and improve communication links but after these talks the two countries agreed to have a structured procedure.⁵⁸ Both states are acknowledge to be nuclear weapons sates though outside the ambit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT), Even while the capabilities remain in a state of non-deployed, non-weaonized states, CBMs are expected to ‘Contribute to generating an atmosphere of thrust and mutual understanding between the two countries. This is a new mindset and it reflected in the two sides.’⁵⁹ .

Non-Military CBMs:

Essentially, these are the agreements and gestures that are intended to soften friction and tension prevalent between states, to increase trust and provide an atmosphere conducive for serious dialog. For instance, oftentimes the discussions between foreign secretaries or the heads of state were preceded by goodwill gesture that involved either easing of visa process or the release of fishermen captured at sea. In Lahore declaration, both sides agreed to resolve all issues including Kashmir, refrained from interference in each other's affair, intensify their composite dialogue process, combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and take immediate step for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear weapons. Further, after Kargil India proposed a series of CBMs such as 20 scholarships and student visas to Pakistani students to study at India's top technical institutions, a meeting of DGMOs, unilateral tariff concessions on 50 items and visa relaxations. These proposals were dismissed by Musharraf, who stated that the only CBM was the resolution of Kashmir. The next round of CBMs was proposed in October 2003. Effort towards normalization of relations had begun as early as spring 2003 after Vajpayee called for another attempt to resolve differences. This resulted in a series of back-channel discussions between Brajesh Mishra (India's NSA) and Tariq Aziz (Musharraf's confidante). In India, the gradual easing of tension was the subject of considerable debate amongst the members of the Congress Party who questioned the judgment of the government in resuming relations even as there was no significant end to cross-border terrorism. In response, Vajpayee stated:

“As a neighbor and with a neighbor, we have to live with a feeling of friendship.... However it is, if there is no opportunity to have good relations, it should not be lost?... we can change friends but we cannot change neighbors. Neither can they go somewhere nor can we. Now one route is that we be friends as neighbors.... Or we keep fighting.”

This speech echoes the sentiments of Narshima Rao when he was Prime Minister of India. Commenting on Indo-Pak relations, Rao had observed in 1991, 'where do we stand? We stand exactly where we stood always. We have to ready for any eventuality but at the same time, we have to persist in our efforts to improve relations to the extent we can. Later in 1994 he stated that India had to learn to live with Pakistan⁶⁰.

In 2005 the two sides envisage turning the LOC into a soft border with more bus services as also opening it for trade.⁶¹ Besides, both states have opened the Attari Border for the transportation of goods through trucks and considered working for joint disaster management techniques in case of eventualities. During the earth quake in October 2005 India not only send a relief of 112 Cores but also open its LOC at five places: Rawalkot-Poonch, Kamon-Chakoti, Teetwal-Nauseri, Mandhar-Tatta Pani and Sialkot-Haji Peer.⁶² India thus proposed the following measures: technical discussions for resumption of civil aviation(especially over flights), Discussions for rail links and air links , bilateral sporting events, visa camps, border crossing by senior citizens(at Wagah checkpoint and by foot), capacity increases on Delhi-Lahore bus service, links between the two coast guards, agreement to not arrest fishermen in certain areas, free medical treatment to 20 Pakistani children, ferry service between Mumbai and Karachi, frequency of bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad should be increased from fortnightly to a weekly basis and should be start between Khokrapar (Pakistan's Sindh province) and Munabao (India's Rajasthan state)⁶³. While Pakistan accepted some of the CBMs, it rejected others such as bus links between towns in JK and Sind or the ferry service between Karachi and Mumbai. In case of the bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, it was proposed that UN official's man checkpoints and that people travel with UN documents. This was unacceptable to the Indian government, which has been extremely wary of international presence along the LOC. Pakistan

also proposed a bus link between Lahore and Amritsar, which the Indian government said it would consider. Pakistan further sought the restoration of its full diplomatic staff in India and offered 100 scholarships to the people from JK and free treatment to disabled, widows and victims of rape. In its response to Pakistani proposals, India rejected the discriminatory focus on JK, arguing that India had never adopted a selective approach for the regions within Pakistan and that if Pakistan was concerned about the plight of Kashmiris, it should end cross-border terrorism⁶⁴. The Pakistani delegation did not agree to the Indian proposal of a series of CBMs which covered exchanges like holding seminars academics and research institutions dealing with strategic and defense related issues. The Indian proposal also called for exchanges, lectures, seminars between the defense training establishments like National Defense Colleges.⁶⁵

End Notes:

¹ Stephen. P. Cohen, “Geostrategic factors in India-Pakistan Relations”, *Asian Affairs*, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 24-31.

² B.J.C. Mckercher(ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Routledge, London, 2012, p.402.

³ Donette Murray and David Brown(eds.), *Multipolarity in 21st Century, A new world order*, Routledge, London, 2012, p. 141.

⁴ C. Raja Mohan, “How Obama Can Get South Asia Right” *The Washigaton Quarterly*, vol.32, no.2, April, 2009, p.175.

⁵Saeed Ahmeh Rid, “*Kashmir: the Prisoner’s Dilemma for India and Pakistan*”, South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, vol.4,no.2, Winter 2012, pp.2-3.

⁶ Bhumitra Chakma, “Road to Chagai: Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme, Its Sources and Motivations”, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.36, no.4, October, 2002, p.903.

⁷ *Ibid*, p.904.

⁸ Mohan Malik, “The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash between State and Antistate Actors”, *Asian Affairs*, Vol.30, no.3, 2003, pp. 187-190.

⁹ Ashok K. Behuria, “Pakistan’s Apporach to Kashmir Since the Lahore Agreement: Is there Any Change?”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol.33, no.3, May 2009, p.434.

¹⁰ Gurmeet Kanwal, “Pakistan’s Strategic Blunder in Kargil”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 23, no.5, August, 1999, pp. 838-840.

¹¹ “India and Pakistan survey”, *The Economist*, May 22, 1999, p.17.

¹²Saeed Ahmeh Rid, “*Kashmir: the Prisoner’s Dilemma for India and Pakistan*”, South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, vol.4,no.2, Winter 2012, pp.2-3.

¹³ C. Raja Mohan, *Opcit*, no.4, p.176.

-
- ¹⁴ John Briscoe, “Troubled Waters: Can a Bridge be Built over the Indus?”, *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol. 45, no.50, December 11, 2010, p.28.
- ¹⁵ Neeru Sharma, “Indus Water Treaty(IWT) and Water, Conflicts Between India and Pakistan”, *Punjab Journal of Politics*, Vol. 30, no.2, 2006, p.5.
- ¹⁶ John Briscoe, *Opit*, no.14. p.29.
- ¹⁷ Ramaswamy R Iyer, “Briscoe on the Indus Treaty: A Response”, *Economic & Political Weekly*, vol.46, no.3, January 15, 2011, p.69.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid*, p.69.
- ¹⁹ Ashutosh Misra, “An audit of India-Pakistan peace process” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 61, no.4, December, 2007, p.514.
- ²⁰ Satyabrata Sinha, “The India-Pakistan Peace Process: Incremental Progress?”, in Anjali Ghosh and others(ed.), *India’s foreign Policy*, New Delhi,2009,p.233.
- ²¹ Iftikhar Gialni, “India Considering Siachen Proposal”, at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk>.
- ²² Syed Imran Sardar, “Conflict Transformation: A Paradigm Shift in Indo-Pakistan Conflict”, *Regional Studies*, vol.29, no.2, Spring 2011, p.28.
- ²³ Ashutosh Misra, “An audit of India-Pakistan peace process” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 61, no.4, December, 2007, p.514.
- ²⁴ Joint Press Statement on India-Pakistan Talk on Sir Creek, New Delhi, 7 August, 2004, at <http://meaindia.nic.in>.
- ²⁵ Iftikhar A. Khan, “Sir Creek Differences Remain”, 19, May 2007, at <http://www.dawn.com>.
- ²⁶ M Kreopn and A Sevak(eds), *Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995, p.95.
- ²⁷ Ashutosh Misra, *Opit*, no.23, p.519.
- ²⁸ Rajen Harshe, “Cross Border Terrorism, Road Block to Peace Initiatives”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 38, no. 35, August 30, 2003, p. 3622.

-
- ²⁹ Matthew Rosenstein, "Editorial", *Defense & Security Analysis*, vol.22, no.4, December 2006, p.345.
- ³⁰ Priyanka Singh, "Militant Training Camps in Pakistan – Occupied Kashmir: An Existential Threat", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 33, no. 3, May, 2009, p. 334.
- ³¹ Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer, "India and Pakistan: A Time of Uncertainty" *Trip report*, January,27- February 15, 2009, pp.1-2.
- ³² Talat Ayesha Wizarat, "Transformation of State Borders: Implications for Pakistan", *Regional Studies*, vol.29, Summer, 2011, p.15.
- ³³ Rajen Harshe, "Cross Border Terrorism, Road Block to Peace Initiatives", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 38, no. 35, August 30, 2003, p. 3622.
- ³⁴ Zahid Ali Khan Marwat, "Indian and Pakistani Missile Programmes: A Comparative Study", *Regional Studies*, vol.19, no.2, Spring, 2011, p.93.
- ³⁵ *Ibid*, p.93.
- ³⁶ *Ibid*, p.93.
- ³⁷ Anupam Srivastava, " Strategic Import of Missile in the Indian Security Policy: Can they Deliver the Goods", at www.rediffonthent.com, August, 2009.
- ³⁸ Monika Chansoria, "India Missile Programme: Augmenting the firepower", at <http://www.drdo.org>, October 2009.
- ³⁹ "PJ-10 BrahMos", at <http://www.global-security.org>.
- ⁴⁰ "DRDO to Develop Long Range, Subsonic Cruise Missile", *India Defencea*, 21, October, 2007, at <http://www.india.defance.com>.
- ⁴¹ "Pakistan derives its first 'Hatf' missile from foreign space rocket", *The Risk Report*, Vol.1, no.8, October, 1995, at <http://www.wisconsinproject.org>.
- ⁴² Zahid Ali Khan Marwat, "Indian and Pakistani Missile Programmes: A Comparative Study", *Regional Studies*, vol.19, no.2, Spring, 2011, p.107.
- ⁴³ *Ibid*, p.108.

⁴⁴ <http://www.app.com>.

⁴⁵ S.M. Hali, “Ra,ad Roars”, *The Nations*, Islamabad, 29 August, 2007, at <http://www.thenations.com> .

⁴⁶ Verghese Koithara, “Coercion and Risk-Talking in Nuclear South Asia” *CISAC Working Paper*, March, 2003, p.16.

⁴⁷ Bhumitra Chakma, “Road to Chagai: Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme, Its Sources and Motivations”, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.36, no.4, October, 2002, p.887-888.

⁴⁸ Mohan Malik, “The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash between State and Antistate Actors”, *Asian Affairs*, Vol.30, no.3, 2003, pp. 177-178.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 184-185.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 191-195.

⁵¹ Kapil Kak, “ Pakistan: A Geo-Political Appriaisal”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol.22, n.8, November 1998, p.1131.

⁵² *Ibid*, p.1133.

⁵³ *ibid*, p.1135.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.1137.

⁵⁵ Gitika Commuri, *Indian Identity Narratives and the Politics of Security*, Sage Publication, New Delhi, 2010, p.202.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.203.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 203-204.

⁵⁸ Amit Mishra, “Foreign Minister Meeting”, 2-6, October, 2005, Indo- Pak Peace Process Update no.10 at <http://ipcs.org>.

⁵⁹ Siddharth Varadarajan, “It’s Time for Boldness on Siachen Issue”, *The Hindu*, 14, September, 2005.

⁶⁰ Gitika Commuri, *Opcit*, no.53, p.210.

⁶¹ Anjali Ghosh and Others(eds), *India’s Foreign Policy*, New Delhi, Pearson, 2009, p.237.

⁶² R.S. Yadav, “India-Pakistan Peace Process: A Study of CBMs”, *South Asian Studies*, vol.43, no.1, January-December, 2008, p.93.

⁶³ Hernaikh Singh and Tridivesh Singh Mani, *South Asia in 2008 A Review*, Manohar Publication, New Delhi, 2009, p.414.

⁶⁴ Gitika Commuri, *Opcit*, no.53, p.211.

⁶⁵ Press Briefings, On Second round of Expert Level Talks Between India and Pakistan on conventional CBMs at <http://www.mea.gov.in>.