

CHAPTER - 3

State Response to Naxalism

The Naxalite movement, starting from a small village on the tri-junction of India, Nepal and what was the East Pakistan in 1967, spread like wildfire to different parts of the country. The movement had a meteoric phase for about two years from the formation of the CPI (ML) in 1969 till the end of 1971. These early stirring were however easily crushed by the Government of India through police action. Following Charu Mazumdar's death 1972, there were divisions and fragmentations in the movement. The formation of People's War Group in Andhra Pradesh in 1980 under the leadership of Kondapalli Seetharamaiah gave a new lease of life to the movement. For about ten years, the PWG remained strident. The Andhra Pradesh government banned the PWG and its front organizations in 1992, and the state police undertook well organized counter insurgency operations.¹ The arrest of Kondapalli Seetharamaiah and other important leaders marked the end of this phase. The current phase, which commenced in 2001, is marked by a conscious attempt to militarize the armed component of the party - the People's Guerrilla Army with a view to launching attacks on the state apparatus. The PWG demonstrated its lethal capabilities by an audacious attempt to assassinate the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, N. Chandra babu Naidu, on October 1, 2003. The Ninth Party Congress, held in early 2007, "reaffirmed the general line of New Democratic Revolution with agrarian revolution as its axis and protracted people's war as the path of the Indian revolution", and resolved to "advance the people's war throughout the country, further strengthen the people's army, deepen the mass base of the party and wage a broad-based militant mass movement against the neo-liberal policies of globalization, liberalization, privatization." The Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, admits the spread of Naxalite movement to thirteen states of the Union, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Kerala, Karnataka, Haryana and Tamil Nadu.²

For the poor people living in these areas, extremists are the only functioning authority. In the absence of the state administration, the people depend on extremist cadres even for essential supplies and services. Ministers and senior officers are reluctant to visit these areas to understand the ground situation. The district school was barely functional with very few teachers and no teaching-aids. Primary students didn't have textbooks, though, on paper, they

were entitled to free textbooks from the education department. ³Most government funds allocated for health, education and housing had apparently been siphoned. The effects of left extremism may not remain confined only to states most affected by it; it could seriously threaten the country's economy. Most of India's mineral wealth is concentrated in the worst-affected areas. The extremists have the capability to completely disrupt the country's economic arteries – road and rail transport systems passing through Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh.

According to a recent report of the Union Home Ministry, the Naxals are now active in 23 of the 28 states in the country. Their aim is to 'liberate and control 35 percent of India's land by the end of 2015'. The report says there are 39 left extremist groups in India with a combined armed wing of over 1 lakh. There has been an unprecedented increase in their arsenal in recent years and their striking power has acquired new sharpness. One can see a new phase of revolutionary movement. According to reliable reports, its armed cadres have increased by almost 40 percent in the last three to four years. The Maoists alone are estimated to have armed cadre strength of over 10,000. The number of training camps, estimated at 48 three years ago, is close to 84.⁴

Democracy has been hailed as the true and authentic voice of people, working for both their tangible and intangible interests. In a meaningful democracy, political stability and working within the conventional framework of law and ethics are the two most desired virtues. People across continents have long cherished the dream of living under healthy governance, which has led to their reaffirming the mandate for constitutionally approved government irrespective of their efficiency levels or experience. Sometimes there is a limit to all that people can brook. Their faith in legal system fails them, the popular government becomes a toy in the hands of industrial bourgeoisie and capitalist entrepreneurs, they lose the power to govern even the aspects of their own lives and there is a sense of simmering anarchy. This is not a passing mood- it has been born out of a strong sense of being wronged and alienated amidst their land and property.⁵

Naxalites, here, similarly have been supporting demands for separate states like Telengan and Vidarbha with an eye to the eventual setting up of a communist state in this country. Not only this, they also support the secessionist movements in north-east and Kashmir and as such they pose bigger threats to national security than we have cared to believe so far. Maoists' new strategy seem to be setting up bases in new regions by means of taking up such emotive issues as forcible displacement caused by Special Economic Zones,

industrialization, infrastructure development projects, caste oppression and religious fascism. Naxalites intend to turn the guerrilla war into mobile war and guerrilla zones into base areas. They have also been exploring newer tactics against the background of changes taking place in the agrarian situation including increasing resort to jail breaks and attacking the express centers of state power like police/military stations. The Maoists do not abruptly launch ‘armed struggle’ or violence, but are known to proceed very methodically including conducting a preliminary study of local social, economic and political milieu and the vulnerabilities of particular groups of population before coming out with customized action plans. They prefer to maintain a low profile in adverse conditions. They deliberately keep violence low in border regions so as to keep away the police attention, there by facilitating intra-state movement. Naxalites are known to follow flexible tactics. If the situation warrants, they restrict the movement at the level of political mobilization , highlight local issues through front organizations and organize meetings in strongholds to garner popular sympathy.⁶

Naxalism: A Short Introduction to India’s Scariest Security Challenge

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has called them “the single biggest security challenge ever faced by our country”. Fourteen Indian states are struggling to battle the insurgency waged by their 20,000 fighters. Over the last three years some 2,600 people have died by their hands. These are the Naxalites, the source of India’s scariest security challenge. The term “Naxalite” is derived from Naxalbari, the name of the West-Bengal town where India’s Maoist movement began. During the late 1960s the Communist Party of India was sharply divided on how to bring about India’s communist revolution. The party broke into two camps: those in favor of attaining power by election, whereby the party would have the influence to provide momentum for a great urban uprising, and those in favor of utilizing the country’s vast peasant class to bring about a government-toppling armed insurrection. In 1967 Charu Mazumdar, a member of this second camp, grew tired with the Communist Party’s dithering and debates and set out to begin the revolution himself. The Naxalbari revolts were the result of his efforts.⁷

Mazumdar called his new movement the “All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries”, but most Indians knew the group by their place of origin, and began to call all Maoist-style guerrillas “Naxalites.” The movement was supported by two very different groups: leftist college students (mostly from Kolkotta), and poor delits and peasants who had just barely survived India’s worst famine in a century. A steady flow of aid from China

further strengthened the movement, allowing it to spread beyond the Naxalbari region itself, taking root in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand. From this point on events turned against the Naxalites. Chinese aid was cut off in the early 70s when the Chinese Communist Party ended their long standing policy of funding Asian Maoist groups. A brutal counter terror campaign was begun by Bengal's police, and it decimated the ranks of the Naxalite faithful. To top things off, Mazumdar himself was captured by state police, and he stayed in their custody until his death in 1972. Absent a steady source of funding, a base of operations, and a leader, the Naxalite movement fell apart. What had been one organization splintered into 30; divided and prone to factional infighting, Mazumdar's mass movement was forced to the precipice of Indian society. Only in rural areas far removed from government power did Naxalism retain a vestige of popular support.⁸ This state of affairs was the status quo well into the 1990s. By this time Naxalism had been reduced to irrelevancy, prompting national and state governments to focus on more pressing problems. Given breathing space the Naxalites were able to rebound and then expand. By 2004 the two largest Naxalite factions joined together to form a new organization, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist). The creation of CPI-Maoist was a watershed event, ending the era of interfactional violence among the Naxalbari and paving the way for a Naxalite resurgence. Naxalism thrives in the regions of India devoid of state control and subject to endemic poverty.⁹ Naxalites are often welcomed with open arms in such circumstances; those leading lives of toil in India's isolated jungle villages eagerly grasp opportunities to escape the system of oppression and impoverishment that dominates rural India. Once welcomed in, CPI-Maoists construct a shadow-state, complete with taxes, regulations, and courts, all ostensibly for the betterment of disenfranchised Dalit peasants and tribal groups. Yet for these oppressed groups seeking recourse by way of Naxalite is an inevitable Faustian bargain. As it becomes clear that a Naxal shadow state has supplanted the authority of state government, police forces are sent to drive the Naxalites out. In the violence that follows it are the Dalit and tribal who suffer most.¹⁰

That Naxalite groups find continued support in rural areas despite the ills that accompany their presence marks another aspect of the regions Naxalite favor: the absence of an educated citizenry. The states with a significant Naxal presence all have literacy rates below the national average; the gap in literacy found between Bihar (54%) and Kerala (91%) mirrors the extent of Naxalite control in the two states. The area of India where

support for the Naxalism runs highest has been called “the red corridor”, a long stretch of territory reaching from southern tip of Andhra Pradesh to the eastern regions of West Bengal. The intensity of Naxalite insurgency varies across this stretch; in most places Naxalites rule unopposed only in remote pockets and patches of the region’s countryside. In the past opposition from the rural population of Eastern India has kept Naxalism from growing past these remote pockets.¹¹ The response to CPI-Maoists’ expansion was violent; many rural landowners would not tolerate a Naxalite shadow state and founded anti-Maoist militias in an attempt at armed resistance. The pattern was set by the SalwaJudum, a grass roots resistance movement in Chhattisgarh that was co-opted by the state government soon after its founding. Eager to find a quick fix to the Naxalite problem, the government of Chhattisgarh paid members of the Salwa Judum as “Special Police Officers” and ordered them to clear the jungle of Naxalite influence. The battles that followed this command resulted in thousands of internal refugees across the state. The heavy handed tactics of the SalwaJudum and their government patrons alienated many of the state’s rural poor, and early this year the last vestiges of the movement disappeared.¹²

The same cannot be said for the Naxalite. Every bit of lost legitimacy for the Indian government was a gain for the Naxalite’s shadow state; by the end of this summer the Naxalites had enough popular authority to set up road blocks on national highways and frisk employees of the Chhattisgarh government. The surge in Naxalite power is not limited to Chhattisgarh. Multiple states, some outside the red corridor, have seen a troubling growth in Naxalite related violence.

We will see. As this blog has noted in the past, counterinsurgency campaigns do not operate on a small time scale. This is but the beginning of another long war.¹³

State Response

One of the important factors that have sustained this self-sustaining dynamic of Naxalite violence in Bihar and Jharkhand is the lack of proper state response and failure of the administrative machinery at the grassroots level. AS a result is many areas government official due to the threat posed by Naxalite. In these areas development works are executed more often than not on paper. In August 1999, special House Committee of the Bihar Legislative Council which was asked to study the chain of the violence and counter violence in Centre Bihar, said the lack of political will and determination on the part of State in tacking extremist head on its failure to set up agencies unafraid to step into the disturbed

region and political affiliations of the extremist groups with mainline parties are some of the reason for the aggravating extremist violence in Bihar. No proper attempt has been made to equip police force properly to deal with the threat. Even in Jharkhand where the successive governments relied heavily on police operations to neutralize the armed groups, proper attention was not paid to this aspect the police operations suffer due to lack of adequate and appropriate equipment including basics such as automatic weapons landmine detectors and communications a proper intelligence network at the grassroots level and better protection to police officers and personnel in the Naxalite affected areas. Therefore it is not surprising that despite large –scale arrests under the POTA, the government was not able to contain the violence. In Bihar also, lack of resources is a major handicap. ¹⁴The extremist groups on the other hand, are well trained and possess even sophisticated arms. On April 16, 2003, then Director General of Police, DP Ojha, made an official statement before the press that the State police were not equipped well enough to prevent extremist violence in Bihar. He said, 'How can one expect the police to contain the extremists? They don't have even matching fire power, lack standardized police pickets and are deprived of state of art communication system besides bullet proof vehicle and mines protected vehicles"¹⁵

The surrender policy announced by the government has not had desired results. Apart from poor implementation of the scheme, the fear of retribution by Naxals is the reason for poor records in surrender. Maoists have been ruthless in dealing with the deserters and any activist who felt tempted by the surrender package must be ready to face the consequences. Another important reason for the growth of Naxalite movement has been the government's inability to implement land reforms. The village economy supports nearly three-fourths of the State's population, yet it remains one of the most exploitative in the world. The landowners were politically very influential and were largely responsible for poor implementation of the policy.¹⁶

In Andhra Pradesh, a determined state government, united under firm Congress Party rule, was able to cope with the violence in Srikakulum on its own. While allegations of police brutality and 'encounter killings' were common, the swift and effective application of force by the state police broke the back of the insurgency there in a matter of months. The situation in West Bengal was somewhat more complicated. With the CPI-(M) occupying key leadership positions in the United Democratic Front government, West Bengal's response to the emergence of Naxalism was initially quite tepid. This was largely due to infighting

between the members of the coalition. While other parties argued for a strong response to the initial outbreak of violence in Naxalbari, the CPI-(M) vacillated. Though it wanted to reign in its adventurist cadres in Siliguri, it was fearful of damaging its revolutionary credentials by authorizing too forceful a response. Additionally, the agitators were still members of the CPI-(M) at this stage, and the party was hopeful of bringing them back into its fold. As a result, police actions in response to the increasing violence through July 1967 were quite circumscribed.¹⁷ By the time a deteriorating situation forced the government's hand in August and September, the movement had already attracted a sizeable following. While the insurrection in Naxalbari was effectively put down in a relatively short period of time, the damage had been done. Though the inability of the UDF to effectively govern forced its dissolution in November 1967, mid-term elections returned it to power in February 1969. With broadly the same makeup, it proved even less capable of agreement in policymaking, particularly with respect to the Naxalites. Not only did the government fail to outlaw the movement, some of its constituent parties actually sought to curry favor with the Maoists in a bid to strengthen their popularity with rural voters. Again, this resulted in a generally weak security response, with the police budget actually reduced just as the activity in Midnapur and Calcutta was beginning to heat up. With the coalition hopelessly polarized and the security situation deteriorating, New Delhi imposed President's Rule on West Bengal in March 1970. President's Rule, an administrative device under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, allows the center to assume executive authority in a state if the ruling government can no longer form a majority in the state legislature. With the governor (as an agent of New Delhi) now firmly in charge, the security situation began to improve rapidly. The 1932 Bengal Suppression of Terrorist Outrage Act was quickly revived, giving the police expanded powers of detention. Funding for the state police forces more than doubled, and the number of officers rose dramatically. Augmented by personnel from the center's Border Security Force, these additional men were posted to hotbeds of Naxalite activity, especially Siliguri, Midnapur, and Calcutta.¹⁸

In April, a joint operation by the Indian military and the Central Reserve Police Force, in coordination with state police, successfully put down the Midnapur uprising in a matter of weeks. Though it took a while longer, the expanded presence in Calcutta also proved effective. Aided by government sponsored volunteer militias, ironically drawn from the same lumping-proletariat element the Naxalites had utilized, forceful policing resulted in the deaths or arrest of thousands of Naxalite cadres and sympathizers. As in Andhra Pradesh, abuses by

the anti-Naxal forces were not uncommon – in one notorious instance, 300 armed members of a volunteer militia rampaged through a Naxalite stronghold in the Cossipore-Baranagore neighborhood of Calcutta, killing nearly 100 suspected Naxalites in cold blood. Though brutal, the tactics were effective. By the end of 1971, Mazumdar was forced to officially abandon the urban campaign in the face of mounting losses. The movement was by this time a spent force, and its fortunes continued to decline as top leadership was caught up in the tightening police dragnet through the first half of 1972. Finally, on July 16, 1972, Charu Mazumdar himself was arrested from a safe house in the Calcutta suburb of entally. On July 28, he died in police custody at the age of 54. The death of Mazumdar was a fittingly symbolic denouement to the movement that had burned so brightly for over five years. With the departure of its spiritual and ideological leader, the first phase of Naxalite activity in India was over.¹⁹

Latest Trends

Recently captured equipment and further interrogations of Naxal cadres reveal that they are using highly sophisticated VHF sets which are not only transceivers, but also scanners, with scrambler facility. They are also planning to set up FM radio stations and their own communication bases. They are using advanced equipment like laptop, PDA, data cards, sat phones, GPS, mobiles, etc. They carry out extensive use of internet for transmission of encrypted data like stenography, PGP, etc. Their front organizations are less aggressive but vocal. Their cadres have infiltrated into media, trade unions and NGOs. Also, they indulge in huge extortions, from businessmen, industrialists, contractors of major developmental works and real estate.²⁰ They are also tapping huge money for protection Tactical. Recently they have started giving more importance to military than to organizational aspects, including induction of more uneducated cadres. Some others trends are given below:-

- (a) They have studied the efficacy of the Mine protected Vehicles and have enlisted the shortcomings in their military magazine.
- (b) They have also studied the details of helicopters and have briefed their cadres about the critical parts and how to shoot down with small arms.

- (c) Their leaders/trainers are versed with helicopter operations, approach/take off directions, size of helipads, etc. It is evident that they are ready to even take on IAF helicopters. However, since the beginning of Op Triveni, there has been no such incident.
- (d) Use of crude rockets, pressure activated mines, wireless activated mines, booby traps, etc is on increase.
- (e) They are indulging in mass attacks and focusing on multiple targets.
- (f) Attack on Central Govt properties has increased.
- (g) Recruitment of more women into cadres.
- (h) There has been increase in frequent attacks on security forces.²¹

States Response to IAP (Integrated Action Plan)

The implementation of IAP has been successful and the scheme has had a very good response. A number of requests had been received from the Chief Ministers, Members of Parliament and State Governments for inclusion of more districts under the IAP. On the basis of requests received from the State Govt. The Govt. of India has decided on 07.12.2011 to include additional 18 LWE affected districts under IAP from the financial year 2011-12 onwards and to provide block grant of Rs.30 crore to each of these districts during the current financial year. The Government's approach is to deal with Left Wing Extremism activities in a holistic manner, in the areas of security, development, rights of local communities, administration and public perception. In dealing with this decades old problem, it has been felt appropriate, after various high-level deliberations and interactions with the State Governments concerned that an integrated approach aimed at the relatively more affected areas would deliver results. With this in view, a detailed analysis of the spread and trends in respect of LWE violence has been made and 83 affected districts in nine States have been taken up for special attention on planning, implementation and monitoring of security situation and development schemes.²²

Indian State Response to the Naxalites

Given India's federalist structure, the onus for responding to the rising Naxalite threat has fallen upon individual states, although with substantial federal support during the past five years. The hardest hit states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh—where roughly half of

Naxalite activity is concentrated and continues to escalate—have raced to scale up the manpower of their state and local police forces, while being supplemented with about 40 battalions of central paramilitary forces. Meanwhile, states such as Bihar and West Bengal have also seen a rise in violence in recent years as their police manpower has declined or held steady. The composition of police is another variable that may adversely affect outcomes. The police forces of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Orissa are composed of a much higher percentage of paramilitary forces (as opposed to civil police) relative to the Indian average, potentially rendering them less locally knowledgeable or legitimate.

Central and state governments have been criticized for their paramilitary forces' shortfalls in size, antiquated organizational structure and age profile, inadequate training (for instance, only firing 20 rounds per year), and most importantly the absence of coordination or a coherent strategy.²³

The Limits of Indian Responses

True to its past history, the Indian central and state governments' COIN responses have been heavily kinetic, disregarding local public perceptions. One Indian commentator wrote, "Exceeding Maoist rebels they accuse of brutality, the police, paramilitary and SalwaJudum recruits continue to freely kill unarmed men and women. It has wrecked any short- to medium-term hope of winning tribal and forest dwellers back to the fold of the state." With the launch of additional major sweep operations and expansion of commando units, collateral damage of civilians caught in the crossfire and through retribution is expected to rise. Violence, whether premeditated or spontaneous, "can be completely indiscriminate, leading to the burning of the homes of innocents and their torture, maiming, rape, and death." While there have been centralized efforts to coordinate the use of force and economic development, these have largely faltered due to poor coordination, misutilization, and co-optation by local elites and corporations. The Indian government has repeatedly set up unified commands to better coordinate the use of central paramilitary forces, state armed (paramilitary) police, and state local or civil police, but these have been riddled with problems and at times hindered local innovation. A major attempt was launched with Operation Green Hunt in late 2009, a massive search-and-destroy operation meant to clear out the Naxalite strongholds in the forests of central India.²⁴ The fissures of this unified command, however, were exposed when a company of central paramilitary forces short on local police support and intelligence

were ambushed and more than 80 killed after being tracked for three days by Naxalite insurgents.

The two states that appear to be relatively successful at reducing insurgent activity or keeping it at bay are Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. Maharashtra seems to have had a relatively higher police to population ratio at the beginning of the decade, potentially buffering it from the spill over of Naxalite insurgency from neighbouring areas. While Andhra Pradesh's manpower ratio rose somewhat over the past decade, its success in dramatically reducing Naxalite activity in its territory is generally attributed by Indian analysts to a rather different strategy of raising a special commando force known as the Greyhounds. Their success was attributed to signals intelligence exploitation, careful operational planning, survey of five northern districts of Andhra Pradesh recently cleared of Maoist insurgents where the majority of those surveyed still sympathized with Naxalite motives, methods, and results, and viewed actions by state forces such as encounter killings as suspect and unjustified. Meanwhile, a plurality believed nothing had improved and exploitation had increased since their departure. Even if the Naxalite presence and violence has been structurally reduced, the survey revealed that the strategy has certainly not relied upon winning hearts and minds to achieve this end.²⁵

Renewed Government Response

In a 2006 speech, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that Naxalism remains “the single biggest internal security challenge” that India has begun to embrace an unprecedented commitment toward addressing this threat. At the end of 2009, India launched a counteroffensive that called for the deployment of more than 50,000 paramilitary soldiers to the region most affected by the insurgency increased violence. In previous years, the Indian government tacitly supported the failed efforts of locally operated militias, such as the Salwa Judum in the state of Chhattisgarh. Chidambaram's action instead draws a combined force from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Border Security Force, Sashastra Seema Bal, and Commando Battalion for Action (COBRA) and the Nagaland Armed Police. Deemed “Operation Green Hunt,” the counter offensive includes the use of helicopters and drones with aerial strike capabilities that can provide support to the land force. To date, the results of the operation have had varying levels of success. While at

times the intensified military and police involvement has led to Naxalite calls for peace talks, other instance have led to reprisal attacks by insurgent groups.²⁶

Main Features

The Government of India have already expressed concern over the spread of the Naxalite movement over a huge geographical area. The Prime Minister described Naxalite movement as the single biggest threat to the internal security of the country. According to the Institute for Conflict Management, the movement has actually spread to 194 districts in 18 states.

The Naxals' potential for violence has increased substantially with their acquisition of sophisticated weapons and expertise in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). They are said to be in possession of at least 6,500 regular weapons including AK 47 rifles and SLRs. They have built this arsenal essentially by looting weapons from police/landlords, purchasing them from smugglers, acquiring from insurgent groups like the NSCN (IM) and ULFA and also obtaining some weapons from Nepal. The movement got a tremendous boost when its two major components, the People's War (PW) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI), decided to merge on March 21, 2004, though a formal announcement was made on October 14, 2004 only. The unified party was called the Communist Party of India (Maoist).²⁷ The merger, a part from augmenting the support base of the movement, has given it the character of a pan-Indian revolutionary group. The Naxals' plan to have a Compact Revolutionary Zone stretching from Indo-Nepal border to the Dandakaranya Region is likely to get a fillip with the unification of their ranks. The Naxalite groups' nexus with the other extremist organizations has added to the complexity of the problem. There are indications that the PWG cadres received training in the handling of weapons and IEDs from some ex-LTTE cadres. They have also some understanding with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (I-M) to support each other's' cause. Some batches of CPML-Party Unity also appear to have received arms training under the guidance of United Liberation Front of Assam. The Communist Party of India (Maoist) has close fraternal relations with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) also.²⁸

Recommendations

Human Rights Watch called upon all parties, including the central government, the state governments, the various Naxalite groups and government-backed vigilante groups, to

respect human rights protections under Indian and international law. In particular, Human Rights Watch urged that:

- Indian security forces must end the practice of extrajudicial executions of alleged Naxalites and their supporters, and allow the National Human Rights Commission and independent civil society organizations to investigate such allegations.
- All state and national security legislation that does not provide for international standards of due process or fair trials or allows for prolonged and arbitrary detention should be repealed or amended to conform to international standards.
- The government must cease the sponsorship of and take steps to dismantle armed vigilante groups that commit human rights abuses.
- The government should ensure that internally displaced persons are protected according to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
- The Naxalites must immediately cease committing abuses of human rights, including killings and abductions, and allow the National Human Rights Commission and independent civil society organizations to investigate such incidents.
- The Naxalites must immediately end all recruitment of persons under the age of 18 and demobilize all individuals under 18 from all forces under their control.

Which Approach is better?

The approach which finds as the solution which will solve the problem of Naxalism is the Social Integration. The tribal's and scheduled castes that live in the Naxal affected areas have been neglected for the past many decades and now want some attention from the government. Providing them with incentives like giving them right over the forest produce from the forests in which they have been living for generations, providing them with houses etc. Is the right modus of solving their basic problems? The main reason for the spread of Naxalism is the exploitation of poor and scheduled castes.²⁹ The main thing which has to be done is to enforce land ceiling laws, utilization of the funds provided to government to the maximum and political expediency. Use of police forces should be to enforce the land ceiling laws, evict landlords and ensure land to the farmers for cultivation. They should be provided with police protection, and proper rehabilitation for the people who have been displaced should be ensured. Security as well as development has to run hand in hand to counter the Naxal problem. The government has to instill faith in the people that they will be governed in

a better manner than by the Naxals. The government should include laws in the forest act that only forest dwelling tribes and scheduled castes should be allowed to use the produce of the forest. Proper guarding of financial institutions sanctioning loans to these tribes should be ensured which will help these tribes to realize that the government is with them. The Central government should form a separate ministry which will undertake the development of the areas affected by the Naxal activities. The following steps ought to be taken by the government:³⁰

Union Home Ministry and the common refrain:

The Central government set up a separate division in the Ministry of Home Affairs to tackle the Naxalite crisis. It has been supporting “Salwa Judum” type campaign and urged the States to take the experiences of Andhra police to train their police forces in the Naxalite affected areas. The demand for more forces has been a common refrain. The Naxalite affected states want 100 central paramilitary battalions (with over 1 lakh ready-to-fight personnel) to go after the roughly 9,000 to 12,000 Naxalites. Eight states that have witnessed Naxalites' attacks presently have 29 such battalions. On 27 April 2006, the Centre sanctioned raising of 9 more India Reserve Battalions (IRB) comprising 9,000 police personnel for Naxalite-affected states of Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Karnataka, Uttaranchal, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana (one each) and two for worst-hit Chhattisgarh. It is also reportedly been considering sanctioning one India Reserve Battalion (IRB) each for Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. The Centre will spend around Rs 20 crore on each battalion, which is higher than the earlier allocation of Rs 13 crore.³¹ The Union Home Ministry is considering to set up three or four specialized anti-Maoist centers at strategic locations - mainly at inter-state borders - each equipped with about five helicopters. The centers would be manned mainly by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the pilots would be from the army or BSF. The MHA has also been considering setting up an elite commando force exclusively dealing with the Naxalite insurgents. In April 2006, Army Chief General JJ Singh suggested setting up an auxiliary force of ex-servicemen drawn from the Naxalite-affected States to carry out duties like detecting mines and explosive devices laid by Naxalites to attack the police and Paramilitary forces.

Government of India's Policy

Government has prepared a 14-Point Plan to deal with the problem. The salient features of the policy are as follows: deal sternly with the Naxals indulging in violence address the problem

simultaneously on political, security and development fronts in a holistic manner ensure inter-state coordination in dealing with the problem accord priority to faster socio-economic development in the Naxal affected or prone areas supplement the efforts and resources of the affected states on both security and development fronts promote local resistance groups against the Naxals use mass media to highlight the futility of Naxal violence and the loss of life and property caused by it have a proper surrender and rehabilitation policy for the Naxals affected states not to have any peace dialogue with the Naxal groups unless the latter agree to give up violence and arms The following administrative measures and arrangements have also been initiated at the highest level: Security related expenditure scheme (SRE) – The SRE scheme envisages reimbursing the expenditure incurred by the state on ammunition, training, upgradation of police posts, etc. At present 76 districts in 9 states badly affected by Naxal violence are covered by this scheme. Strengthening of law enforcement - This includes raising India Reserve Battalions to strengthen the security apparatus at the state level and also releasing funds under the Police Modernization Scheme to the states to modernize their police forces in terms of weaponry, communication equipment and other infrastructure.

Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) and Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) – The government has included 55 Naxal affected districts in 9 states under the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) component of the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY). The BRGF scheme covers a total of 250 districts and is to be administered by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj. The scheme should accelerate socio-economic development in these 250 districts. Task Force – A Task Force has been constituted in the Home Ministry to deliberate upon the steps needed to deal with Naxalism more effectively and in a coordinated manner. The members of the Task Force comprise Nodal Officers of the Naxal affected states and representatives of the IB, CRPF and the SSB. Coordination Centre – A Coordination Centre was set up in 1998 headed by the Union Home Secretary with Chief Secretaries and DGPs of Naxal affected states as its members. It reviews and coordinates the steps taken by the states to control Naxal activities. Empowered Group of Ministers – At a meeting of the Chief Ministers held on September 5, 2006, it was decided to set up an Empowered Group of Ministers headed by the Home Minister and comprising select Union Ministers and Chief Ministers to closely monitor the spread of Naxalism and evolve effective strategies to deal with the problem.³²

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