

India- USA Defence Relations (2005-2016)

**A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Political
Science in partial fulfilment of requirements for the
Degree of Master of Philosophy**

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DECLARATION

I, Anwita, hereby declare that this dissertation entitled '**India- USA Defence Relations (2005-2016)**' is the outcome of my own study undertaken under the guidance of Assistant Prof. Rajeev Kumar Singh, Department of Political Science, Central University of Haryana, Mahendragarh. It has not previously formed the basis for the award of any degree, diploma or certificate of this Institute or any other institute or university. I have duly acknowledged all the sources used by me in preparation of this dissertation.

Dated:

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Anwita

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled '**India- USA Defence Relations (2005-2016)**' is the record of the original work done by Ms. Anwita under my guidance. The results of the research presented in the dissertation have not previously formed the basis for the reward of any degree, diploma or certificate of this or any other university.

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CHAPTER - 1

INTRODUCTION

The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended the 'thirty years' war, is regarded by many as the key event ushering in the contemporary international system. Before the Treaty, even he was dynasty were used to frequently change, besides the boundaries of states were almost fluid. (Pant, 2010, p. 1). The peace established the right of the German state that constituted the Holy Roman Empire to conduct their own diplomatic relation. They were also formally started to enjoy 'an exact and reciprocal Equality; the first formal acceptance of sovereign equality for a significant number of state. The period from 1648-1776 saw the international society that had been taken shape over the previous 200 years come to fruition. Wars were frequent if lacking the ideological intensity of the Thirty years' war. Some states, notably the Ottoman Empire, slowly declined; others, such as Britain and Russia came into prominence. Some pointed to religious and cultural similarities in seeking to explain this phenomenon, but the central elements that all were agreed on were a determination by all states to preserve their freedom, a mutual recognition of each other's right to an independent existence, and above all a reliance on the balance of power. Diplomacy and international law were seen as the other two key institutions of international society. (John Baylis, 2014, p. 46)

With the treaty of Westphalia, these things were completely changed. Territories of the state head fixed and marked as inviolable. The sovereignty of the state become an acceptable norm. These changing script of the world give a perfect platform to the growth of international relations, now different states can tie their relations with the other state clearly according to their wish an interest and they and they can maintain their relations actively, and now state not changing their roll very frequently. The Westphalia world order was based on three principles. The first is *rex est imperator in sue* or that ' the King is the master in his land'. This means that the king is the highest authority. Also, all sovereign states are equal. The second is that the king determines which religion is to be followed in the state. The third and the last principle is that of the balance of power. This norms evolved to keep in check the hegemonic ambitions of a state. (Pant, 2010, p. 1)

The international relation can be defined as the study of relationships and interactions between countries, including the activities and policies of national governments and all

other governmental and non-governmental organisation which affect the policy-making process of a nation. It can be both a theoretical subject and a practical. The main reason behind the study of international relations is that the entire population of the world is divided into separate political communities or independent states, which profoundly affect the way people live. (Oded, 2010, pp. 1023-45). In the present world, there are almost 200 independent states. These States are independent of each other, and they are sovereign. But that does not mean they are isolated or insulated from each other. Furthermore, states are usually embedded in international markets that affect the policies of their governments and the wealth and welfare of their citizens. That requires that they enter into relations with each other. Complete isolation is usually not an option. IR is the study of nature and significances of these international relations. There have been State systems at different times and places in different parts of the world, in for example ancient Greece, and Renaissance Italy. (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010, p. 4)

To understand international relations, one should be examine their own daily life, and can be helpful for citizens of particular states to see what we generally expect from a state. There are at least five social values which are usually expected from every state to uphold it: security, freedom, order, justice and welfare. These are social values that are so fundamental to human well-being that they must be protected or ensured in some way in every way. In the modern era, however, the state has usually been involved as the leading institution in that regard; it is probable to ensure these basic values. Almost all states act like human organisation states present problems as well as provide solutions. Most states are likely to be friendly, non-threatening, and peace-loving. But some states may be hostile and aggressive and there is no world government to constrain them. That is a basic and age-old problem of state systems and national security. Many states also enter into alliances with other states to increase their national security. To ensure that no one great power succeeds in achieving a hegemonic position of overall domination, based on intimidation, coercion, or the outright use of force, it is also necessary to construct and maintain a balance of military power. Security is obviously one of the most fundamental values of international relations. The approach to the study of world politics is typical of realist theories of its (Jackson & Sorensen 2016; p 5).

Mostly states behave friendly and they love peaceful co-existence, but sometimes some states show aggressiveness and behave very hostile and there is no world government

to control their behaviour. The most basic component of state system is national security. Just to ensure their security some time state also consists some alliance. This alliance same time use to construct power balancing in different regions. The approach based on the power/might of a state called realistic approach based on Morgenthau theory. (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010, p. 6)

INDIA

India is one of the oldest civilisation and the largest democracies of the world and one of the important emerging powers in the world. It has achieved all-round socio-economic progress during the last 70 years of its Independence. It is a vast South Asian country and seventh large country in the world having diverse terrain – from Himalayan peaks to Indian Ocean coastline.¹ ‘It covers an area of 32,87,263 sq. km (1,269,346 sq mt), extending from the snow-covered Himalayan heights to the tropical rain forests of the south. Situated in the northern hemisphere, the mainland spreads among latitudes 8° 4' and 37° 6' north, longitudes 68° 7' and 97° 25' east and the area is about 3,214 km from north to south between the extreme latitudes and about 2,933 km from east to west between the extreme longitudes. It has a land frontier of about 15,200 km. The total length of the shoreline of the mainland, Lakshadweep Islands and Andaman & Nicobar Islands is 7,516.6 km’.²

India achieved its freedom on 15th August 1947 from the Great Britain after a very long struggle. During the freedom struggle, India got support from the different part of the world. Even before independence, we can see the US has a soft corner for India and at a different stage of world politics the US has supported India freedom struggle as it believes that India should be free from Britain and it has should be right to decide its internal and external affairs freely (Tiwari, 1977, p. 1).

There are many commonalities in India and USA especially in nature and structure of the political system. After independence India choose to have a government of people, by the people, and for the people like the USA. The US and India both are democratic countries. Both represent democratic ideas through elected representatives. Both are

¹ <https://india.gov.in/india-glance>

² <https://india.gov.in/india-glance/profile>.

dedicated to the freedom of the individual. Both belief in free and impartial elections. The constitution maker of India chooses a federal structure of the parliamentary system of government, in which power is distributed between state and central government. In India, there is a rule of law and Indian parliament got it all power from the Constitution of India.

In the pre-independence era, India's foreign policy was largely Euro-centered. India's relation with South Asia entered a new phase after the indo-Pak war in 1965. The conflict between China and USSR and the partially move on of America from Vietnam has to impact on relations of South Asian countries (Das, 2012). In the post, cold war era India reached to its boom of economic growth. In 1992, its launch a policy 'look east' to establish a closer relationship with the Asian state. By the time China has increasingly become the centre of gravity for Asian trade and it was the largest economic partner in Asian state. In the South Asia, India is an emerging power which can give competition of economic emergence of China. Even the newly elected Modi government continuing to emphasise the importance of its economic and strategic relations in Asia and committing to 'act' more ambitiously to further this interest. Of particular emphasis under the Modi government's 'Act East' policy is the dismal physical infrastructure connections between India and ASEAN markets. Apart from ASEAN countries, India has also pursued stronger economic relations with Japan and South Korea. India's attempts to find an export market in Japan have not met with great success. (India's Look East Policy, 2010)

In 2003 India, along with China, was the first states outside of ASEAN to sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and in 2004 ASEAN and India signed a Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity agreement. By December 2012, the relationship between India and ASEAN was declared by both sides to have the status of a 'strategic partnership'. Ignoring China's previous protests in 2007, Japan has been invited to participate in the US-India MALABAR naval exercise in 2009, 2011 and 2014 where the exercises were held in the North West Pacific. So by the time India is achieving is the strategical and economic aim of act East and it's making its position strong between Asian states. (Lee, 2015, pp. 78-79, 91)

The United State of America

In the United States America, the government gets its power to govern from the people³. Citizens in the United States shape their government and its policies, so they must learn about important public issues and get involved in their communities. The 55 delegates who drafted the Constitution included most of the outstanding leaders, or the founders of this country decided that the United States should be a representative democracy⁴. They represented a wide range of interests, backgrounds, and stations in life. All agreed, however, on the central objectives expressed in the preamble to the Constitution: "We the people of the United States, in order to form a perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

In a representative democracy, the people have right to choose officials to create laws and represent their opinions and concerns in administration. The world oldest federal democratic state comes into existence on 4th July 1776 when it got freedom from Great Britain. The 13 original states were all former British colonies. When the all 13 colonies turn out to state, each state established its own government. Eventually, the people in these states created a new form of national government that would unite all the states into a single nation under the U.S. Constitution. Today, the United States has 50 states.⁵

Washington did not want to be drawn into the wars which were raging in Europe. Even it says that the alliance with France, which helped in winning American independence, was no all time alliance to support France in all wars. He set on its view in the proclamation of neutrality which it made on 22 April 1793. (Tiwari, 1977, pp. 22-23) In his famous farewell address of 17 September 1796, Washington declared that America should avoid all political connection with the European states, the reason which prompted the United state to adopt a policy of non-involvement were its negligible military strength, critical economic problems, and serious political cleavages at home. (Robert, 1954). A succession of presidents- Madison, Jefferson, Adams, and

³ Learn about the United States: Quick Civics Lessons for the Naturalization Test , page1

⁴ Welcome to the United States: A Guide for New Immigrants, 2007, page 74

⁵ Learn about the United States: **Quick Civics Lessons for the Naturalization Test , page1**

Hamilton- followed the same policy. President Monroe went a step further when, in December 1823, he propounded the doctrine that no European power should be acquired territory in the two continents. This isolation policy helped the USA concentrated its energies and internal power. (Tiwari, 1977, p. 22)

The US had followed a policy of isolation for a long time. It had adopted that policy and followed it faithfully throughout the nineteenth century in view of its economic and military weakness. This policy was an occasional change to suit new circumstances after the 2nd world war. The US never kept aloof from world affairs. It formed several alliances in Europe and another part of the world. It entered into various types of defence pacts and organisations to strengthen security. These resulted in a cold war. Both the US and the Soviet Union have been trying a gear up their war potential and armament. This tendency of the two strong nations has naturally affected the peaceful life of other nations. In pursuance of its policy, the US has formed several defence alliances which aim at checking the spread of communism. (Tiwari, 1977, pp. 30-35)

Theoretical framework

In the late 1970s, Keohane and Nye argue that post-war complex interference is qualitatively different from earlier and simpler kind of dependence previously, international relations was directed by the state. The ‘high politics’ of security and survival had priority over the ‘low politics’ of economics and social affairs. But under the condition of complex interdependence military force is a less useful instrument of policy and this time different power resource, NGO and other international organisation also play an effective role in policy making. (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010, p. 107)

The realist view of international relations is based on the pessimistic view of human nature in which due to a high level of security concern and state survival they think war is the ultimate solution of the international conflict. Basically, in the world order, everyone wants to be on the driver seat so they can take advantage per their own. They believe that the acquisition and possession of the power, and deployment and uses of power, are central preoccupations of political activity. According to Morgenthau, Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the models of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action. Here he clearly echoing Machiavelli and Hobbes. (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010, pp. 67-74)

In 1979 Kenneth Waltz gave neorealist theory which was heavily influenced by economic models. In Waltz's view, the best IR theories are one that focuses centrally on the structure of the system, on its interacting units, and on the continuities and change of the system. Basically, Waltz believing in a system of power balancing between state. According to him, bipolar systems are more stable and thus provide a better guarantee of peace and security than do multipolar system. His theory of international politics very seeks to provide a scientific explanation of the international political system. In his view, the best IR theory is that one which focuses centrally on the structure of the system. In classical realism, state leaders and their international decisions and actions are at the centre of attention. In neorealism, by contrast, the structure of the system that is external to the actors, in particular, the relative distribution of power, is the central analytical focus. (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010, p. 79)

According to waltz's neorealist theory, a basic feature of international relations is the decentralised structure of anarchy between states. All states have to collect taxes, conduct foreign policy, and so on. In the world order, we can see change according to rising and fall of great power and accordingly balance of power also shift from one to another. In the international political system balance of power can be achieved but it can give any guarantee that wars can stop by it. Waltz differentiate between bipolar and unipolar world system. He believes that bipolar system or balancing of power can give a better peaceful and stable security environment rather than a unipolar world system. (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010, pp. 70-80)

Unlike Schelling's strategic realism, waltz's neorealism not giving any fix policy guidelines to leaders to confront practical problems of world politics. His theory does not make many guidelines for statecraft and diplomacy for states. His argument is based on determinist theory in which structure dictates policy which is a move on from the classical realist concept. He opted a normative aspect. For example, he operates with a concept of state sovereignty which means state is in a position to decide and it's independent. He also give importance to the concept of state national interests. (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010, p. 80)

Waltz (1979:195) also argue that the great powers always manage the international system so the concept of the 'great power' follow by 'great responsibilities' is not a traditional realist idea but it is a care idea of the international societies approach. So it

is clear that he is convinced that international order is more likely to be achieved in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems. (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010, p. 81)

As Waltz has accepted the sovereignty of the state and he describe that he sovereign means not insulated , we can see that today's world order is based on interdependency and different state try to rise as a global power to balancing world power system. In this order to growth as a supreme power at different point, national interest of different states clash with other state; here conflicts raise between states. In the world order there is a numbers of basis of conflicts, many of them exist from the origin of states and many conflicts are the consequences of the change in the society.

Civil wars last many years longer on average than inter-state conflicts, and have a much higher civilian death count. Civil conflicts have rumbled on in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Central African Republic and South Sudan to name but a few. Terrorism also continues to make headlines and annual death tolls are rising. Organised crime can consider under terrorism. Terrorism is the reason between the conflict between India and Pakistan. Environmental issues is also a caused of the conflict where national interest of different country clashed with each other. Encroachment of others territory, like China in Indian territory, obligation of sovereignty of others state like America in North Korea or Russia in Afghanistan, fight for economic growth after globalisation, state desire to become a supreme power in the world and arm race and formatting different military troop; these things can be considered as issues of major conflict in the present world order. (Pant, 2010)

But when different countries suffered from the similar kind of problem they come closer and start to understand others pain and problem; on this situation, these states take step toward mutual cooperation and start making a strategy to come out with that problem, whether these problems are natural or it's man-made. In the present world, we can see that on the issue of terrorism different country coming together as in the world most of the country suffering from it. The Same fear of nuclear weapon is also same for every state and they are trying to work together so this weapon of mass distraction can't prove harmful for entire humanities. Interdependency is also a reason for cooperation in the world.

Statement of the problem:

The current wave of globalisation has been driven by policies that have opened economies domestically and internationally. In the years since the Second World War, and especially during the past two decades, many governments have adopted free-market economic systems, vastly increasing their own productive potential and creating myriad new opportunities for international trade and investment. Governments also have negotiated dramatic reductions in barriers to commerce and have established international agreements to promote trade in goods, services, and investment. Taking advantage of new opportunities in foreign markets, corporations have built foreign factories and established production and marketing arrangements with foreign partners. A defining feature of globalisation, therefore, is an international industrial and financial business structure. For the purpose of economic strength and development, different states try to establish good relations with each other. Now the economic growth is prime rather than other ideology. Developed and developing country both are dependent on each other to fulfil their need, example: developed countries need market while developing countries need Modern technology. (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010, pp. 196-197)

Today's world order is interdependent, where all states of the world are dependent on others to fulfil their requirement whether it is social, economic, culture or security. Sometimes they cooperate with each other or sometimes some stronger states dominant to others to fulfil their desire, it depends on the position in the world order of the particular state. Even now the objectives of the state have changed from ancient state and state is become a welfare state and virtually all states are recognised insiders possessing formal or juridical statehood where they also try to provide social-economic security to their citizens with conflict management.

Despite the advancement of global order into a more interdependent one international politics is still dominated by the realist perspective with a focus on power politics; an arena of rivalry, conflicts, and war between states in which the same basic problem of defending the national interest and ensuring the survival of the state, and the security of its people, repeat themselves over and over again. The state is still a pre-eminent actor in world politics – individuals, international organisations, non-government

organisation etc. are either far less important or unimportant. This perspective to see global order place a great deal of importance on the balance of power, which is both an empirical concept concerning the way that world politics are seen to operate and a normative concept: it is a legitimate goal and a guide to responsible statecraft on the part of the leaders of the great powers. It upholds the basic value of peace and security. (John Baylis, 2014, pp. 16-17)

In the dynamic world, different country modifying their policies to make their relationship more positive with others. USA and India, first one the dominant power and another the emerging one, both are taking many steps to give a positive track to their relation in a different field. The security of boundaries along with the cooperation against the emerging potential threat is one of the important aspects of the cooperation. India-USA cooperating in the fields of nuclear non-proliferation, terrorism and security strategy, strategical cooperation in energy and environmental change, educational development and women empowerment, economic, business, agriculture development and food security, science, technology, health and new innovations. The ties between India and USA moves to limited relation stage to a strategic partnership where both the nation understand the importance and requirements of each other. Now the strategic relations become stronger than ever before as America support India's entry in NSG and MTCR. The USA also recognised India's strong claim on permanent membership in UN Security Council.

The present Indo-US rapprochement has been termed as 'irreversible' and is known as Strategic Partnership. Both states took numerous steps which lead them to develop a strong strategic partnership. This strategic partnership is comprised of a broader range of areas for mutual cooperation which includes economic, trade, space, nuclear technology, missile technology, and defence cooperation.

In the modern state system, state security is a complex phenomenon; each state in international sphere has its own specific security definition according to its strategic interests, therefore, one can not confine any specific concept of security which could cover the concept and definition of security in general and would be acceptable for all states in the world. Besides this, there are some general elements which are usually found in the security policy of almost all the countries in the world, i.e. Identifying and preserving core values, internal security, preservation of the ideology of the state,

security from external intervention and threats, economic security, political independence, avoiding hegemony, border security, avoiding disintegration, security from state and non-state terrorism, maintaining a favourable regional and international environment etc. Among all the above elements of security different states may have different priorities, for example, United States' priority may be avoiding terrorism, China's may be avoiding hegemony, India's may be avoiding disintegration etc. (Bukhari, 2011)

The nature and content of relations between New Delhi and Washington have been an enigma and a paradox over the last five decades. India's relations with the US have always been a roller coaster. A former Indian Ambassador to the US termed the relations as "a pattern of misunderstanding, miscalculations and missed opportunities." Dennis Kux has called India and the US "Estranged Democracies." The love-hate syndrome haunts relations between the two countries. Differences in our backgrounds, resources, attitudes, perspectives and priorities were clearly reflected during the Cold War. The characteristic American hostility towards India was particularly visible during the Dulles period when a country that did not toe the American line was considered to be against it. The battle lines got hardened during the Cold War when the differing world views of the Indians and the Americans came into sharp focus. Both New Delhi and Washington have viewed their national interests vis-a-vis the world at large in divergent ways.⁶

An ever more influential and significant India in the international arena is acutely in national interest of the United State. The United States that maintains its power and influence in the international arena, especially in Asia, is deeply in India's national interest. The adjoining possible policy partnership between India and the United States in all the dimensions of their relationship is more and more important to both nations, helps sustain a favourable balance of power in Asia and beyond, and promotes international peace and stability establishment in Asia writ large. With these ideologies as a foundation national interests of India and the United States and proposes specific policy prescriptions for both governments to undertake to advance the bilateral relationship in the period ahead. (Mukherjee, 2009)

⁶ <https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun-6.html>

To maintain a balance of power in Asia and in Europe that promotes peace and stability; promote the security of the global energy supply; cooperate in the management of the global economy, and effectively address climate change. A strong, vibrant, ever-deepening U.S.-India relationship advances the vibrant national interests of both nations. In this respect, India and the United States seek to slow the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ensure the safe and responsible stewardship of nuclear weapons and fissile material; reduce threats from international terrorism. Henry Kissinger observed well over a decade ago that the United States and India have “no conflict of interest in the traditional and fundamental sense,” a point that the late premier Indian strategist K. Subrahmanyam also eloquently emphasised in ensuing years⁷. Although undoubtedly Washington and New Delhi will have periodic tactical and conceptual differences over how best to defend them, these congruent national interests—together with democratic values—represent the most long-lasting basis for ever friendly U.S.-India relations in the years ahead. Executing policies which strengthen the dynamic national interests can make available content to what could otherwise risk becoming purely a rhetorical “strategic partnership” illuminate the relationship’s significance in the middle of a vast range of competing pressures on the time of policymakers in Washington and New Delhi, and reduce the frequency of lower-level bureaucratic skirmishes and paralysis.⁸

Review of literature

Swaran Singh & Jayanna Krupakar (2014) Indo–US Cooperation in Countering Cyber Terrorism: Challenges and Limitations, Strategic Analysis, 38:5, 703-716. In this paper, authors analysis about cyber terrorism that how the internet is using for Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, online hate propaganda and recruiting, planning and effecting terrorist attacks have become new frontiers of terrorism. The ubiquitous cyberspace has expanded terrorism structures and transformed their operations. Given their democratic traditions of privileging basic freedoms, such as individual privacy, and the unprecedented spread of the internet, India and the US face a formidable challenge in confronting cyber terrorism. While both countries share a strong

⁷ <https://books.google.co.in/books?isbn=0876095090>

⁸ International Relations , pant

political affinity to cooperate and have set up institutional mechanisms to secure cyberspace, divergences in their approaches and a lack of clarity and consensus on their immediate and long-term goals continue to be their fundamental limitations. In spite of their strong commitment to work together, their divergent approaches to internet governance and episodes like the WikiLeaks and Snowden affairs have only re-enforced their continuing trust deficit.

Bharat- America sambandh ki eitihasik samiksha aur modimay America by Prof. M.D. Badrul Alam published in World Focus (Hindi) Feb 2015.

In this article, he discussed the relation b/n both countries during the cold war and post-cold war period. How both countries work to save a life during the Tsunami in 2004. Both provide a licence for import technology and go through the open-air agreement. Bilateral trade b/n both raise to 40 billion dollars from 13.48 billion dollars. Both work for strategical cooperation and to make sea area more protected both works on marine cooperation framework. America also helps in the nuclear field to fulfil energy supply. Both are committed to fighting against terrorism. To improve citizen living standard, different organisation of America will help USAID to develop smart cities. In the field of education under GYAN project India will invite at least 1000 teacher from America to teach in the central university of India. So, during the Modi-Obama administration, both countries are more committed to the cooperation and good relation.

India – America security and internal security cooperation in the 21st century by Dr Rajesh Kumar, a paper published in World Focus in Dec 2015 (Hindi).

In this paper, mainly the analysis India-America defence relation during the current Modi government period. America not only sold Arm and plan to India but they also signed an agreement to produce ordinance compositely in 2005. In 2002 America sold 12 arms locator radar made in Rethiyan in 200 million dollars which were the matter of concern for India's biggest arms supplier Russia. Even during the Modi's 3rd USA visit America focuses on single window recommendation system to sell defence utility to India. Modi met with all high CEO of Silicon Valley to transform Make in India campaign in Reality. The Indian government also open some defence venture

of FDI cooperation. India is changing its strategy in act East policy to rebalancing in Asia Pacific region. Both countries together trying to prod China to rebalance in Asia.

US-India Defence Relations: A strategic partnership for the 21st century by John Pedro; Cornell international affairs review 2016, In this article, John Pedro (2016) review US-Indo relationship from the time of India's independent, he goes through the reason of difference and now how common interest of both country help to grow a strong relationship between both countries. vol. 9 no.1

Amit Cowshish (2015) Indo-US defence cooperation: Harvesting Defence Technologies at IDSA says that the US offer all those defence technic to India which required. Out of 41, 17 has been transferred to India while 24 believed to be on the card. The US has emerged as the largest supplier of arms to India, surpassing Russia and Israel. But still, there is some issue.

Lavia Lee (2015), India as an of consequence in Asia: the potential and limitations of India's 'Act East' policy; The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol.29 no.2 - In this paper author looked India's very prominent role in Asia under the leadership of Narendra Modi. It first outlines the historical basis for the Look East Policy which starts in 1992, which started with the objectives of economic boost up by earlier governments. But it analyses the economic, diplomatic and security objectives and strategies pursued by more recent Indian governments to deepen relations in Asia and try to find to explain why the region want Indian Partnership large scale. Finally, it also analyses the main features that obstruct in the growth of India's economic and strategic role in the region. India's economic integration in the region has improved, its capability has to be realised. The greatest scope for an extended role for India is clearly in terms of its capacity to play a soft-balancing role to be able to compete for the rise of China. India could support other strategic players by exerting extra expenses and limits the China to discourage behaviour that disrupts and undermines the normative and strategic basis of Asia's regional order. However, it can say that

India has its own strategy in South Asia to prevent China and make stronger relation to other Asian state to achieve its aim.

Gray K. Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut and Anupama Shrivastava (1999), Engaging India: US Strategic Relations with the world's largest democracy:- Books are about the India-US strategic relationship that how NAM has effected relationship of both the country and how India pro- Russian view and America tilt toward Pakistan has worked as a factor the relationship of both the country. It's also describe that after the indo-Sino war in 1962, India changes its strategic policy. Effect of India's first nuclear test and formation of NSG in 1974 and USA non-proliferation programme and effect on India's nuclear programme. In BJP govt. time India defence policy was different and what was the threat to Indian national treat.

Hypothesis

- Cordial relations between India-USA are complimentary to their national interest.
- Both the nation are facing similar kind of challenge especially in security dimensions.
- A strong defence mechanism will help India to maintain better border security which also helps to focus on the different field of development.

Objectives

As my thesis have the main emphasis on defence cooperation between both countries, so my objectives are:

- To find out the drivers which help in the betterment of ties between India-USA.
- To discern the trajectory of defence cooperation in multilateral perspective.
- To find out the roadblocks to the bilateral defence cooperation.

Research methods

The proposed study will be descriptive cum analytical in nature. Empirical evidence will be collected from the secondary sources. The focus is to discern the trend of India-USA relation through the content analysis techniques of the dominant literature. Also, the term and conditions of various MoUs and agreement will be taken into consideration in general and in defence term in particular.

Primarily following sources will be used for the collection of empirical evidence and content analysis:

- MoU signed by India-USA in a different field of cooperation will use as primary data.
- The article of different magazines, newspapers related to defence field and related to international relation will use as Secondary sources.
- Analysis of day by day activity.
- Books are written on India-USA relation and foreign policy of India.

Universe of the study

Many articles have been published on Indo-U.S. relations. But my research is different from all of these. I have especially tried to show why India's relations with the United States of America have been changed the time to time and what is the reasons behind these changes in the relations. And what kind of changes took place in the relationship between both countries. The factors which play vital roles in making good relations have been ostentatiously discussed in my thesis. America's relations with Pakistan always effect negatively Indo-U.S relation also have been mentioned. I have intended to explore reasons, why the U.S.A. regards India as a potential power. I try to explain how the relationship between both countries has taken a positive trajectory and why both countries are important for each other in world politics. India and USA relation face many ups and down. As this research work aims to study defence relationship among both countries especially in past one decade. The issue will be approached through a multilateral perspective and the role of various state and non-state actors will be visualised in the research concerned.

Tentative chapter

- Introduction
- India-USA Relations- 1947-2005
- India-US socio - economic and others relations.
- India- USA Defence relations in multilateral world order (2005-16)
- Findings and conclusion

The United States looked upon the Middle East as an important area. In the fall of 1952, therefore, held a discussion with the United Kingdom on the question of setting up a Middle East defence organisation. Its plan was to include Pakistan as well, in the MEDO. The MEDO, however, did not materialise through the United State continued it's offered for a similar pact. Secretary Dulles declare to his people over the radio and television networks on 1st June 1953 that " the Middle East defence organisation is a future rather than an immediate possibility." he expressed the need for such an organisation in an area which had the Soviet Union for their immediate neighbour. On 2nd November 1953, the New York Time published a report from its Karachi correspondent that the Governor General of Pakistan would hold talks with the US President Eisenhower. The leader of the two countries held a discussion on the subject from 12 to 14 November 1953. The whole of India reacts strongly to the US proposal to give military aid to Pakistan. But Dulles favoured military aid to Pakistan. This was for 2 reasons first, India helped refuse to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty. The second India had not modified or abandoned its policy of nonalignment. (Jalal, 1989)

On 19 February 1954 Turkey and Pakistan announced that they had mutually arrived at an agreement which guaranteed closer political economy and culture tie between them. The US government warmly welcome this announcement. President Eisenhower announced on 24th February 1954 that the United State was complying with a request from Pakistan for military aid. The USA announced military aid to Pakistan at the time when the two countries were going to have direct negotiations on the Kashmir question. It was, therefore, very natural for the Indian people to think that US arms at to Pakistan were intended to force India to settle the Kashmir question to the advantage of Pakistan. The Western power, particularly the United State, try to isolate Pakistan from India no wonder, therefore, the Pakistan become increasingly anti-Indian. (Jalal, 1989)

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CHAPTER – 2

India –US relation during cold war (1947-1991)

The Foreign policy of a country much depends on its geographical condition on globe, resources available in its territory, economically condition of the citizen and form of government working there and set of neighbourhood etc. Formal relation between two countries India and USA started after India's independent on 15 August 1947. India's foreign policy which opts by its leader also born by the situation after independence and partition of India. After independence India not only lost its huge part which was most fertile land as Pakistan but also got a neighbour who always prepared to make India in trouble. Relation with China and other neighbouring countries and India's position in world politics are also playing an important role in deciding India's foreign policy. (Bipan Chandra, 2007, ch.12)

The study of India's independent foreign policy undoubtedly begins with the study of Nehru's role in determining it. Nehru admittedly articulated India's foreign policy, but studies on this phase have often exaggerated the role he has played. the present objective is not to belittle his role, but to restore a more balanced perception of India's foreign policy. (Pant, 2010)

Indo-US relation during the Cold War

After India's independence, Jawahar Lal Nehru took oath as a first prime minister of India on 15 August 1947. It was the phase of the cold war. The second world war had ended and cold war has started, due to it, the World has divided into two group one who supports capitalism and was associated with the America and second who supports communism and was allied with Russia. Nehru has understood that all poor countries of Asia and Africa who got recently independence after a long struggle has nothing to lose but they will lose everything if they got assigned with any of the power blocs which trying hard to do military alliances with these newly independent countries. So he affords to pursue an independent foreign policy for India. He realised that given its great civilisation, India could not but aspire to the right to speak in her own voice. The recent, hard-won freedom from the colonial oppression would also be meaningless unless India found expression in the international arena. (Bipan Chandra, 2007, p-147-148)

Nehru has given shape voice in the form of the idea of non-alignment and an organisational cohesion through the non-alignment movement (Bipan Chandra, 2007, p. 148). The most obvious difference between the foreign policies of India and the US is that while India's foreign policy is based on non-aligned but US foreign policy was based on the concept of a series of alliances for the purpose of containing communism. On the contrary, India has adopted a policy of non-alignment. It has cultivated friendly relations with both the blocs. It has avoided siding with either of the power blocs. The US has entered into military alliances with a number of countries and has established a military basis in those countries. India is fundamentally opposed to such a policy. It is the pursuit of such a policy by the US which has been responsible for the many ups and downs in Indo-US relations since India become independent. In 1949, the NATO was formed at the instance to the US. In 1951, the US joined mutual defence pacts with Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. It also entered into a pact with Japan, South Korea and Nationalist China (Rana, 1994).

If we go through the Indo- US relation before independence we can see the US has a soft corner for India and at a different stage of world politics the US has supported India freedom struggle as it believes that India should be free from Britain and it has should be right to decide its internal and external affairs freely (Tiwari SC, chapter1). But after India's independence world scenario has changed and the US has also abandon its policy of isolation and it becomes a super power who act as a leader of capitalist countries in the world politics. So when Nehru gave the idea of non-alignment to the newly independent countries of the third world it was an unexpected step of India for the U.S. Relation of both countries went on bad terms when the U.S. realised that the ethics of Non-alignment against the U.S policies of capitalistic imperialism, as the USA wants to his position continue as a superpower, he opted all the way to prevent the Soviet Union socialist ideology, and its try to spread it capitalistic approach. To their economic improvement USA strongly recommended capitalism and oppose other ideology as it was an economic reality, While India's foreign policy was based on idealism which was more or less tilt toward Russia's policy of socialism. As in the early phase of Indian foreign policy; it was totally governed by the idealism of the national moment and Nehru's thought. Nehru's political ideology was an 'odd mixture' of liberalism, Marxism and Gandhi which has a radical transformative thrust against Western modernity. Nehru supposed the need for a mixture of vanishing point between

the scientific essence of post-enlightenment modernism and the profound lessons of life, which have witnessed the minds of thinkers in all ages and in all countries. Nehru's thought to control India economic was mixed of both ideologies- liberal and sociological. Even due to the basic ideological difference between India-USA, once can see that he ideologically was too much tilt towards Russia's socialist economic policy. (Bose, 1982)

The crucial importance of the Kashmir issue to India and its involvedness were never appreciated by the US and other western power for many years. They also failed to see that in the 1950s Kashmir was more than any other single issue made the Soviet friendship a valuable asset for India. In the matter of Merge of Hyderabad in India, Truman also supported Nizam of Hyderabad and in 1956 during the Goa inclusion in India America also criticise Indian government. (Bipan Chandra, india since independence, 2007, pp. 152-153)

Notwithstanding the difference in some crucial issues and its attitudes to international situation as a whole, there was a general fund of goodwill for America among the Indian people. This was amply demonstrated during President Eisenhower's visit in December 1959. Millions turned out to give thanks greet the celebrated war hero who was described in some welcome banners as the "prince of peace". The election of John. F. Kennedy was welcomed in India. The new president indicated a qualitative change in the U.S. foreign policy, especially in relation to the emerging third world, when he said that neutralism had been a part of America's own history for more than a century, and practice of neutrality by the emerging nations was "inevitable" and not "immoral". Kennedy showed better appreciation of India's policy of non-alignment much to the dislike of Pakistan. The appointment of Kenneth Galbraith as the U.S ambassador was viewed as an indication of the importance attached to India by the new administration. (Bipan Chandra, india since independence, 2007, p. 54)

Indo-US relation in 1960's

The course of Indo- U.S. relation was not smooth all the way to being with the bay of pigs episode (April 1961) evoked much criticism in India including a few politically motivated anti-American demonstration. But the Chinese invasion of India's Himalayan frontiers in the north-west and northeast in October 1962, gave a dramatic turn to the relations between the two countries. (Williams, 1969, p. 24). The debacle of the Indian

army and threatened danger to the nation's security compelled India to turn to the United States for support which soon turned into an appeal for military aid. The ready and sympathetic U.S. response to India's appeal for help in her hour of peril earned the latter's appreciation and gratitude. India-China war marked the high watermark of Indo-U.S. relations. Kennedy's decision to immediately accede to Nehru's pleas for American armaments was influenced by the consideration that India is the only country in Asia which capable of scampering for political and military leadership with China. Hence an all out war between these two great and populous nations and China's victory was most unwelcome and was certainly to have extensive and far-reaching complications. The loss of Indian image also led to a further loss of American interest in Indian affairs. The Nehru era in India ended in May 1964 with the death of Jawahar Lal (Pant, 2010, pp. 102-104).

After Nehru and Kennedy, both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Lyndon Johnson lacked the charisma and dynamism of their predecessors in office. But both were businesslike and competent in their own ways. While the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam was causing great concern in the United States the worsening relations with Pakistan posed a serious problem for India. The warmth of Indo-U.S. relations generated during the Sino-Indo war had cooled down to a large extent mainly due to the American attitude on Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations in general. The Indian feeling was that the U.S. had been persisting in its pro-Pakistan stance on the Kashmir problem and was trying to put pressure on the Indian government by taking advantage of India's dependence on PL-480 supplies. India's suspicion deepened when President Johnson abruptly cancelled a well-publicized invitation to the Indian prime minister to visit the United States. The outbreak of war between India and Pakistan towards the end of the year deeply annoyed the United States. To demonstrate her displeasure the U.S. indefinitely suspended all aids to India and Pakistan. In the face of congressional opposition the United States govt. also, refuse to sign a long-term agreement with India under PL-480. The existing agreement had expired in August. The United States released an additional two million tonnes of food between September and December against an estimated overall requirement of eight million tonnes in 1965-66. One outcome of this experience was India's greater determination to avoid dependence on imported food which accelerated the green revolution that was to make the country generally self-sufficient in food within a few years. Another result was the more vocal and trenchant criticism that the

United State had all along been using PL-480 to influence Indian foreign policy. Indian politician and economists strongly denied that the PL-480 program had any altruistic motives and had been of any real benefit to India (Bose, 1982).

The Indo-Pakistan war ended rather dramatically followed by the signing of the Tashkent Agreement (January 1966) under Soviet mediation. Once again the Soviet Union gained a spectacular diplomatic success and appeared as a friend of India and champion of peace in the Indo-Pak subcontinent, but even that time no initiative was taken by the United State of America to maintain the situation (P.M.Kamath, 1987, p. 84).

The sudden death of Lal Bahadur Shastri immediately after the signing of the Tashkent Agreement, led to the advancement of Mrs Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister, after a short period of forceful political debates and manipulation within the Congress party. Besides her own insecure position in the party, Mrs Gandhi was faced with sequences of serious internal problems. The war with Pakistan followed by a suspension appeal by Mrs Gandhi to President Johnson for the resumption of economic assistance received an only partial response. Anxious to improve and revitalise the relationship between the two countries Mrs Gandhi visited the U.S. where she was warmly welcomed by President Johnson. Her visit seemed to clear much of the misunderstanding between India and culture relations looked better. Though in material terms, Mrs Gandhi's visit has yielded significant result- a \$300 million Indo-American Foundation a billion dollar food programme and an unblocking of the channels through which economic aid may flow—no one here has been ungallant enough to say that Mrs. Gandhi came here just to get food and money. Her visit instead seems to have stimulated the basic humanitarian characters of the American people and a gratitude, particularly by Mr Johnson that the Indian people value pride and self-respect and that the way to establish sound relations with a sister democracy is to recognise that fact. This becomes clear when the visit and what was achieved by it is viewed against the background of the "conditions". Mr Johnson had set for normalising relations with India in the course of his now famous Texas Ranch briefing of Last December. He had then stressed three things: performance, and political affinity. But such hopes were soon belied. Several factors were responsible for the reversal of trend. (Goswami, 1983)

Soon after being elected as the prime minister Mrs Gandhi found her position threatened by the old Congress leadership who strongly disapproved her internal policies and her way of conduct within the Congress party. Her chief rival to the office of prime minister Morarji Desai and the powerful old guard in the Congress, known as the syndicate, who opposed her ascendancy was viewed as pro-western with sympathies for the United States. After the war with Pakistan and the earlier war with China, India's military needed throughout rebuilding and modernization (Goswami, 1983). A strong defence force and the organisation were essential to the nation's security against possible Pakistani and Chinese aggression. But the Johnson administration was unwilling to accede to India's request for resumption of military aids. In other fields of economic assistance also the United States, faced with the mounting cost of the Vietnam war, failed to offer generous help to India. Naturally, India turned more and more to the Soviet Union for its vital military and another basic requirement. To all these factors were added the Vietnam War and bombing on North Vietnam by the United state. India's leaning towards the Soviet Union and its strong criticism of the U.S. role in Vietnam and bombing of North Vietnam caused much resentment in America. India's failure to condemn the suppression of the uprising in Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and others communist countries further undermined the image of India as a neutral country in the eyes of the America. (Bose, 1982)

Indo-USA relation in 1970's

A number of developments in 1970 affected Indo-US relations more adversely than they would have if these relations relation had been base on a higher degree of confidence and trust. But in 1970 the USA instructed to close their culture centre in 5 state capital- Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Lucknow, Patna and Trivandrum in the suspect of a spy. Even the relations between India and the United States took a fall and reached the lowest point during the emergence of Bangladesh and the resultant India-Pakistan conflict of 1971 (Sinha, 1994). To begin with, Richard Nixon was not particularly fond of India or Mrs Gandhi. Nixon, to put it mildly, in the words of Kissinger, "was less liable to Indian claims of moral leadership than some of his predecessors." He viewed their "obsequiousness" to India as "a prime example of liberal soft-headedness." When he paid a short visit to India in 1969 on his round the world trip the reception in no way

matched the one received by President Eisenhower in 1956. Nixon's dislike for Mrs Gandhi was ill-concealed. Her "assumption of moral superiority and her moody silence brought out all of Nixon's latent insecurities" (Bose, 1982, p. 16). The U.S. decision to stop all supplies of military equipment to both India and Pakistan in 1965, Kissinger argues, was "deceptive" because it was injurious to Pakistan as India received its arms from Communist countries and her own arsenal (Bose, 1982, p. 17).

Nixon and Kissinger wished to found U.S. foreign policy on a sober perception of permanent national interest. They now judged India by the impact of its actions, not by her pretensions or by the legacy of 20 years sentiment. Kissinger succeeds in making two things clear. The first one is that both Nixon and Kissinger had tilted towards Pakistan and had a deep-rooted dislike and suspicion for India well before the India-Pakistan crisis of 1970-1971. The second point is that the U.S. attitude to the crisis was dictated by self-interest. The Nixon administration had no doubt that the main motive of India was to be about a total dismemberment of Pakistan and make a dramatic demonstration of Indian predominance on the sub-continent. Both Nixon and more Kissinger did not have the slightest doubt that India wanted total dismemberment of Pakistan; that the Soviet Union was giving support to India's aggressive design motivated by the desire to humiliate Pakistan and embarrass her allies china and the united states; that the indo-Pak war was really a power conflict "in proxy" between the Soviet Union and China; that the preservation of the "china-link" was crucial to American self-interest. Opposed to so many vital self-interests was the professed U.S. commitment to support democracy, free society and human rights- all of which were trampled in East Pakistan and genocide was being committed by West Pakistan army. (Bose, 1982, p. 18)

It is futile to decide whether India had the motives which white house believed she had in 1970-71. No amount of argument and evidence are likely to have any impact on men of Nixon-Kissinger disposition who had pre-judged the crisis well before it actually flared up. However, he has generously admitted that Mrs Gandhi was relentlessly pursuing India's national interest with single-mindedness and finesse. He says that the U.S. could respect her strength, even when her policies were hurtful to America's national interest. But the latter could by no means support India's hegemonic ambitions. Mrs Gandhi was a far too intelligent and earliest leader to make such a misadventure. The other alternative was to destabilise Pakistan and help the establishment of and help

the establishment of Soviet influence there. This also was detrimental to India's national interests. Mrs Gandhi, in spite of India's very friendly relations with the Soviet Union, would never have welcomed that situation. Such proximity with the soviet union would have posed serious international and national problems for Mrs Gandhi. Against the Pakistan-China alliance and the flirtation between the U.S. and China, India had little option left but to lean increasingly on Soviet help and friendship. In October 1974, Henry Kissinger came to India on a short visit obviously to meet the Indo- U.S. relations which had been seriously damaged by the events of 1970-1971. On October 28, he addressed a meeting of the Indian council of world affairs in new Delhi. (Kaul, 1980, pp. 65-70)

After the dust raised by the storm of 1971-72 had settled down, both Indian and the U.S. sought to leave the past behind and build up a more friendly workmanlike relationship. This process was natural and inevitable because, as the leaders of the countries had reiterated time and again, there was no basis cause of the difference between India and the entanglement of their relationship with the web of international power politics. India's national interest was threatened by Pakistan and China. Moreover, India and always felt that the U.S. was more sympathetic to Pakistan. It was American arms that had encouraged Pakistan to be militant in her attitude to India and she had used American arms against her during the war of 1965. Rather, it was India's obstinacy that had stood in the way of satisfactory settlement of the long-standing Kashmir dispute. (Biswal, 2016, p. 155). This had offered an opportunity to the Soviet Union to woo India, encourage instability and extend the Soviet influence in South Asia. Thus, India-Pakistan tension had long-range effects and vitiated Indo-U.S. relations. Viewed in this context the Shimla conference of 1973 between Z.A. Bhutto and Mrs Gandhi leading to the United States (Rana, 1994). The Shimla accord, followed by Kissinger's visit to India in October 1974 and other high-level visit and talks, had a distinct effect on the improvement of Indo-US relations. This was evident in the agreement to establish a joint commission to "explore the possibilities of fostering mutually advantageous cooperation". The joint commission made a very encouraging beginning and undertook a plan for a wide-ranging program to increase trade between two countries to encourage joint ventures between the Indian and U.S. firms in third countries, greater cooperation in such areas as agriculture, energy and natural resources, communications, education and culture (Bose, 1982).

Relations between India and the United States approached on the unfriendly during the 1970s. After Nixon rudely dismissed US\$82 million in economic aid, India closed down a huge United States Agency for International Development program in India. The Indian government also restricted the flow of American scholars and students to India and also closed American cultural centre suspected in spy. India's criticisms of United States strategies in Vietnam and Cambodia increase, and his up gradation of its representation in Hanoi.¹

The process of improvement in Indo-U.S. relations received a setback in June 1975 with the imposition of the emergency by Mrs Gandhi. Though there was no official U.S. criticism of the emergency there was little about American dislike for the step taken by Mrs Gandhi. Many of the bitter opponents of Mrs Gandhi went to the state and spoke vehemently against the imposition of the emergency. They received much publicity in the media. The U.S. government and majority of Americans interested in the subcontinent never had much liking for Mrs Gandhi. To the U.S. officials and conservative sections, she appeared to be a strong lady who was positively pro-soviet and anti-American in her attitude. (Sinha, 1994, pp. 200-202)

In the US presidential election of 1976, the Indian subcontinent did not figure prominently. This was indicative of the low priority given to South Asia in the American concern for world politics, however, the Democratic party platform acknowledges the fact that India had achieved “a considerable degree of hegemony over the subcontinent” which future American policy should accept. The US had reason to hope that India would be successful in her struggle for political unity and economic progress. The Democratic party was in favour of “a low posture policy” in South Asia. The US should participate as a mediator in local disputes only when all the parties agreed on the usefulness of such mediation and the US herself saw the possibility of offering positive assistance. It also lent support to the general Indian belief that Republicans favoured Pakistan and Democrats favoured India. (Bose, 1982)

Jimmy Carter’s victory in the presidential election of 1976 was warmly welcomed in India. he was believed to a liberal with greater sympathies for third world countries. A change for the better in Indo-US relations was perceptible once again. The unexpected debacle of Mrs Gandhi and her party in the Indian general elections of March 1977,

¹ <http://countrystudies.us/india/134.htm>

cause election in the United States and expectancy of closer ties between India and America in the years ahead highest, the new Indian prime minister Morarji Desai, the foreign minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the Janata party as a whole were believed to be more pro-western in their attitude than the preceding government. soon after the Janata party came into power the Indo-US joint commission and its sub-commissions were activated. The US Congress began to show more sympathetic interests in India and indicated a responsive attitude to India's request for assistance from the international development association. In April 1979, Vajpayee and the secretary of state Cyrus R. Vance, at the end of former's visit to Washington, sign an agreement creating a sub-commission on agriculture to coordinate the knowledge and experience of the both countries. (Sinha, 1994, pp. 215-220)

Vajpayee appreciably recalled the contribution made by US institutions and scientists to India's green revolution. The much-publicized improvement in Indo-US relations during the Janata government could not really have stood the test of a close national security. Some of the most important among the issue areas were economic relations, secular energy and security, naval base in Diego Garcia and management of Indo-American educational and cultural exchange programmes. None of these differences were ironed out during the Janata Carter period of friendly relations between the two countries. (Sinha, 1994, pp. 221-230)

President Carter said the United States welcomed India's bold declaration that it would not manufacture nuclear weapons and would refrain from conducting even peaceful nuclear explosions. He said the friendship between the two largest democracies in the world, which had in right earnest respected human rights, was deep and abiding and an era of very constructive co-operation lay ahead of them. He described Mr Desai as a man of courage and conviction. Replying, Mr Desai said he had come to the United States "with a feeling of deep satisfaction that our bilateral relations are so much closer than they have been for some time in the past." ²

² <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pm-moraji-desai-holds-talks-with-carter/article6446146.ece>

Indo-US relation in 1980's

The massive victory of Indira Gandhi's Congress and the complete rout of the Janata and other opposition parties in the general election of January 1980, confounded all political scientists and analysts in India and abroad. Thus the re-emergence of Mrs Gandhi came as a shock and surprise to the United States and most of the western world and a pleasant surprise to the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. The official US reaction was of course discreet. But the press and the public reaction clearly revealed American uneasiness and apprehension. India's refusal to join the chorus of condemnation of Soviet action and her abstention from the overwhelming U.N. vote condemning the Soviet intervention depended on the fear of India's return to a pronounced pro-soviet policy. At the same time, the US decision to offer arms aid to Pakistan to build up the latter's defence against possible Russian aggression alarmed India. Citing experience of the 1965 war when Pakistan had used American arms against India, in spite of American assurance that this would not happen, Mrs Gandhi vehemently voiced her criticism of the US proposal. (Bose, 1982)

The US did not agree with the Indian viewpoint. To the US the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was the first step towards the realisation of a much greater objective. The presence of the Soviet military in force there is a palpable threat to those countries and the sensitive Persian Gulf region from which flows 2/3 of the world's oil exports. Goheen emphatically asserted that a strong reaction to the Soviet threat was "a matter of simple prudence". He tried to assure the Indians that they had nothing to fear from US assistance to Pakistan and friendly relations between China and America. He pointed out that the US government had "deliberately avoided offering either the kind or quantity of arms that might endanger India". The American people and their government genuinely feared that the Soviet march into Afghanistan was only a step for what to their ultimate destination the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The Carter administration at this point was anxious not to antagonise India and in fact endeavoured to remove Indian misgiving without compromising, what Americans perceived their national interests and security. (Bose, 1982)

Opposed to this was India's sincere conviction that the soviet's had no such design. So here was a situation where though both prime minister Mrs Gandhi and President Carter had no intention of widening the rift between their respective countries, they took totally

different views of a situation in the light of their perception of national interests. The issue of nuclear energy and security has been for about a decade a major stumbling block in the way of a better relationship between India and the United States. The latter had been insisting for a long time that India should sign the international nuclear non-proliferation treaty (1968). But both Mrs Gandhi and Morarji Desai refused to be a signatory to the treaty unless the superpowers themselves agreed to implement the conditions which they were asking others powers to fulfil.

India maintained the position that the treaty must be signed by all the countries on a “basis of equality”. The origin of the disputed issue goes back to 1963 when the United States under an agreement to cooperate in the civil uses of atomic energy, started to supply to India enriched uranium for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) for 30 years. But when in May 1974 Indian made a nuclear explosion it caused great consternation in the western world. India’s emphatic and repeated assertion that it was a “peaceful nuclear explosion” and that she had no intention of producing the bomb of using nuclear energy for any other purpose did not succeed in allaying the fear of nuclear proliferation. The U.S. government was under pressure to stop the supply of uranium to India unless she agreed to accept certain safeguards and stipulations and was willing to sign the nuclear proliferation treaty. The indo-American joint communique issued at the end of Henry Kissinger’s official visit to India in October 1974, referred to India’s affirmation that she would not develop nuclear weapons and she would use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only. The meeting between Carter and Desai in 1978 and a series of high-level talks and correspondence failed to resolve the issue. However, the Carter administration, in spite of mounting congressional and political pressure, was unwilling to stop the supply of uranium in violation of the existing agreement. The secretary of state Edmund Muskie pleaded for the sale of 38 tonnes of nuclear fuel to India for its Tarapur reactor. (Mohite, 1995, pp. 82-83)

The Reagan administration took a different view of the issue and was of the opinion that resumption of supply to supply to India will encourage nuclear proliferation and will be an unwise acceptance of India’s adamant that there was no other option but to give the agreement of 1963 a decent burial. A series of high-level talks failed to resolve the problem. The apparently improved and more cordial relations between the U.S. and India was being accorded an important position in American foreign policy in general

and south-west Asia in particular. America, he said, was interested in a “cooperative relationship”, with India because of the latter’s role as “a leader among the developing and non-aligned nations”. Kenney said in 1959, would determine the future of that continent. He sincerely wished to see India win that race with China and was strongly in favour of helping India in all respects. It is quite obvious that Kennedy’s interest in India and his desire to help her were inseparably linked with the national interest of the United States. The worsening of indo-U.S. relations has been aggravated by the crisis in Afghanistan. The U.S. ambassador to India Harry G. Barnes recently said, exist on the question of Tarapur nuclear power plant; the U.S. military assistance to Pakistan; India’s decision to abstain on the U.N. resolution urging withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan (implying the Indian reluctance to condemn Soviet intervention in Afghanistan) are the points of disagreement between both country. In 1962 the U.S. responded to India’s pleas for military aid against Chinese aggression. But the situation has greatly changed since the early 1970s. Now there is a sort of Pakistan-China –U.S. alliance. In the event of any threat from China, India cannot any longer count on material support from the United States. American disappointment with India’s failure to openly condemn the Soviet action and call for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is unconcealed. Many public leaders have expressed their anger and dejection. Strongly pleading for giving arms aid to Pakistan Henry Kissinger reiterated his conviction that India, in collusion with the Soviet Union wishes to see the dismemberment of Pakistan. Nixon informed Mrs Gandhi in a letter that the U.S. had “chosen to work primarily through quiet diplomacy” (Chadda,1986)

A few factors had in the past and will in the foreseeable future continue to have some influence on Indo-U.S. relations. One of these in the legacy of the U.S. foreign policy of the past three decades and the legacy of the Indian struggle against imperialism. To the United States, the crucial problem in the post-second World War period was containment of communism. The U.S. support for the unpopular dictatorial regimes in Thailand, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan and other places was a part of this general policy of containment. The U.S. attitude to the resurgence of numerous.

An American coach of a worldwide strategic and ideology confrontation against the Soviet Union was unable to comprehend let alone appreciate democratic India's policy of standing aside and head holier than thou forces of Evil on both house." This was followed letter by speculator state visit to the United States Indira Gandhi's July 1982

trip to Washington was a great media success both Reagan and Indira Gandhi visually enjoy the publicity. (P.M.Kamath, 1987)

The individual understanding between Indira Gandhi and United States President Ronald Reagan, established during a series of meetings in the early 1980s, permitted the two nations regularly to begin refining two-sided relations. Indira Gandhi and Ronald Reagan "hit it off well when they meet for the first time at the Cancun meeting in 1981". Whether her visit was equally successful or otherwise, inheritance she had nothing to declare in the accompanying baggage". Most analysis, however, agrees that the Indira Regan Summit had a significant achievement to boast of both sides agree to stop barking at each other in an unseemly manner and habitual display of mutual disagreement at every turn. Upon his return to New Delhi after the Indira Regan Summit investor Harry Barnes went out to his way to put into practice the new policy of projecting the positive. The Indira Regan submit head the net effect of substantial improvement in clearing negative perceptions in Indo-us relation (Jain, 1988)

The Reagan administration reviewed its policy to India and decided to enlarge areas of cooperation, particularly in the commercial and scientific field, as a means of responding Soviet impact in the region. Washington also looks upon New Delhi's status as the most important regional power in South Asia in a highly favourable condition. For her part, Gandhi feels that India was not able to stop United States arms sales to Pakistan, but better communication with the United States could open other areas of collaboration that could advantage Indian interests. Indira Gandhi's highly successful 1982 state visit to the United States was followed by a series of high-level interactions, including the visits of Vice President George Bush and Secretary of State George Shultz to India. In addition, in 1982 the two sides settle down their clash regarding supplies of fuel and spare parts for the nuclear power plant at Tarapur. In 1984 the United States decided to increase technology transmissions to India.³ But Indira Gandhi's tragic death in October 1984 marks the end of a chapter in Indian politics and public affairs.

Rajiv Gandhi was quite different from his mother, he doesn't seem to suffer from any ideological hangup, not strong personal preference or prejudice seem to twist his pleasant manner. He was very keen to get the world across especially among the industrially advanced Western countries that India had embarked on liberalisation drive

³ <http://countrystudies.us/india/134.htm>

and will encourage large scale and Rapid modernization of India's Technology and managerial base. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Reagan meet to each other in June 1985 in the state of Indo-us relation. Both show a positive attitude during the meeting, the youth new leader was seen in the United States as unencumbered by the ideological angularities and inherited anti-Western bias so so characteristic of the Asian-African people and a majority of their leaders. Rajiv Gandhi is the new economic strategy of seeking growth through decontrol De-licensing and economic liberalisation coupled with positive incentives to the private sector with a view to in cute larger investments was extremely well received in the United States. There is a few optimist who even detects welcome portends radical betterment in Indo-us relations in the near and long term future (P.M.Kamath, 1987, chapter 8).

The new enthusiastic trend in relations between New Delhi and Washington continuous with the 1985 and 1987 visits by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Washington. Similarly, as the United States developed its gratitude to see India's role in South Asia as a force for stability, Washington supported New Delhi's step in Sri Lanka in 1987 and in Maldives in 1988. In the mid- and late 1980s, the United States secretary of defence and the Indian minister of defence visited for represented an unsure but emergent program to support in the field of military technology and other defence. In 1988 the USA and India confirmed a cohesion to provide United States technology for India's light combat aircraft program and also permitted to transfer technology for the F-5 fighter plane. Collaboration between India and the United States in different scientific fields followed the signing of a two-sided agreement on scientific and technological exchanges in 1985. Civil technology transfers also enhanced, and in 1987 India obtained a Cray supercomputer for agricultural research and weather forecasting and acknowledged the stringent United States safeguards to preclude military uses (B.K. Ahluwalia, 1985, pp. 139-149). Additionally, economic liberalisation actions cemented the way for better trade and United States investment in India. In 1988 the improved economic environment resulted in the conclusion of a deal for a Pepsi-Cola plant and the signing of a bilateral tax treaty. In 1989 American asset in India touched US\$1 billion⁴.

⁴ <http://countrystudies.us/india/134.htm>

The government of both countries had shown a different view on international issues like Afganistan, Middle East, Central America and Cambodia, in the 1980s. The American policy of favouring Pakistan and on the nuclear proliferation issue was unchanged. India was consistently disagreed with the American policy to provide advanced military weapon and technology and other support to Pakistan till 1980. While the USA was continued forcing India to sign on NPT, even the USA warns India to abstain from developing a ballistic missile capability by following to the restrictions of the Missile Technology Control Regime, in May 1989, when India successfully tested its intermediate-range ballistic missile Agni. India rejected these appeals on the grounds that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not based on equality and the United States-sponsored Missile Technology Control Regime discriminated against nonnuclear states, so India had a right to develop such technology and that. (India: Foreign Policy & Government Guide, Volume 1, 2001)

Administrative and private-sector were not totally agreed to foreign contribution in the economy, infrastructure problems, bureaucratic red tape, and legal problems remained challenging obstacles to the significant Indian-United States economic cooperation. In the late 1980s, India had differences with the United States on improving its legal protection of intellectual property rights, opening its markets to American service industries, and liberalising its foreign investment conventions. (India: Foreign Policy & Government Guide, Volume 1, 2001)

End of cold war and change in world order

The end of the cold war was one of the most unanticipated events in world affairs. When the USSR collapsed most historians and Scholars of international theories were taken it by surprise. In 1990, with the collapse of USSR, cold war rich to its end and world order has been rebuilt. know in the world only one power has left and the world becomes unipolar from bipolar. India's policy of nonalignment and its significant military dependence on the Soviet Union was a continuing focus of America distrust. Between New Delhi and Washington in international forums were a frequent source of tension (Pant, 2010). But after the end of cold war in 1990, the two largest democracy has had the opportunity of a new start. As an outcome of the end of the cold war, Indian began exploring also other possibilities. Slowly, New Delhi, take on measures to recover their relations with the United States. More importantly, the Indians largely abdicated their

contemplative opposition to American strategic, economic, and diplomatic policies, evincing a new openness to the pursuit of mutually beneficial endeavours. While strong-minded to avoid becoming a counter in U.S. efforts to hold back China, the Indians realised that a closer relationship with the U.S. could help them fill the emptiness left by the Soviet Union's fall and also balance against rising Chinese power. In 1991, India also goes through various economic reforms which also attracted the USA. The United State saw India is a big emerging market. It was in fact both India's largest foreign investor and its largest trading partner in 1991 the United State expanded its military contacts India. The United State was also efficient to bring Russia into the Democratic inflexion. With the cold war over, Airbus a number of development and forces pushing the United State and India to co-operate. Why is some diverging interest continued to trouble the India-US relationship, one heard more and more references to cooperative engagement, strategic operations and other promoting development coming out the both Washington and New Delhi in the 1990s.

The U.S., for its part, was no longer coercively to view India in light of the latter's friendship with the Soviets and could re-evaluate Indo-U.S. relations on their own merits. Thus, the massive structural shift that resulted from the end of the Cold War foreclosed India's old Soviet-centric strategic policies and drove it to consider an approach more amenable to cooperation with the U.S. The shift also enabled the U.S. to be more receptive to this new orientation.

In the early 1990s, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and his finance minister, Manmohan Singh, faced a stark choice. They could seek a short-term solution to India's financial crisis through multilateral loans, or they could try to address the deeper economic problems. Rao and Singh opted for the second approach and decided to use the crisis to make fundamental changes in India's economic growth strategy (Bipan Chandra, 2007). They directed, for all practical intention, India's atavistic commitment to "import-substituting industrialisation" and the labyrinthine regulatory system that it had spawned. Instead, they chose to move India toward more market-friendly economic policies. Key aspects of this approach included adopting a structural adjustment regime, reducing tariffs and agricultural subsidies, loosening industrial regulations, and paring down India's massive public sector. Individual leadership has also played a major role in facilitating enhanced Indo-U.S. ties. Various Indian and American leaders have made significant contributions in this regard. For instance, the decision by Narasimha Rao

and Manmohan Singh to break with India's autarkic development strategy and begin moving toward market reforms facilitated the growth that has made India such a valuable economic partner for the U.S. Even though these market reforms were triggered by the economic crisis emanating from the Gulf War, it still took considerable foresight and political courage for Rao and Singh to launch a policy that represented such a major departure from the past. This is particularly true given the entrenched interests within India that opposed any break with previous policy⁵.

Even, we can feel change deeply in the post-cold war ideology of Indian foreign policy, during the cold war period wherever, India was highly influenced by the Russian socialist thought, in post-cold war its change and India moved toward realism from idealism. With the end of cold war, India start abandoned Nehrusim, which was a major change in its policy to which took India forward to globalisation and to save its vital national interests. During the Cold War period, India's relations with the US and the east while the Soviet Union were viewed in a zero-sum context. But after post, cold war era Indians leaders had felt that Indian military strength and liberalised economy should be the basis of India's national interest and its regional leadership. So now India tilt towards capitalism or economic realism which resembles the basis of the foreign policy of USA. (M.L. Sondhi, 2002, pp. 18-22)

Indo-US relation in 1990's

The United States has been highly supportive of India's efforts to transform its formerly quasi-socialist economy through fiscal reform and market opening, beginning under the Narasimha Rao government in 1991, when India took steps to reduce inflation and the budget deficit, privatize state-owned industries, reduce tariffs and industrial licensing controls, and institute incentives to attract foreign trade and investment. By mid-March 1994, Indo-US relations had touched the lowest level in the 90s, the same was established during the Nixon Administration in 1971 during the Bangladesh war. Against this background, the then Prime Minister of India, P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Washington, DC, in May 1994⁶. This summit between Prime Minister Rao and President Bill Clinton surprised many. It was as a result of negotiations between the

⁵https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Kapur_Transformation_of_U.S._India_Relations.pdf

⁶ <http://countrystudies.us/india/134.htm>

two that all open criticism of India's human right record was withdrawn. Similarly, the pressures created by other security-related insecurities were also relaxed. The US promised flow of funds into Indian industries, particularly in the fields of power and infrastructure development. India was recognised as one of ten major markets for American trade and investment. 1995 saw the visits by the then Energy Secretary, Hazel O'Leary, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and Defence Secretary William Perry in quick succession to promote bilateral Indo-American trade and improve relations generally⁷

However, Narasimha Rao also made certain important security related concessions to the US. he said that India would not create any problems for the US in its effort to extend the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely at the 1995 New York Conference. Rao had given an assurance to go slow on the missile programme of India. After the return of Prime Minister Rao from his visit to Washington, DC, India conducted a test of the Prithvi missile in June 1994. However, subsequently, there were neither any tests of the Agni nor of the Prithvi. The intermediate-range missile, Agni, was, in effect, shelved by stating that it was a technology demonstrator and the experiment was successful. The US officials, in their testimony before the South Asian Affairs Committee, had stated that India's Agni project was in "a period of suspended animation", while the project on Prithvi was in "a period of hibernation".⁸

After the Prime Minister's return from the working summit with Bill Clinton, there was no looking back. It was an upward march for Indo-US relations. In the economic field, the US emerged as the largest investor in India mainly in power, infrastructure and many other industries. The second term of the Clinton Presidency that shows a greater consistency in improving Indo-US bilateral relations than his first term. During the second term of Clinton, both countries show their concern to fight together against the terrorism as USA experience domestic and international terrorism till 1997.⁹

But India's nuclear tests in May 1998 seriously damaged Indo-American relations. President Clinton imposed wide-ranging sanctions pursuant to the 1994 Nuclear

⁷<https://www.idsa-india.org/an-feb-2.html>

⁸<https://www.idsa-india.org/an-feb-2.html>

⁹<https://www.idsa-india.org/an-feb-2.html>

Proliferation Prevention Act. The United States encouraged India to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) immediately and without condition. The U.S. also called for restraint in missile and nuclear testing and deployment in both India and Pakistan. The non-proliferation dialogue initiated after the 1998 nuclear tests have bridged many of the gaps in understanding between the countries. However, India has yet to sign the CTBT, agree to a fissile material production moratorium, or define its intentions on acquiring a nuclear deterrent clearly. U.S. sanctions on Indian entities involved in the nuclear industry and opposition to international financial institution loans for non-humanitarian assistance projects in India remain sources of friction. As a result of the tests, President Clinton imposed wide-ranging sanctions on both countries, mandated by the Arms Export Control Act. Many of these sanctions gradually were lifted through Congress-Executive branch cooperation in 1998-2000. The remaining nuclear sanctions on India and Pakistan were removed on September 22, 2001.(Outlook India)

However, in the Indians' view, Clinton's actions during their country's 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan largely atoned for his earlier policy. Indeed, American actions during the Kargil conflict helped begin undoing the deep distrust of the U.S. that Indian leaders had acquired over the previous several decades. To explain, India discovered in the spring of 1999 that Pakistani forces had breached the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir in a sector called Kargil. The Pakistani positions enabled them to threaten Indian lines of communication into northern Kashmir. As a large-scale Indian counteroffensive began to beat back the intruders, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif travelled to Washington in July and asked Clinton to help him devise a solution to the conflict. Clinton refused to cooperate until all Pakistani forces had retreated back to their side of the LoC. (htt9)

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) coalition government led by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, which came to power following the March 1998 parliamentary elections, supported a modest pace of economic reform. In April 1999, the BJP government resigned following the loss of a confidence vote, 270-269. In October 1999, the BJP government regained power following national elections. A BJP-led multiparty alliance won about 300 of 545 parliamentary seats, prompting analysts to forecast a period of more stable government. In November 2001, Vajpayee met with President

Bush in Washington to discuss the outlines of expanding U.S.-India cooperation.(CSR 2002)

Relationship in the 2000s

Rapidly expanding U.S.-India economic relations were a major focus of President Clinton's March 2000 five-day visit to India. During his visit, South Asia represented a major U.S. initiative to improve cooperation across a broad spectrum, including economic ties; regional stability; nuclear proliferation concerns; security and counter-terrorism; environmental protection; clean energy production; and disease control. Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee agreed in a vision statement to institutionalise dialogue between the two countries through a range of high-level meetings and working groups on the various areas of cooperation, capped by regular bilateral "summits" between the leaders of the two countries.

Economic ties were a major focus of Clinton's visit, during which U.S. companies signed agreements on \$4 billion in projects with Indian and Bangladeshi firms. Clinton also announced \$2 billion in government financial support for U.S. exports to India through the U.S. Export-Import Bank. To further expand bilateral economic cooperation, the United States and India agreed to establish working groups on trade; clean energy and environment; and science and technology. U.S.-India agreements also were signed on environmental protection, clean energy production, and combating global warming. The President also lifted sanctions on some small U.S. assistance programs, including a U.S. Agency for International Development initiative to provide technical assistance to strengthen Indian financial markets and regulatory agencies. On the social welfare side, U.S.-India cooperation agreements were signed on efforts to combat polio, tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS, as well as the trafficking of women and children in South Asia (CSR Report, 2002)

During his 10-day visit to the United States in September 2000, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress and was the guest of honour at a state dinner at the White House. During the course of the prime minister's visit to Washington, U.S. officials announced \$900 million in Export-Import Bank financing to help Indian businesses purchase U.S. goods and services. U.S. companies also signed agreements to construct three large power projects in India, valued at \$6 billion, as part

of increased energy cooperation between the two countries. On September 15, President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee signed a joint statement agreeing to cooperate on arms control, terrorism, and AIDS. When Vajpayee revisited the United States in early November 2001, he came at a time of heightened tensions in South Asia but also during a time of warming Indo-U.S. relations in spite of the close U.S.-Pakistani cooperation during the war in Afghanistan. Vajpayee used the occasion to express his concerns that if the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan were perceived as “slackening” then extremist forces in Pakistan could be bolstered. Recent years, however, have brought a sea change in U.S.- India relations, which was reflected in India’s swift offer of full support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism following September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on New York and Washington.¹⁰

During the tenure of the George W. Bush administration, relations between India and the United States were seen to have blossomed, primarily over common concerns regarding growing Islamic extremism, energy security, and climate change. George W. Bush commented, "India is a great example of democracy. It is very devout, has diverse religious heads, but everyone is comfortable about their religion. Even "described George W. Bush as "being the most pro-Indian president in American history." (htt10) In the December 2004 during the tsunami, the US and Indian navies cooperated in search and rescue operations and in the reconstruction of affected areas. The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continues to grow, while significant two-way investment also grows and flourishes.

In late 2009 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the White House as President Barack Obama's first official state guest. The influence of a large Indian-American community is reflected in the largest country-specific caucus in the United States Congress, while between 2009-2010 more than 100,000 Indian students have attended American colleges and universities. In November 2010, President Barack Obama visited India and addressed a joint session of the Indian Parliament, where he backed India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (Karl, D. 2013).

¹⁰ The full official detailed of president Clinton is published by the embassy which can access by https://www.indianembassy.org/pdf/october_2000.pdf

Between 2004 and 2014 Western *think-tanks*, especially in the US and UK, failed to foresee the swing in electoral voting patterns of the growing middle-class and anticipate the scale of political change in India brought about by improvements in basic education and freedom of the press. According to Michael Kugelman, South and Southeast Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre, the US was unprepared to meet new challenges in India because of its inability to keep pace with the transformations.

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CHAPTER – 3

Cooperation in Socio- economic and other field (2005-16)

Introduction

Relations between the nations are multi-dimensional and India – US relation is no exception. Therefore relations in one field can't be seen in isolation. At the time of its independence, India was not economically strong as it faces an awful famine hit in 1943 in the state of Bengal, killing millions. Under these circumstances, India chooses to take full benefits of being a Non-align state and sought support from either side. Unfortunately, the US was not too willing to help India's according to its desire of rebuilding its national economy. India's plea was put down and the request for help rejected by the US. So since independence, if India has tilted toward the USSR, the reason was USSR has helped to India at the time when India needed economic and technical assistance and, it also helped India in shielding its national interest. India is no longer economically dependent on other states, today because of that time the Soviet Union did a lot of investment in heavy industries. (Pant, 2010, p. 95)

There was a paradigm shift at policy level before and after Indian independence. India needs a change in its commercial relationship for the development in its commercial and economic field and to change commanded global attention. Both the countries, India and the US recognised an extended trade relationship which is beneficial bilateral. now can be seen that India and USA commercial and economic cooperation and ties are playing a very dynamic role in their bilateral relationship. (Kamath, 1987, p. 132)

After 1990, the collapse of the USSR, cold war has over and world order has changed from bipolar to unipolar. The Economic scenario has been also changing, and it was the time of emergence of globalisation. In 1991, India also opted the policy of economic reforms under globalisation. In this age of globalisation, India needs to be aware of the policies of international trade. It has extremely tough to be economically independent and to safe measure for its economy.

At the Doha round of the World Trade Organisation, the US and other developed states argued that the international trade and international policies should be freed from all kind of restrictions. The US and its western alliance also broadcast the idea of international trade system as established under the world trade organisation which will be similarly beneficial for all, but in reality, its serve the interest of the US and its alliance. the manner in which the US

had been forcing India open its market for the sale of American goods is worrying. Yet, when attempts are made to sell Indian goods in European markets obstacles raised on the ground that the Indian companies encroach upon a human right or are not environment-friendly. The objection sorts from the quality of the good to the environment to human rights etc (Pant, 2010, pp. 95-96).

Economic and Trade Cooperation

The year of 1991 was a turning point in Indian history when India faced a serious balance of payments crunch, Prime Minister Rao's has initiated some very important reforms to open the Indian economy under the guidelines of finance minister Mr Manmohan Singh. This unlocked the door for foreign private capital investment, which was a great opportunity for America (Mukherjee, 2009, pp. 1061-62). America started investment in India from US\$165 million in 1992, which increases annual around \$2.14 billion by 1997 annually, which was a 13-fold. In the same manner, two-way trade between India and the US grew affectedly during this period (despite falling as a share of total global trade) and in 2006 reached to almost \$30.6 billion. The United States in 2006 accounted for nearly one-sixth of Indian exports. The growth of India's knowledge economy and the global outsourcing industry brought about multiple private sector linkages. The Economic relation has given a new high to India-US relations (Mukherjee, 2009, pp. 1061-62).

Since then India's economic performance has improved dramatically. With a gross domestic product (GDP) of over \$4 trillion, the Indian economy is now the sixth largest in the world. Moreover, India's GDP growth is no longer stuck at the traditional "Hindu" rate of roughly 3%. Instead, GDP grew 5.6% in 1990 and 8.4% in 2005. **The Asian Development Bank (ADB) predicts 2016 and 2017 GDP growth rates of 7% and 7.4%, respectively¹.** India has also emerged as a major player in the information technology sector and an important international source of skilled labour. Its burgeoning middle class offers a potentially vast market for foreign exports. Not surprisingly, Indo-U.S. trade has skyrocketed from approximately \$4.5 billion in 1988 to roughly \$27 billion in 2005. Despite this progress, India continues to face serious economic challenges, particularly regarding inequality, education, infrastructure, and continued liberalisation. These are potentially serious problems that could undermine India's economic progress—and the further expansion of its relationship with the U.S. Nonetheless the

¹ <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/Vz3abbBkVLzpUgZK71FbVM/Demonetisation-fallout-ADB-reduces-Indias-growth-forecast.html>

new market-oriented approach has helped to spur India's economic growth. This has played a major role in India's rapprochement with the U.S. Both sides have much to gain from further cooperation in the future. They can no longer afford to ignore one another.(Ganguly, 2007)

Hence the US chose the latter option. While India did not have a close a relationship with the US, trade flows between India and the US have been steadily increasing over the years. As per the US Census Bureau, in comparison to 1998 (the year of the nuclear tests), India's exports to the US increased by almost 900 million dollars in 1999. Indian exports to the US grew steadily over the last decade. US imports from India increased from US\$8237 million in 1998 to \$21,832 million in 2006. US exports to India also grew from \$3564 million in 1998 to \$10,056 million in 2006 (Hosur, P. 2010).


As long as China is ruled by a party based on the Leninist concept of the monopoly of political power, a rapidly growing China with increasing military expenditures could emerge as another threat to the US in the coming decades. Elements of the US strategic community are therefore looking for new allies and friends. There is an increasing recognition in the US that India could be one such friend because of shared values (democracy, respect for rule of law and human rights), the highly educated/ skilled and prosperous Indian diaspora in the US and overlapping (not identical) interests. Much of the US establishment (political and academic), steeped in non-proliferation doctrine, was not however willing to end the nuclear apartheid structure that it had built to contain India's strategic advancement after the 1974 atomic test (Virmani, A. 2006).

In 2005, the US imported 16.1 percent of the world's merchandise imports, ranking it as the biggest importer of goods. It is, therefore, the largest market for global exporters and exporting countries and this is a factor in the economic influence and power that it has over others. The share of the second largest importer, Germany at 7.2 percent was about 45 percent of that of the US and that of China at 6.1 percent the third largest importer was less than 40 percent of that of the US. The next three largest importers, Japan (4.8 percent), UK (4.7 percent) and France (4.6 percent), import 30 percent or less of that of the US. They are followed by another group of importers with a group of countries with around 20 percent of the imports of the US (Italy (3.5 percent), Netherlands, Belgium, Canada (3 percent)). Thus for the world, these countries would be ranked high as a destination for their exports. In contrast, India's (and Russia's) imports constituted only 1.2 percent of world imports placing it at 17th (19th) position. If we want to increase the economic influence of India over other countries we must

aim to increase our share of world imports above 3 percent so as get into the top 10.³⁹ What is true globally also applies bilaterally. A progressive and corresponding increase in Indian imports from the US will also increase the dependence of US exporters and US economy on the Indian market. Though world imports of commercial services are 21 percent of merchandise imports, India with 2.9 percent of world imports is ranked 10th. The picture changes somewhat if we treat the EU as a single economic entity. The WTO has carried out the exercise of eliminating intra-EU trade (i.e., among the 25 members) to obtain its trade with the rest of the world. The US is the largest importer with 21.4 percent of world imports, a share that is higher than its share of world GDP at PPP. As noted earlier this is an important component/channel for the US' economic influence on the of the world. The EU is the second largest importer from the rest of the world with an 18 percent share of world imports. Though the import ranking of these two entities is the same as their GDP (at PPP) ranking, the US' share of world imports was higher than its share of world GDP (20.7 percent), while that of the EU was lower (20.4 percent). Next in the ranking are China and Japan with world import shares of 8.2 percent and 6.4 percent respectively. India with an import share of 1.6 percent and Russia with 1.5 percent are ranked 11th and 13th respectively. We must reach the top five by 2020, by exceeding the 4 percent share of 5th ranked Canada. Germany (9.3 percent), US (8.7 percent) and China (7.3 percent) are also the three largest exporters in the world.⁴⁰ The US is, however, least dependent on exports while Germany and China are much more dependent on exports for their growth than the US is. Fourth ranked Japan (5.7 percent) falls in the former category, while fifth-ranked France (4.4 percent) falls in the latter category. Similarly, 13th ranked Russia (2.4 percent) and 29th ranked India (0.9 percent) fall in the former and latter category, respectively. Though world exports of commercial services are 23 percent of merchandise exports, India with 2.8 percent of world exports is ranked 10th in both. If the EU is treated as a single entity the export shares are EU (17.2 percent), US (11.7 percent), China (9.9 percent) and Japan (7.7 percent). Russia (3.2 percent) and India (1.2 percent) are ranked 8th and 20th respectively. The EU, US and India are less dependent on exports while China, Japan and Russia are more dependent on exports for their growth. FDI inflows into an economy also measure the relative attractiveness of an economy. Though the stock of FDI, equity and debt owned by foreigners in an economy denotes a mutual dependence of the host and the source country, once invested and to the extent they are difficult to disinvest, the balance of advantage shifts to the host country. Thus, the share of a country in the world FDI is an indicator of its economic power over the rest of the world. China with 9.3 percent of world FDI flows was the second largest recipient in 2003, followed by France in third place with 8.3 percent and the US in fourth place


with 7 percent. Germany (2 percent), Russia (1.4 percent), Japan (1.1 percent) and India (0.7 percent) were ranked at 14th, 17th, 22nd and 23rd. India's share of FDI has risen significantly over the last two years and is expected to rise further with the removal of sector FDI share limits in telecom, insurance, real estate, banking and retail trade. In particular, a sharp increase in FDI from the US would increase the interdependence of the two economies and thus help to reduce the asymmetry in economic power. (Virmani, A. 2006)

India's Merchandise Trade with the United States, 1958-2006 (U.S. \$ Billions)



Source: Direction of Trade Yearbook, International Monetary Fund, various years.

U.S. Share of India's Merchandise Trade, 1958-2006



Source: Direction of Trade Yearbook, International Monetary Fund, various years.


After India conducted underground nuclear tests in 1998, US President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions on India leading to mistrust between the two countries. The situation eased in 2001 when the George W Bush administration lifted all the sanctions. In 2005, the countries signed a civil nuclear agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. The association between the two countries has grown up since then, manifest by the fourfold growth of bilateral trade since 2006 to 100 billion USD in 2014. Both the administrations are now keen and committed to further improving trade relations. The time is ripe for a new ambition to be set in its trade relations. India continues to arise as one of the most important markets in the developing world and an important business partner for the US. This is evident by the fourfold growth in India–US trade since 2006 to 100 billion USD in 2014. India and the US already have a multidimensional strategic relationship.(AICC report Sep 2015)

India was the 18th major goods marketplace for the U.S in 2013. That year, total India-U.S. trade was \$96.7 billion, up over 400 percent from \$23.9 billion in 2003. In a year this total,

U.S. exports to India were \$35.7 billion and imports were \$61 billion, producing a bilateral trade deficit of \$25.4 billion in 2013, up from a deficit of \$6.3 billion in 2003.²

A key article of growth in two-pronged trade has been in services, which raised 600 percent since 2003, from \$5.8 billion to \$32.5 billion in 2013. This includes an increase in India's services exports to the U.S. of over 900 percent since 2003—from \$2 billion to over \$19 billion in 2013—and growth in U.S. service exports to India of over 350 percent from \$3.7 billion in 2003 to almost \$13.5 billion in 2013. In fact, since 2006 the U.S. has had a growing services trade deficit with India, however, the U.S. runs an amenities trade surplus with the rest of the world.³

Region – wise share of India's Export (April – October 2011-12)




Source:- http://commerce.nic.in/publications/annualreport_chapter7-2011-12.asp

² <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/growing-the-india-u-s-trade-and-investment-relationship/>


³ <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/growing-the-india-u-s-trade-and-investment-relationship/>

Region – wise share of India’s Import (April – October 2011-12)



http://commerce.nic.in/publications/annualreport_chapter7-2011-12.asp

Growth in Indo-US merchandise trade (million USD)



source: - Indo- American Chamber of Commerce (Annual report Sep 2015)

According to ‘Future of India: The Winning Leap’, a 2014 report by PwC, India has seen its GDP rise by more than 1 trillion USD over the past two decades. The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion indicates that total foreign direct investment (FDI) received by India in April– December 2015 was 40.82 billion USD. During FY2015, India received the maximum FDI equity inflows from Singapore at 10.99 billion USD, followed by Mauritius (6.12 billion USD), the US (3.51 billion USD), the Netherlands (2.15 billion USD) and Japan (1.08 billion USD). India is an attractive FDI destination due to a range of factors— wage arbitrage, availability of a large and educated pool of workers and professionals, a government that is keen to make India a preferred FDI destination, and initiatives such as Make in India, which is designed to harness India’s economic advantages. (IACC, Annual Report August 2016)

With its favourable demographics, India offers financial services providers a huge opportunity. Nearly 53% of the country’s population will be in the working age bracket from 2016 onwards, leading to an increase in GDP, while the proportion of population aged 65 and above is expected to double from 5% to 10% over the next 20 years. Both these factors will create a huge demand for financial services products. (IACC, Annual Report August 2016)

In financial year 15, Indian gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP stood at 32.45% which, when compared to the figure for India’s peers, is relatively low. In addition, national savings in India are forecast to increase from 647 billion USD in 2014 to 1,012 billion USD in 2019.2 both these trends are expected to lead to an increase in the need for financial products. (IACC, Annual Report August 2016)

With the potential to become the fifth largest banking industry in the world by 2020 and third largest by 2025, India’s banking and financial sector is expanding rapidly. Indian banking sector assets have reached 1.96 trillion USD in financial year 15 from 1.3 trillion USD in financial year 10, with over 70% accounted for by the public sector. (IACC, Annual Report August 2016)

Cooperation in High-Technology and Space

Basic science and high technology cooperation have been a major pillar of the strategic partnership, the two leaders confirmed, and they looked forward to reviving the science and technology agreement in order to expand joint activities in innovative technology. Prime Minister Modi welcomed the United States as a partner country. For the first time, at India’s annual technology summit in Nov 2014. In addition, they dedicated to organising the 9th high technology cooperation group (HTCG). They planned to launch new partnerships to source and

scale innovation for the benefit of the citizens of both countries and to harness innovation to solve global development challenges. (Alam, 2014)

The two leaders exchange congratulations on the successful entry into the orbit of their respective Mars missions. They welcomed the establishment and planned a 1st meeting of the NASA- ISRO Mars joint working group under the US-India civil space joint working group. The leaders also looked forward to the successful conclusion of a new agreement to support the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (INSAR) mission, to be launched in 2021. (Alam, 2014)

In January 2015, Prime Minister Modi and President Obama once again reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring that partnerships in science, technology and innovation are a crucial component of the overall bilateral engagement in the 21st century. They also confirmed their cooperation for the role that science, technology and innovation partnerships can play in addressing pressing challenges in areas such as food, water, energy, climate, and health and developing innovative solutions that are affordable, accessible and adaptable, meet the needs of the people of the two countries and benefit the global community. The Leaders of the both countries agreed to carry on to develop cooperative efforts in many areas of science, technology, and innovation, including studying the impacts of water, air pollution, sanitation and hygiene on human health and well-being. The Leaders also agreed to enduring U.S.-India collaboration in hydrology and water studies and monsoon modelling and noted the need to expeditiously work towards launching an Indo-U.S. Climate Fellowship to facilitate human capacity building. The Prime Minister and the President also reaffirmed the importance of ongoing efforts to strengthen women's participation in science, technology, engineering, and math through networking and mentoring programs.⁴

Cooperation in Health Sector

President Obama and PM Modi recognised the extensive ongoing cooperation in the health sector which they would put to use in preventing the spread of the Ebola virus. The US welcomed India's contribution to the UN fund and donation of protective gear to the effort against Ebola and thanked PM Modi for encouraging Indians on business in West Africa to

⁴ Part of Joint Statement given by PM Modi and President Obama on 25 January 2015.
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all>

contribute to the fight against Ebola. The PM also offered to deploy Indian expertise in the fight against Ebola, including by investing its resources in producing modelling in the spread of the disease, jointly producing rapid deployable diagnostic and considering the joint training of response personnel. (Alam, 2014)

The leaders agreed to launch a phase of the India-USA vaccine action program to develop an affordable vaccine for dengue, malaria and tuberculosis and the establishment of an adjuvant development centre. They also agreed in principle to initiate cooperative activities to increase capacity in cancer research and patient care delivery, including by developing collaborative programs for India's upcoming AIIMS-National capital institute. The president welcomed India's offer to take a leading role in the global health security agenda. (Alam, 2014)

Cooperation in Educational field

On 25 June 2013, spokesperson of both the country had announced that, In a continuation of the educational partnership between India and the United States, the State Department is pleased to announce the eight institutional partnership projects below for the second round of Obama-Singh 21st Century Knowledge Initiative awards. This initiative strengthens collaboration and builds partnerships between American and Indian institutions of higher education in priority fields. Each project will receive an award of approximately \$250,000 that can be utilized over a three-year period, with the objectives of cultivating educational reform, fostering economic growth, generating shared knowledge to address global challenges, and developing junior faculty at Indian and American institutions of higher learning Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Barack Obama announced the Obama-Singh Initiative in November 2009 as an affirmation of their commitment to building an enhanced India-U.S. partnership in education. Each government pledged \$5 million for this endeavour, for a total of \$10 million.⁵

The leaders committed to partner on the digital media initiative, with the goal of enhancing digital infrastructure, deploying e-governance and e-services, promoting industrial collaboration, and digitally empowering India's citizen. President Obama welcomed Indian proposal to establish the global initiative of academic networks (GIAN or knowledge). Under

⁵ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/211099.htm>

which India would invite and host up to 1000 American academics each year to teach in central universities of India. (Alam, 2014)

Toward this end, Prime Minister Singh and President Obama agreed to strengthen existing U.S.- India cooperation on education, while encouraging new collaborations:-⁶

The Fulbright-Nehru Partnership: President Obama and Prime Minister Singh have substantially increased funding for the Fulbright-Nehru Scholarship Program, the cornerstone of our education partnership. Each government is committed to a nearly 40% increase in funding, initiated in 2010, to expand exchanges in priority fields. The Fulbright program in India is celebrating its 60th anniversary this year and has benefitted more than 17,000 American and Indian students and scholars.

The U.S.-India Higher Education Summit: The United States and India have agreed to convene a bi-national Summit on higher education, chaired by senior officials from both governments, to highlight and emphasise the many avenues through which the higher education communities in the United States and India collaborate.

University Delegations: The United States has sent senior officials on two delegations comprised of U.S. colleges and universities, organised by the Institute of International Education with support from the U.S. Department of Education, to promote U.S. higher education and to assist U.S. institutions in developing partnerships with their counterparts in India. The Indian Minister of Human Resource Development has accompanied Indian institutions on several visits to meet with U.S. institutions in the United States.

School to Work: The United States – through its U.S. Department of Education – is poised to share with India lessons learned from Skills for America, a new initiative announced by President Obama on October 4, 2010. This initiative will identify strategies to link education and business leading to apprenticeships, internships and jobs. The United States – through the State Department – has also initiated a pilot community college program linking Montgomery College with three technical institutions in India. The aim of the initiative is, through faculty and administration exchanges, to better align programming including curricula, student support services and internships to the actual needs of local businesses. Pilot program results will be highlighted in a Spring 2011 conference.

⁶ From the factsheet released on 8 November 2010 during President Obama's India visit.

Community College Student Exchange Program: The United States has also launched its new Community College Initiative Program for Indian students to earn one-year certificates at U.S. community colleges in fields key to national development; the first cohort of 48 students arrived in the autumn of 2010.

Language Learning: The United States strongly supports language learning and sends 100 American high school and university students to learn Indic languages in India each year, while providing English Access Micro scholarships in India to 1,000 disadvantaged 14-18-year-old students for quality after-school English language instruction.

Room to Read Literacy Empowerment: The United States is supporting a dramatic scaling up of programs to increase the numbers of local language children's books available in India, through author and illustrator training, the establishment of new libraries and reading corners, and teacher training on how to engage children with books.

Girls' Education: The United States is supporting girls' education in India. Through a partnership with Room to Read, secondary school girls in need are provided with financial support, life-skills training, female mentors and girl-friendly school environments to help ensure school completion.

Partnership for Basic Education: The United States Government, through USAID, in partnership with the Government of India has recently signed an agreement for a new five-year program to bring proven best practices, innovations and technology to improve India's basic education by augmenting teachers' competence and effectiveness. USG technology aided elementary school program already reaches over 40 million children across India and is showing exemplary improvements in teaching-learning practices, and students' learning gains.

Cooperation in the field of clean energy and climate change

During the visit of President Obama in Nov 2010, both reaffirmed their countries' strong commitment to taking vigorous action to address climate change, ensure mutual energy security, and build a clean energy economy that will drive investment, job creation, and economic growth throughout the 21st century. Toward that end, Prime Minister Singh and President Obama agreed to strengthen U.S.-India cooperation on energy and climate change through the following initiatives: The leaders noted the work of the U.S.-India Partnership to Advance Clean Energy (PACE) to improve energy access and promote low-carbon growth

through the research and deployment of clean energy technologies, and affirmed their support for the CEO Forum recommendation on clean energy.⁷

The leaders welcomed the achievement of significant PACE milestones, including the signing of an agreement to establish a Joint Clean Energy Research and Development Center that will mobilise up to \$100 million in public and private sector funding over five years for R&D on potential breakthrough technologies. This collaborative, peer-to-peer partnership is focused on transformational scientific and technological cooperation on building efficiency, solar energy, and advanced biofuels. The leaders also celebrated the signing of two partnership agreements to facilitate the deployment of clean energy technologies. The governments agreed to jointly develop, deploy, and commercialise innovative clean energy technologies to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy. Recognising unconventional gas as a lower-carbon bridge fuel to a clean energy future, the United States will partner with India to improve its understanding of the country's unconventional natural gas resource potential under the auspices of the Global Shale Gas Initiative (GSGI) and PACE. The leaders welcomed the signing of an MOU on Unconventional Natural Gas Cooperation towards helping India achieve greater energy security in environmentally responsible ways.⁸

In support of PACE, the United States pledged to spur private sector investment in clean energy infrastructure in India through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Export-Import Bank. In line with a CEO Forum recommendation, OPIC is providing \$100 million in financing for the \$300 million Global Environment Fund (GEF) South Asia Energy Fund. The GEF Fund, which will invest in solar, wind, hydropower, advanced biofuels and natural gas projects, will predominantly focus on investments in India. In addition, GEF is announcing today the formation of an India-specific sub-fund in conjunction with the Infrastructure Development Finance Company (IDFC) and other potential Indian investors targeting India-only investment. OPIC's financing for the sub-fund and broader GEF fund is in addition to a growing pipeline of more than \$280 million in potential OPIC-supported clean energy and energy efficiency projects in India. The Export-Import Bank will provide substantial financial support for the purchase of U.S. goods and services to be used in the development of significant renewable energy and natural gas projects in India.⁹

⁷ From the fact sheet released by US govt on 8 Nov 2010

⁸ From the fact sheet released by US govt on 8 Nov 2010

⁹ ibdb

In Jan 2015, during the visit of President Obama as a chief guest on Republic day Prime Minister Modi emphasised India's ongoing efforts to create a market environment that will promote trade and investment in this sector. USAID will install a field investment officer in India this summer, backed by a transactions team to help mobilise private capital for the clean energy sector. In February, The United States will host the Clean Energy Finance Forum and government-to-government Clean Energy Finance Task Force to help overcome strategic barriers to accelerating institutional and private financing. The Department of Commerce will launch a trade mission on clean energy. The Export-Import Bank is exploring potential projects for its MOU with the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency for up to \$1 billion in clean energy financing. OPIC plans to build on its existing portfolio of \$227 million in renewable energy and continue to identify potential projects to support utility-scale growth and off-grid energy access. Both sides renewed their commitment to the U.S.-India Joint Clean Energy Research and Development Center (PACE-R), a \$125 million program jointly funded by the U.S. and Indian governments and the private sector. The renewal includes extending funding for three existing research tracks of solar energy, building energy efficiency, and advanced biofuels for five years and launching a new track on smart grid and grid storage technology.¹⁰

The USA and India find that global climate change is a thoughtful hazard to humanity and to the essentials of sustainable development, growth and the abolition of poverty. President Obama and Prime Minister Modi share a deep concern about the climate challenge and understand that it will require concentrated action by their countries and the international community. They stressed the significance of improving their bilateral cooperation on adaptation measures, as well as joint research and development and technology revolution, adoption and diffusion of clean energy and efficiency solutions that will help achieve the goals of transitioning to a climate resilient and low carbon economy. They also focus on the importance of working together and with other countries to settle an ambitious climate agreement in Paris in 2015. They also plan to collaborate over the next year to achieve a successful agreement in Paris. The President and Prime Minister reiterated their prior

¹⁰ From factsheet released on 25 Jan 2015 by secretary of state (white house).

understanding from September 2014 concerning the phase down of HFCs and agreed to cooperate on making real growth in the Montreal Protocol this year.¹¹

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¹¹ Part of Joint Statement given by PM Modi and President Obama on 25 jan 2015. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all>

Chapter 4

INDO-USA Defence relation

The cold war and End of the cold war

World's political structure has changed with the end of second world war as the entire world has changed into two power group. The period of 1939 to 1945 was the witness of a huge change in the world history. During World War II, America and the Soviet Union fought together as allies against the Axis powers. But still, during the end months of the cold war, the relationship between the both partners of war became tense. Americans had long been mistrustful of Soviet communism and worried about Russian leader Joseph Stalin's autocratic, blood-thirsty policy of his own country. While another side, the Soviets disliked the Americans' decades-long refusal to treat the USSR as a sincere part of the international community as well as their late entry into World War II, which resulted in the losses life of tens of millions of Russians. After the war ended, these complaints grew into an overwhelming sense of mutual doubt and hate. Post world war Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe fueled which created fears of a Russian plan to control the world among Americans. Meanwhile, the USSR came to resent what they supposed as American officials, aggressive rhetoric, arms buildup and dominant approach to international relations. In such an unfriendly atmosphere, no single party can be entire to blame for the Cold War; in fact, some historians believe it was predictable.¹

Nuclear bombs were not the only occupations for the Soviet and the Americans at the start of the cold war. It also must be noted that the American diplomat and Statesman were for more responsible for the one set of the cold war. In 1947 the US administration it funds to Turkey and Greece sending out the message very clearly that the US was prepared to subvert a Soviet ambition to dominate East Europe. This was the birth of the Truman plant, which distinguished between two Worlds of freedom and operations. The Marshall plan, beginning in 1947 according to Bay lies and Smith also reflected the defensive portion of the US in providing aid for European economic recovery. (pant, 2010, p. 38)

The year 1949 was a crucial year for the cold war as this was the year Germany was divided. The issue of Germany decided, therefore, to both campuses. After the war, Germany had been

¹ <http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cold-war-history>

divided into four zones, under France between the US and the USSR. The Western Power Made in London to discuss the decisions the re-industrialisation of Germany. In this discussion, the three unit was treated as one. This is sure that the division of euro was complete, except for the two cities of Vienna and Berlin, which was still within the Soviet June. The USSR retaliated by announcing a blockade of the city. This was the closest the two side had ever come to a direct confrontation and the outbreak of War was a plausible reality. Even Korean War become the reason of due to which cold war reached to Asia. (pant, 2010, p. 39)

The end of the Cold War has created the opportunity for a significant improvement in the relation to the United States and India. Although India and the United States are the world's largest democracies, their relationship during the cold war year was unstable and frequently troubled. India's policy of nonalignment and its significant military dependence on the Soviet Union was a continuing focus of America distrust. Between New Delhi and Washington in international forums were a frequent source of tension. From the Indian perspective, American military assistance to Pakistan has just obliged South Asia, impeding the evolution of a "natural" regional balance of power in which India, the overwhelmingly large state, would enjoy its rightful position of unchallenged Supremacy. The basic psychological conflict is that India sees itself as an emerging great power with the, is it stage, by the United States, has viewed India as a regional power. Thus, US policies described as giving greater importance to China than to India, as bracketing India with Pakistan, have been a persistent source of discord.

Reasons behind cooperation and close relation between India-USA

It true that end of the cold war has opened new doors for both countries but it was not only the reason to come closer both the countries. In past two decades, many changes have occurred in the world order and the different state has faced kind of troubles, which may not even think during the cold war era. In the cold war period, the ideology of the both superpower and military troop formatted by both superpowers were the only threat to the world peace. But in present scenario many there is many caused around the world which creates danger in for the world peace and humanity. Terrorism, the weapon of mass destruction, the identity crisis in the multi-culturalism world, global warming and environmental issue faced by every country in the world and race of nuclear armament between countries are some issues which make rethink to every country about their policies. Many of the developed countries were sure in the past that they will never go through these problems.

The base of cooperation is not peace conflict between both countries but there is a number of the issue on which both share their opinion and have the option to work together in present and future. Nuclear Non-proliferation and cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, is another area here we can see cooperation between both countries from after 2000. India needs advance technology for its betterment in the field of science and technology and the US need a field for consumption of their military and civil projects. In the field of education, both countries inked many MoU and agreement. Right now 100000 Indian students are studying in the US. So we can find out there is a huge area, where both countries can cooperate and take their relationship in positive ways.²

INDIA-US defence relation from 2005-16

In strategic relations, between both countries can be referred as Corporation on the fundamental issues of War and Peace. The perspective of India and the United State or Non-proliferation, regional security and stability in Asia and the regional dynamic in South Asia, these are the things which bound to influence Indo-US relation in the future.

India-US relations reached a new level of understanding when in 1991, both have decided to increase strategic partnership between their defence forces. The kind of strategic dialogue and defence cooperation that is now being envisaged has never taken place in the past between the two countries. In the past, India was particularly sensitive to the perception that Americans either wish to ignore it or to attach unfair restrictions on its legitimate defence needs. Collectively, the various proposals were called the Kicklighter proposals after Lt Gen Claude Kicklighter, who was in Hawaii as Commander of the US Pacific Army. The Kicklighter proposals were drawn from existing Army programmes with other countries. In fact, it was the US Pacific Command which first mooted the possibility of greater cooperation with India in the region. It may be noted in this context that the US Pacific Command is responsible for American security in both the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean regions. The objective of the Kicklighter proposals was to pursue a common policy of gradually strengthening ties towards expanded cooperation and partnership by the end of the decade. Eventually, in the subcontinent defence ties have evolved gradually without so much disturbing the balance of power. In the case of India, defence relations are being virtually built from scratch. Ever since

² https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/122829/2010_10_StrategicImplications_Kumar.pdf

the military dialogue began, the US has been keen to have joint military exercises, particularly in the mountainous terrain. Beginning 1991, the two countries have been having joint military exercises, including joint naval exercises which were held in May 1992. India-US service-to-service cooperation saw joint naval drills being conducted in the early part of 1995. Washington even fielded two nuclear-powered submarines in these exercises. The US has also expressed its desire to practise with aircraft carriers. Besides, the US is also keen to reach an agreement with India for US naval ship repairs to be undertaken at Mazagoan Docks, and making Goa and Cochin permanent port of calls for the US Navy deployed in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. However, it is unlikely that India will accept this.³

The luminosity shown by the heads about the possibility of India-US relations has at times been in stark contrast to that of the politicians or the bureaucrats. Some scholars like Selig Harrison have even spoken in terms of the need for an "India-Centred" policy, given a scenario wherein India "will gradually grow into an economic and military power, whatever the US does." As part of India's new military cooperation with the US, the larger question that has been raised is whether India would participate in a structure of "cooperative vigilance" in the region. India is basically looking for high-technology from the US. But it has to try and do this without having to make major concessions in terms of its national interests. There is no need to say that India wants good defence tie with the US, while the US also looking for not disturb the subcontinent's military balance. The relations in defence field have start come closest when the US Ambassador, Frank Wisner, in an interview to Span magazine in August 1995 stated that the US recognises the right of India to have a strong national defence. In other words, the scope of India-US military cooperation have to be recognised, and one does not know at this stage that whether Indian and American geopolitical interests and opinions will converge in the future. (idsaartical)

Cooperation in nuclear field

More than a decade back from now, on 18 July 2005, during the state visit of President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh given a joint statement for an extraordinary deal, in which they announce that United State will support India's access to global nuclear commerce and will help to play India a major role in global non-proliferation efforts as well as

³ <https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun-6.html>

accord its civil nuclear program according to the norms of nuclear non-proliferation regime. It was the movement for defining non-proliferation regime, reconstruction its structure wherein perceived 'outlier' was being assimilated into the system through a process that was seen by different section is having the prospect of strengthening as well as unravelling it. Nuclear agreement between India and the United States was initialled during President Bush's official visit to New Delhi in 2006. Under this, India agreed to (i) Separate its nuclear civilian and military facilities, and place its civilian facilities under the IAEA safeguards; (ii) keep its commitment to unilateral moratorium on future nuclear testing; (iii) adhere to the IAEA's additional protocols regarding civilian nuclear reactors; and (iv) refrain from transferring sensitive nuclear technology, including enrichment technology, to non-nuclear states. And finally, India agreed to abide by the guidelines of the NSG and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In return, India would be entitled to an uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel from America, with the right to build a strategic reserve for nuclear fuel. (Jain, B. 2016)

The agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation which was signed between India-USA (called "123 Agreement") was approved by the U.S. Congress on October 1, 2008, the height of an extraordinary three-year effort by the U.S. and India, working together as never before. Approval of the Agreement bolsters our partnership with the world's largest democracy and a growing economic power, provides trade and investment opportunities for the U.S. economy and helps India's population of more than one billion to meet its rapidly increasing energy needs in an environmentally responsible way while reducing the growth of carbon emissions. The U.S.-India 123 Agreement will also enhance our global non-proliferation efforts and reflects a common commitment to share both the benefits of the international system and also the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining, strengthening, and defending it. ⁴

Several key objectives were accomplished to bring us to this moment in history. In December 2006, the U.S. Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (Hyde Act), which provides a framework in U.S. law for facilitating civil nuclear cooperation with India. In July 2007, the United States and India concluded negotiations on the 123 agreement, which required approval by the U.S. Congress to be brought into force. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria approved the India Safeguards Agreement on August 1, 2008. Others precondition for submitting the 123 Agreement also took place in Vienna, with the Nuclear

⁴ <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

Suppliers Group (NSG) accord conclusion on September 6, 2008, to grant an exception to its full-scope safeguards requirement to permit civil nuclear supply to India.⁵

The 123 Agreement establishes the legal framework for the U.S. to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with this key strategic partner. The President submitted the Agreement to Congress on September 10, 2008, with the requisite determinations on India's progress on a number of commitments it made in the 2005 Joint Statement, as provided for under the Hyde Act. The U.S. Congress approved the U.S.-India Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy on October 1, 2008 with strong bipartisan support and cooperation. These historic events reflect the transformation of U.S.-India relations and recognition of India's emergence on the global stage. The Agreement was signed by the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and then Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee on October 10, 2008. Its entry into force opens the door for American and Indian firms to participate in each other's civil nuclear energy sector.⁶

In 2008, NSG agreed on an exemption for nuclear transfers to India over the protestations of the governments of Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand. The exemption, which was initiated by the George W. Bush administration and strongly backed by France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, reversed the long-standing NSG and NPT policies barring nuclear trade with states that have not accepted comprehensive international safeguards. (Kimball, D. 2010)

Nevertheless India got exemption from NSG in the year 2008 NSG, now states such as Australia and Japan should resist commercial and political pressures for engaging in nuclear trade with India, at least until New Delhi complies with UN Security Council Resolution 1172, passed in June 1998, which calls on India and Pakistan to stop producing fissile material for weapons, to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and undertake other nuclear risk reduction measures (Sharma. A; 2008). Those NSG governments that have decided to sell nuclear material and reactors to India should clarify that if India or any other state breaks its non-proliferation commitments and conducts a nuclear test explosion for any reason, they will immediately terminate nuclear trade with the offending state. The NSG must address future proliferation risks as well. India and other states in regions of proliferation concern are seeking advanced enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology. As a result, the United States and other NSG states must overwhelm disagreement from South Africa and Turkey and

⁵ <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

⁶<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

adopt tougher guidelines that would bar the transfer of such technology to those states that have not signed the NPT and do not have in place IAEA inclusive safeguards and enhanced examinations under a supplementary protocol. If the NSG is to remain effective and credible, member states must respect and uphold their own rules, avoid actions that feed the nuclear arms race and strengthen their guidelines to prevent weapons-related nuclear technology from proliferation in the years ahead. The US administration is to subsequently help secure the consent of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to treat India as an exception to its current guidelines, following which the 123 agreement would be presented before the US Congress for a vote. It was another step which was taken by both countries to take their relationship in a significant way (Bent on Strategic Embrace. 2008).

The Nuclear Suppliers group reached an agreement plan decision to grant an exception to its full-scope safeguards requirement to permit civil nuclear supply to India on September 6, 2008. This historic achievement brings us closer to realising the important benefits – including non-proliferation benefits – that successful implementation of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative will bring about.⁷

The United States gave a vote of thanks to all the participating governments in the NSG for their outstanding efforts and cooperation in forging this consensus on welcoming India closer to the international non-proliferation regime. As well as the UN also congratulate the people of India on its accomplishments in carrying out the Initiative. India's commitments will strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, and the NSG consensus policy decision has brought us another step closer to realising full civil nuclear cooperation with India, thus helping the world's largest democracy gain access to environmentally responsible energy supplies.⁸

In November 2010, during a visit to India, President Barack Obama announced his support for Indian entry into the NSG and three other multilateral export control groups. At the NSG's 2011 plenary meeting, the United States submitted a "Food for Thought" paper on options for bringing India into the group (HORNER, D. 2012).

On 1 August, 2008, India's safeguards agreement has approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. The Safeguards Agreement provides for appropriate, effective safeguards in perpetuity, based on accepted IAEA safeguards principles while taking into account India's

⁷<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

⁸<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

unique circumstances. India took pledge to sign and bring into operation an IAEA additional protocol, which will provide IAEA inspectors with additional tools and information for conducting inspections under India's Safeguards Agreement, as well as contribute to the universality of the Protocol and help establish it as the new international safeguards standard – an important non-proliferation goal for the United States, many other NPT States Party, and IAEA.⁹

India has also made a civic strategy to segregate its civil and military facilities, in which 14 reactors, including the 4 presently safeguarded reactors, and other facilities would be offered for safeguards under the treaty. The Agreement is based on INFCIRC/66, the IAEA safeguards system utilised for states, not under NPT full-scope safeguards. The safeguards agreement provides that, once a facility is added to the Annex of the safeguards agreement, safeguards must remain in place until the IAEA and India jointly determine that the facility is no longer usable for nuclear activities. We have made clear to the Government of India that there will be no cooperation on safeguarded facilities. India's forthcoming civilian thermal power and civilian breeder reactors will be positioned under safeguards, the amount of India's nuclear industry subject to such controls will increase over time.¹⁰ This kind of steps, which will take India's more than 65% of reactors under safeguards, it will help India to brought it closer to the non-proliferation mainstream, and the United States believes the India Safeguards Agreement represents an important step toward realising the economic and energy benefits foreseen by the Initiative.¹¹

India-US relations turned sour over India's Nuclear Liability Act (August 2010), which holds both the supplier and operator of nuclear reactors liable for any nuclear mishap, thus requiring exporting companies to pay damages to the affected parties. The 2010 India's liability Act puts an obligation on the operator for a nuclear accident, and limits total liability to 300 million SDR (about US\$450 million) "or such higher amount that the Central Government may specify by notification. Operator liability is capped at 15 billion rupees (approximately US\$285 million) or such higher amount that the Indian Government may specify, beyond which the Central Government will be liable. (CRS Report for Congress, 2011)

⁹<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

¹⁰<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

¹¹<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

President Barack Obama, during his visit to India in November 2010, asked India to review and amend the existing Act as it was in contravention of international law and international treaties and conventions. In fact, American companies were reluctant to set up their nuclear plants in India unless the Indian government addressed their concerns by amending its Nuclear Liability Act (2010). Teresita and Howard Schaffer opine, "India's nuclear liability regime remains a serious problem for U.S. companies wanting to build power plants in India, and it is not yet clear that their concerns have been meeting . (CRS Report for Congress,2011).

The USA fully supports the “clean” Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) exclusion for India and speedy application of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement during the Obama Administration. Nothing about the new Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) transfer restrictions agreed to by NSG members should be construed as detracting from the unique impact and importance of the U.S.-India agreement of full civil nuclear cooperation. Efforts of the NSG to strengthen controls on the transfers of ENR are consistent with long-standing U.S. policy that pre-dates the Civil Nuclear Agreement and have been reaffirmed on an annual basis by the G-8 for years. This new guideline reflects a consensus among all NSG members.¹²

During his 5 days visit to the USA in June 2016, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi and President of the United States of America Barack Obama meet at White House. Prime Minister expressed his gratitude to President of United States to support India’s inclusion in Nuclear Suppliers Group and Mission Technology Control Regime. The Delegates had discussed the following matters related to the strategic partnership between the nations and agreed to grab new opportunities. America has promised to support India for NSG group membership¹³.

The American view of the means and ends of its Non-proliferation efforts in South Asia has taken it into the clash with the countries in the region. In this matter, neither a one-sided approach nor a confrontational approach can help. The tactfulness with which the US deals with India, Pakistan and China on the nuclear issue, would have gone through an assessment of their post-Cold War nuclear diplomacy, on the one hand, and its commitment to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation, on the other. In the South Asian context, a "top-down global approach" and a "down up regional approach" is simultaneously required. (Carnegie website)

¹² <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166878.htm>

¹³ Agreement sign b/w both country see annexure1

India's missile programme was another controversial topic in the American viewpoint. The medium range Prithvi and long range Agni missile programmes were seen by the US as potential systems that can deliver nuclear weapons. The US considered that Prithvi's prompting the deployment of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent. Continuous pressure had to bore on India not to deploy the Prithvi missiles and to stop the testing of the long range Agni missiles. Even the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members have applied pressure both collectively and individually. In brief, the US looks India as "part of the problem", and "not as a partner" in missile proliferation solution. America remarks any attempt by India to position the Prithvi as a crisis in the South Asian strategic environment. Hence, Washington assumes the MTCR as a key instrument in the battle against missile proliferation.

Under this initiative (agreement 123), India remains outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but assumes important nonproliferation responsibilities and obligations, including separating its civil and military nuclear facilities, accepting IAEA safeguards at its civil nuclear facilities, and signing and implementing an additional Protocol. India has created a robust national export control system, including through harmonisation with and adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines and annexes. Additionally, India has pledged to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and is working with the United States to conclude a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty – a longstanding objective of the international community. Individually, each of these activities helps strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. Together, they constitute a dramatic change in moving India into closer conformity with international non-proliferation standards and practices and form a firm foundation for the U.S. and India to strengthen our efforts in the future to prevent WMD proliferation and to combat terrorism¹⁴.

It relative basis to treat the issue of ballistic missiles in terms of the South Asian region alone. South Asia does not lie around a geostrategic emptiness, and missiles which have the range to target the subcontinent cannot be ignored. China has deployed hundreds of missiles on its territory and is even reported to have supplied M-11 missiles to Pakistan in the early 1990s. Besides, Pakistan has also been developing the 600+ km range Half-3 missile. Any effort to understand the problem of ballistic missiles in South Asia will also have to take awareness of those missiles which were targeted towards the subcontinent. Missiles installed in countries like China, the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and the Central Asian region become

¹⁴<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm> (it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

very important in this situation. Saudi Arabia, for example, has learnt many 2,700-km range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China since 1988, after the MTCR came into effect. The need of the hour to work towards a complete and world-wide regime for the control and management of ballistic missiles ([website, idsa](#)).

It was possibly unrealistic to imagine India to conform to the one-sided stipulations of the MTCR. Besides, as the former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev put it, "If the US sells arms to Pakistan, it should not be surprised why India responds by testing missiles" (Deccan Herald, February 12, 1996). India resists that deployment of Prithvi would depend on the threat perception and the security condition dominant at a particular time. To quote from the Carnegie Endowment Report prepared in 1993 by Selig Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp: "The Indian security perspective is dominated by the perceived threat of Chinese power, both traditional and nuclear, with supposed Chinese intermediate-range missiles emplacements in Tibet and Sinkiang, and by a desire to maintain what New Delhi considers an acceptable safety margin of military superiority over Pakistan."¹⁵

The U.S.-India Initiative is about civil nuclear cooperation, not about India's strategic weapons program. It seeks to enable civil nuclear cooperation with India, a state that faces real and growing energy needs, has a solid nuclear nonproliferation export record, has an established and widespread nuclear infrastructure, and has made enhanced nonproliferation commitments which strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. India's commitment to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, along with the other steps India has taken under the Joint Statement, made this Initiative achievable.¹⁶

The NPT allows for nuclear energy cooperation with non-parties that do not have full-scope safeguards, as long as the cooperation itself is under safeguards. And a successfully implemented Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative will create strong energy and economic incentives for India to ensure that its civil nuclear energy sector is properly separated. This Initiative establishes a firm foundation for additional nonproliferation and counterproliferation cooperation, areas we fully intend to advance through the course of our partnership. The United

¹⁵ <https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun-6.html>

¹⁶ <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm> (it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

States looks forward to a new strategic partnership with India in a way that will provide global leadership in the years ahead.¹⁷

As active participants in the Nuclear Security Summit process, the United States and India welcomed progress towards reducing the risk of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons or related materials and noted their shared commitment to improving nuclear security nationally and globally. The Prime Minister welcomed the hosting of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit by the United States. President Obama and Prime Minister Modi also welcomed the recent convening of the first bilateral nuclear security best practices exchange, under the auspices of the Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership, as an example of their cooperation on nuclear security. In a further effort to strengthen global nonproliferation and export control regimes, the President and the Prime Minister committed to continue to work towards India's phased entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group. The President reaffirmed the United States' position that India meets MTCR requirements and is ready for NSG membership and that it supports India's early application and eventual membership in all four regimes.¹⁸

Though India has co-sponsored the move for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and had unambiguously supported the imposition of a verifiable cap on the production of fissile materials, yet differences have surfaced over the method and way of doing this, rather than the objective. Whether the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the fissile materials cut-off will only serve to legitimise the nuclear weapons programme of the nuclear weapon states, will have implications for all the countries in South Asia and for the global non-proliferation regime as a whole. India has opposed that any exemptions and exclusion would only lead to a CTBT that will not be comprehensive, and perhaps even unfair

Cooperation to Counter Terrorism

Terrorism is the main focus point of the emerging strategical policy between India and USA. Counter-terrorism is very important for both the countries. security of their citizens is the

¹⁷<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm> (it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

¹⁸ Part of Joint Statement given by PM modi and President Obama on 25 jan 2015.

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all>

primary for the government of the both countries. both are working on capacity building and secret information in the reference. (Tourngbang & Sethi, 2015). Terrorism is a global problem in the present world. More than half of the states of the world is facing this problem, even the USA who was sure because of his secure border that terrier attacks can't make over him, but he is suffering from internal terror attack from last many years. He felt the pain of a major terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, and some consequences of a terrorist attack. Before that, the USA was not so much serious about terrorism, but after 9/11 its view has been changed about this global problem, even after the 9/11, America announced war against terrorism under his leadership.in that circumstances India offer help to the USA in fighting against terrorism. Moreover, following the September 11, attack, the attack on Indian Parliament and 26/11 attack in Mumbai, both India and the USA have begun to share more interest in fighting against international terrorism and looking more elements in Pakistan as the masterminds of mayhem created in India and across the world. (Tourangbam, 2012, p. 93)

During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington in November 2009, he and President Barrack Obama had agreed on the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative. The CCI is aimed at giving both the U.S. and India additional opportunities to work together across a broad spectrum, including transport security, money laundering, counterfeit currency and terrorist financing, maritime, port and border security, cyber security and mega-city policing.¹⁹

As both had announced in 2010, according to that in 2011, they did submit in which both had shown their concern for the exchange of secret information and data, the basic structure for security, trade and transportation, evaluation of joint necessity, money seizure and cross-border crime. (Tourngbang & Sethi, 2015). In the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, the U.S. and India resolved to deepen collaborative efforts and intensify exchanges, culminating in the signing of the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative (CCI) in July 2010. This landmark agreement made clear the determination of our two governments to combine efforts to combat terrorism and to work closely to ensure the security of our citizens. Programs to exchange law enforcement best practices, hold reciprocal visits of senior-level officials to discuss lessons learned, conduct joint military training exercises, and joining forces in international fora on key counterterrorism issues, demonstrate the closeness of this cooperation.²⁰

¹⁹ <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/India-U.S.-sign-counter-terrorism-initiative/article16207465.ece>

²⁰ <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/us-india-partnership-fact-sheets>

The State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance training division provided 1,630 Indian law enforcement officials 82 CT-related courses and plans 24 more such courses by 2012. The Department of Defense hosted visiting Indian officers at a variety of its facilities while increasing its outreach on joint exercises, interoperability, and best-practices sharing in the fields of maritime, port security, and military counterterrorism issues. In addition, the U.S. Treasury Department is actively engaged and cooperating with Indian authorities responsible for implementing India's FATF anti-money laundering/terrorist financing (AML/CFT) Action Plan.²¹

The Leaders reaffirmed the need for joint and concerted efforts to disrupt entities such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, D Company and the Haqqani Network, and agreed to continue ongoing efforts through the Homeland Security Dialogue as well as the next round of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism in late 2015 to develop actionable elements of bilateral engagement. The two sides noted the recent U.S. sanctions against three D Company affiliates. The President and the Prime Minister further agreed to continue to work toward an agreement to share information on known and suspected terrorists. They also agreed to enter discussions to deepen collaboration on UN terrorist designations, and reiterated their call for Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai to justice. The President and the Prime Minister also noted the positive cooperative engagement between the Indian and the U.S. authorities with a view to working together to counter the threat of IEDs and to develop counterterrorism best practices.²²

Cooperation in Traditional strategical field

In the period of 2004- 2016, can see that India and the USA sharing a 'strategical participation', the relationship of both countries is on all time high based on shared values and generally convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives - including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation - are underway. This latter initiative, first launched in 2005, reversed three decades of American non-proliferation policy. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defence framework agreement, with the goal of

²¹ From the Fact Sheet on U.S. - India Counterterrorism Cooperation released on 8 nov 2010 by office of press secretary(white house)

²² Part of Joint Statement given by PM modi and President Obama on 25 jan 2015.

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all>

expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries engaged in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises and major US arms sales to India were concluded.²³

Defence relationship has emerged as a major pillar of India-U.S. strategic partnership with the signing of 'New Framework for India-U.S. Defence Relations' in 2005 during India's visit of President George W. Bush, and the resulting intensification in defence trade, joint exercises, personnel exchanges, collaboration and cooperation in maritime security and counter-piracy, and exchanges between each of the three services. The Defence Framework Agreement was updated and renewed for another 10 years in June 2015. As far as defence trade is concerned, it can be said that it is one-sided in the sense that it is India which only purchases defence equipment from the US and not vice-versa. Thus, while India has a trade surplus with the US in general, it is the US which has upper hand in trade in defence equipment. Joint Exercise With the growing Indo-US military to military ties, a joint exercise between the two forces to have grown dramatically. The joint exercise is aimed at achieving a better understanding of each other's capabilities and to develop the ability to operate jointly. Broadly speaking, the two countries conduct four naval exercises annually: Malabar, Habana (naval aspects of amphibious operations), Spitting Cobra, (explosive ordnance destruction focus), and Savex (diving and salvage). These exercises are important vehicles in developing professional relationships and familiarity between the two navies and run the gamut of high-end naval warfare, including integrated air/missile defence, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and naval special warfare. In addition to the annual Pacific Fleet-Indian Navy Executive Steering Group meeting, India and the US also hold regular naval bilateral staff talks, engage in port visits, and conduct personnel exchanges at all ranks. The U.S. Army's engagement with India centres on the annual YUDH ABHYAS exercise. DEFENCE TRADE With the improvement in the bilateral defence relationship, India-US defence trade has seen unprecedented growth. The United States remains committed to being a reliable and transparent defence supplier to India. Since 2002, India has signed more than 20 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases for defence articles and services such as C-17 and C-130J aircraft, TPQ-37 radars, Self-Protection Suites (SPS) for VVIP aircraft, specialised tactical equipment, Harpoon missiles, Sensor-Fuzed Weapons, and carrier flight and test pilot school training. In less than a decade, and starting at zero, we have seen the FMS program grow to a combined total case

²³ <https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun-6.html>

value of approximately \$6 billion. Defence sales provide the Indian military with capabilities that mutually support both our nations' strategic priorities. Additionally, we view defence sales as a mechanism to enable new training and exchange opportunities between our militaries. The last five years have given us several opportunities to reach a new level of interaction between our militaries through defence trade. The C-130Js delivered beginning in February 2011 are the first U.S. military aircraft to have been delivered to India in half a century and have already been successfully employed to provide critical humanitarian assistance following an earthquake in Sikkim in September 2011. As part of that sale, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) trained Air Force personnel – including pilots, loadmasters, and maintenance staff. Once the C-17 contract is fulfilled, India will operate the second largest fleet of C-17s in the world. The former USS TRENTON, which was transferred to the Indian Navy in 2007 and christened the INS JALASHWA, has helped the Indian Navy expand its amphibious and expeditionary warfare capabilities (Defence report. 2011).²⁴

However, though India-US defence relationship has witnessed unprecedented improvements after the end of Cold War and particularly in the 21st century, there are still many issues that create hurdles in the way of strong and friendly defence relationship. The trust deficit between the two countries, India's reluctance to sign the so-called foundational agreements i.e. Logistic Support Agreement, Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation. Another factor that often raises the hackles of New Delhi is Washington's continued military aid to Pakistan. The US despite being aware of the fact that its military aid which is often provided for combating terrorism actually is being used against the interests of India. Similarly, Washington's continued supply of advanced military equipment to Pakistan is not considered to be healthy for the bilateral defence relationship. Indian policymakers, strategists, and analysts are unable to reconcile their perception of U.S. policy on terrorism and its attitude toward Pakistan. Washington's over-eagerness to accommodate Pakistani demands and perceptions accompanied by an inability or unwillingness to penalise Pakistan, despite the harsh reality of Pakistan's continued support for terrorism, remains inexplicable to most Indians. This continued support by the U.S. has emboldened Pakistan to resist demands to

²⁴ Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation U.S. Department of Defence November 2011, Preparation of this report/study cost the Department of Defence a total of approximately \$12,000 for the 2012 Fiscal Year.

dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. These issues have to be amicably solved in order to give a boost to the bilateral relationship²⁵.

India-USA relation was on an all-time high during the second tenure of the USA President Obama. Mr Barak Obama has visited 2nd time in India in January 2015, when he invited by India's newly elected Prime Minister Mr Narendra Modi as a chief guest on India's Republic day celebration. After that Mr Modi had visited thrice as a state guest of the USA in September 2014, January 2015 and in June 2016. All these meetings of both countries delegate can count as a significant step to take India-USA relation on a new high²⁶.

The latest agreements come on top of a growing pile of protocols that go beyond defence co-operation to include a "joint strategic vision" for Asia signed in January 2015. American armed forces now hold more joint exercises with India than with any other country. And two years ago India overtook Pakistan as a buyer of American weaponry. It helps that America has the kinds of goods that India's armed forces want as they seek to project power more widely in the Indian Ocean, including long-range patrol aircraft and drones, maritime helicopters, aircraft carrier technology and anti-submarine gear. America has also moved nimbly to accommodate India's plans for strengthening its own defence industry. Aside from half-a-dozen existing partnerships involving such things as jet-engine design and avionics, the two sides have suggested jointly producing fighter aircraft, probably an Indian version of the F-18. (USA/India politics, 2016)

It is over China that Indian and American interests converge most. Mr. Bhaskar says that Americans want India to become more capable and "carry a bigger load". They may seek more than that. Speaking last month in Delhi, the Indian capital, Admiral Harry Harris, who heads America's Pacific Command, described expanded military cooperation with India as "arguably the defining partnership for America in the 21st century". But deepening mutual interests, kind American words and tempting American hardware are not enough, yet, to prod India into an open embrace. For one thing, the possibility has yet to be exposed to the rough and tumble of Indian politics, where the opposition would be fierce. And for all its size and growing strength, India's armed forces remain compartmentalised and tradition-bound.²⁷

²⁵ <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/10/how-modi-changed-the-india-us-relationship/>

²⁶ <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/10/how-modi-changed-the-india-us-relationship/>

²⁷ www.economist.com/news/asia/21697031-pentagon-wooing-india-bride-still-coy-suitable-boy and <https://openev.debatecoaches.org/rest/wikis/openev/spaces/2016/pages/Northwestern/attachments/India%20Allies%20DA%20-%20Northwestern%202016.docx>

New Delhi and Washington had been decided to work further in the field of civil nuclear Cooperation and for the strategic point of view and to make their defence mechanism more impermeable, the inked agreement to access to latest Technology. According to this treaty, both can access each other arms and military technology.²⁸ To strengthen economic growth and sustainable development; To Promote peace and security in and around the world; To enhance inclusive, democratic governance and respect for universal human rights; To provide global leadership on issues of shared interest. During this visit, the Prime Minister of India and President of United States have signed the 8 agreements related to strengthening economic growth & sustainable development. To improve the collaboration between the nations regarding on Energy Security, Clean Energy and Climate Change through both countries Enhanced bilateral ties for Future initiatives and installing sustainable growth.²⁹

The Obama administration invited Prime Minister Modi to address a joint session of Congress, eager to portray the occasion as an opportunity to consolidate bilateral relations. Indeed, this dramatic shift in President Obama's foreign-policy priorities stems from the assessment of three components of American national interests and India's role in their achievement: build strong bilateral security and defence cooperation, make India an important export market for U.S. goods and services, and situate India in the strategic pivot to Asia. President Obama considers vital to American interests concerns building closer security and defence cooperation. Cooperation between the two countries has improved dramatically over the past decade. India conducts more annual military exercises with the United States than any other country. In 2015–16 alone, for example, Washington and Delhi conducted several bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Of course, the U.S.-India defence relationship also depends on the sale of military equipment. India now constitutes the second-largest arms market for the U.S. defence industry, after Saudi Arabia. Sales have totalled nearly \$17 billion in the past five years. Between 2011 and 2014, American arms sales to India exceeded \$13.9 billion. India signed another contract in 2015 valued at \$3 billion. This defence engagement between the United States and India is also growing in complexity and sophistication. Both countries are actively exploring ways to jointly develop and produce joint military projects—for example, research and development of mobile electric hybrid power sources and next-generation protective body suits. These joint ventures have been admittedly of low value so

²⁸ Agreement sign b/w both country see annexure1

²⁹ Agreement sign b/w both country see annexure 2

far, but both countries are moving to develop more sensitive technologies. These technologies include jet engine and aircraft carrier design.³⁰ The recent signing in principle of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) for sharing American and Indian facilities for refuelling, supplies and spare parts is an important indicator of growing defence cooperation. The creation of the India Rapid Reaction Cell in the Pentagon is the first country-specific cell of its kind and simplifies defence collaboration. India decided in principle this April to sign one of the three foundational agreements. Although LEMOA is a watered down version of what the U.S. has been asking for, the agreement allows the two militaries to use each other's land, air and naval bases for resupply and refuelling. India was eager to point out that this agreement does not apply to troops stationed on Indian Territory and that the logistical support would be considered on a case-by-case basis. This is precisely where defence cooperation has reached its limits. (pib12april2016)

Second, co-development and coproduction of military equipment with the United States certainly appeal to India, but hurdles remain. India has a history of signing ambitious defence cooperation agreements only to see them fall apart. Corruption scandals, bureaucratic inertia and missed deadlines are common spoilers. The recent deal to purchase the French Rafael multirole combat fighter is a case in point. Although the agreement was signed in 2011, India has been engaged in protracted negotiations to lower the cost of the deal and appears to be reducing the fighter count from 126 to thirty-six. More to the point, there is no reason to believe that co-development and coproduction with the United States will not face some of these challenges. India's own attempts at developing indigenous military technology do not offer many examples of success. Take the example of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the development of which was conceived in the mid-1980s and is still incomplete. Rechristened now as the Tejas, India had to sign an agreement with General Electric to manufacture and supply engines for the LCA. (pib12april2016)

It is over China that Indian and American interests converge most. Mr Bhaskar says that Americans want India to become more capable and "carry a bigger load". They may seek more than that. Speaking last month in Delhi, the Indian capital, Admiral Harry Harris, who heads America's Pacific Command, described expanded military cooperation with India as "arguably

³⁰ Based on joint statement and agreement signed between both countries. To access these agreement can visit: <https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/USA> ; Embassy of India Washington Website : <https://www.indianembassy.org/> ; or <https://in.usembassy.gov/embassy-consulates/public-affairs>

the defining partnership for America in the 21st century". But deepening mutual interests, kind American words and tempting American hardware are not enough, yet, to prod India into an open embrace. For one thing, the possibility has yet to be exposed to the rough and tumble of Indian politics, where the opposition would be fierce. And for all its size and growing strength, India's armed forces remain compartmentalised and tradition-bound.³¹

During his 5 days visit to the USA in June 2016, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi and President of the United States of America Barack Obama meet at White House. Prime Minister expressed his gratitude to President of United States to support India's inclusion in Nuclear Suppliers Group and Mission Technology Control Regime. The Delegates had discussed the following matters related to the strategic partnership between the nations and agreed to grab new opportunities. America has promised to support India for NSG group membership. New Delhi and Washington had been decided to work further in the field of civil nuclear Cooperation and for the strategic point of view and to make their defence mechanism more impermeable, the inked agreement to access to latest Technology. According to this treaty, both can access each other army and military technology.³²



³¹ www.economist.com/news/asia/21697031-pentagon-wooing-india-bride-still-coy-suitable-boy and <https://openev.debatecoaches.org/rest/wikis/openev/spaces/2016/pages/Northwestern/attachments/India%20Allies%20DA%20-%20Northwestern%202016.docx>

³² Agreement sign b/w both country see annexure1

Challenges

Pakistan and China factor in Indo-USA relations:-

After the end of cold war, India-USA not took too much time to extraordinary progress in their relation. During the cold war and after the Cold War, the world's two largest democracies sustained divided. In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, the two countries argued over nuclear non-proliferation; the U.S. role in the India–Pakistan disputes, especially the question of Jammu and Kashmir; terrorism; trade and finance; regional security in the Middle East and Asia; and multilateral issues. While the U.S. military engagement with Pakistan is deeper than that with India, New Delhi—unlike Islamabad—has not, in any way, undermined the American effort in Afghanistan.³³ Since the partition of 1947, the relations between India and Pakistan had been strained over Kashmir. Many time Pakistan took these matter in UNO and try to make India uncomfortable at world level and ill end of the cold war The US has always support pakistan on this issue. (M.L. sondhi, 2002)

Not only During of the cold war but even after the cold war, America having soft corner and tilt toward pakistan. During the first year of the Obama Administration the United States try to build stronger relations with Pakistan and China without concerning to India's feelings and interests. The assumption of Obama that the road to peace in Afghanistan demanded Indian political concessions to Pakistan, raised up a genuine concerns for India that President Obama was abandoning President Bush's neutrality on the issue of Kashmir. This crisis may also lead Obama to some far-reaching policy changes vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Iran. If Pakistan is unable or unwilling to clamp down on militants operating along its north-western frontier, citing tensions with India as a reason, Obama may be forced to rethink the entire Afghan strategy and might follow the path blazed by India of using Iran for access to Afghanistan.³⁴ India wants to do Pakistan isolated on global form so, it can put pressure on Pakistan but still America looking its national interst in Pakistan and still helping him. In October 2016, the Obama administration announced that it had approved the sale of up to eight F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan in a deal valued at \$699 million. since 2002, the U.S. has provided \$30 billion worth of aid and assistance to Pakistan³⁵

³³ <http://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/beyond-the-plateau-us-india-relations>.

³⁴ <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/indo-u-s-ties-the-ugly-the-bad-and-the-good/>

³⁵ <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/the-importance-difference-in-the-us-india-and-us-pakistan-relationships/>

China factor in indo-us relation:-

By any standard of evaluation, Nixon's initiative to normalise relations with the China is a major diplomatic coup. He came to office with a clear idea to bring the China into the mainstream of world politics. When the first time the NSC of US discussed China on August 14, 1969, President surprised members by standing that the US had a strategic interest in the survival of China. For Nixon and Kissinger the major problem was to make the state department accept their perceptions of the importance of China in a new geopolitical balance of power game. They felt that the state officials still felt that the chines were probably using the U.S. contacts to get concessions from the Russian. With the government's inability to speak with one voice, and China finding the war saw channel not safe for the fear of leaks to the Soviet Union, Nixon and Kissinger were looking for a new 'safe' channel. They decided to use the Pakistan channel through President Yahya Khan which had been in use ever before. Since India-China war of 1962 (Kamath. P. 57).

Handling China's rise is an vital factor of Indo-US defence relationship. Beijing's power activities has been condemned by many countries in Asia, including India. In fact, many South-East Asian countries concerned of China's hyper-activity have welcomed US presence in the region to offset China's influence. But, things are more complex when one looks at the bigger picture. The US, India and some South-East Asian countries have major differences with China regarding freedom of navigation, especially in the South China Sea over which Beijing claims uncontested authority. But, at the same time, economically, New Delhi, Washington and most of South-East Asia are so inter-linked to Beijing that one can hardly foresee any major conflict.³⁶ Washington has a huge and strong economic relationship with China, its economic relationship with India involves fewer political problems. President Obama's effort to accommodate China's rise through "strategic reassurance" and partnership on regional and global issues generated deep fear for India about the potential significances of a Sino-U.S. duopoly in Asia.³⁷

China remains more important for the United States for a host of reasons. First, there is a burgeoning trade between the US and China, touching the mark over \$500 billion, five times larger than the Indo-US trade. Second, by virtue of China's permanent membership of the UN Security Council, its vote on critically important issues is indispensable for the United States.

³⁶ <http://www.orfonline.org/research/indo-us-relations-a-reality-check/>

³⁷ <http://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/beyond-the-plateau-us-india-relations>

Third, the US debt to China is over 1.5 trillion dollar, making America feel psychologically inferior in financial terms. Fourth, the cash starved America is unable to compete with China in disbursing huge foreign aid and grants to Third World countries.³⁸

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Chapter 5

Finding and Conclusion

The trajectory of the relation of India- US was not smooth since the independence of India. Before independence, the USA always support to India that it has to right to decide its internal and external affairs freely. But after independence, India opted the policy of Non-alignment which did not match the USA policy of economic expansion as in the era of cold war he wants to his position of super war, more strong and effective. Nehru gives the idea of Non-alignment, so newly free country can make safe their newly found freedom from economic encroachment and they can use their sovereignty during making their foreign policy. India decided not to allied with either the USA or USSR. In fact at the time of independence India was economically weak and its need help to develop its economic power, so Nehru's intention was to take financial help from both superpowers. If India got alien with anyone power it can be constraints to get help from another side and as India's foreign policy was based on Non-alignment and Panchsheel, it also doesn't want to be part of any military group, like NATO or SEATO etc. At the different point of time, India criticises the US, whenever it found that the USA has worked against the norm of world peace or he violated the sovereignty of any state, whether it was the matter of ceasefire in Korea or Suez crisis but whenever Russia did any thing against any state at that time India use soft voice to criticise USSR. Even india face criticism for it Non-alignment moment as it shown it tilt toward USSR in different time period. The reason to showing tilt toward USSR that because whenever india need support to save it national intrest at world level, USSR also help India.

But still, we can't say that the relations between both countries were entirely based on enmity and conflicts. Even the US was not willing to much to help India, still, Kennedy helps India in tough time. Like the USA helped India under the P.L-480 agreement and he also helps India during the China invasion in 1962. Due to this harsh behaviour of India USA tilts toward Pakistan and Pakistan become a member of NATO in 1949.

In the 1970s, we can saw the downhill in the Indo-US relations due to divergent chemistry and policy orientations between prime minister Mrs Indira Gandhi and President Nixon, the US tilt toward Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis in 1970-71. In 1977, when Morarji Desai become a prime minister under Janta Party, at that time they show more pro-western and relations

between both took the way of positiveness. But in the general election of 1980, again Mrs Gandhi become prime minister. During the Presidentship of Ronald Regan, leaders of both countries established the series of meeting to improve relations. In 1982, visit of Indira Gandhi to the USA considered as a successful step toward positive relations of both the states. After a tragic death of Indira Gandhi, Mr Rajiv Gandhi becomes the Prime Minister of India. Rajiv Gandhi was a person of progressive thought and free from all ideological prejudice. he visited the USA in 1985 and 1987 and inked some agreement to enhanced civil technology transfer, and economic liberation also committed in this period.

In 1990, the collapse of USSR and end of cold war make a dramatic change in the world scenario. In 1990, after the end of cold war, both countries get a new scope to refine their relationship in in new era of the unipolar world. During 1991, when India made changes in its economic policies and enter into the phase of globalisation, the US saw India as an emerging market and the one who can prod China. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited the USA in 1994. But in 1998, when India made its nuclear test Pokharan-II, again tension created in between both countries and the USA impose many bans on India. Those bans have removed in 2000, by 5 days visit of the US President Clinton.

We can see till 1998, both countries seen many ups and downs in their relationships but since 2000, after the visit of President Clinton, we can see a positive change in the relation of both countries. Between 1992 to 1997, the USA has increased its investment from US\$165 million to around \$2.14 billion annually. Two-way trade between both grew affectedly during this period and in 2006 it's reached to almost \$30.6 billion. By 2013, India becomes 18th largest goods market for the USA. Bilateral trade between India-USA has increased almost 600% from 2003 to 2013. During his 10 day visit in September 2000, Prime Minister Vajpayee address a joint session of the congress and was the guest honour at a state dinner. During this visit on 15 September, both leaders signed a joint statement agreeing to cooperate on arm control, terrorism and AIDS.

Observations

In global order, relation between two countries are driven by their national interest more than anything else. Relation between two country can be friendly or unfriendly according to fulfilment or clash in their national interest. No one take guarantee of lifelong friendship or enimities between two state of the world, and this principles of unstability is applicable world wide when we talk about international relation. Same thing we can felt in the relationship

between India and the USA. As already described that from the Independence of India to till 1998, there was lots of ups and downs we can see in the relationship of the both country. The USA, who was always tilt towards Pakistan and was against India, looked toward India with suspicion, because of india's tilt toward Russia. America never understand the relavence of India's Non-alignment Moment. Nehru was a influence with the socialist idealism, but in the post independence situation was not suaitable to impliment communism, so Nehru opted libral-socialism for India.

At the time of india's independence the entire world was divided into two power group due to cold war. In that situation Nehru given the concept of Non-alignment for newly free countary so they can save there newly found independence and sovreignty, and would be able to decide there internal and external affairs according to their own wish and comfart. In the world senerio of that time period, whenever India need help to save its national interst, it got help from USSR, either it was economically or stragical help, and at most of the point india face oppose and criticism from the US.

So when we look in past we can seen USSR as a good friend while we feel the US always want a chance to sapress India, at all front. But after end of cold war as world order has change and cold war got over. India also moved from socialist idea to toward libralism and globlization. As world order change and india made change in its economic policies, we can also see change in behaviour of America toward India. The US who was used to maintaning distance from India from almost last 40 years, who findout india as a emerging market for its goods.

Even during the cold war era US-China came closer, as US has felt that Chaina can prod USSR expention in south asia and it will be helpful for balancing of power in the reagion. That time US use Pakistan as a mediator to establish relation with the China. But after end of cold war and collapuse of USSR, the US feel new machenism for reblancing of power in the region. With all this, economical growth of China and its share in globle trade also came as a point of stress for the US by the time, becouse in economic field China emerge as a comptiter for America which was not totally against the national interst of America. Same as we can see that during the 9/11 atteck America got commitment for counter terroresim but he never took any strong step against pakistan, even than, when America caught master mind of 9/11, Osama Bil Laden in pakistan. Becouse America know that, if he need to eshtablist army base, he can use Pakistani terretory according to need. So to save his national interst America consider Pakistan as a tool.

Now when we focus on the relation between India-US in the changing world senerio, I found a dramatic change in the relation between both countries and I also feel that almost all ‘small & big’ incident, which effect world order they can also effect relation between two countries, may be the amount of effect can variey in defferent part of the world. But end of the cold war has had major impact on the relationship between the both countries

The relations between India and USA is transformed from being a relation between two distant neighbours to strategic partnership and this can be best exemplify in term of cooperation in various sectors rather than limited to selected one.

- In educational field between both countries, many fellowship programs are running, educational summits and seminar conducted by both states, GAIN and many other programs are going on to increase cooperation. In 2010, both leaders of both countries shown their strong commitment to taking action in the field of climate change and to grown cooperation in the field of clean energy. Both have sign agreement to establish a joint research centre for clean energy, which will fund by public and private sector up to \$100 million for five years.
- Now India and USA sharing their strategic policy, with the strategical policy both are creating each other in the field of science and technology, they inked agreement for improving their space technology, both are working together for counter-terrorism after 9/11 attack in America, health sector and clean energy and climate change are also matter of cooperation between both states.
- Cooperation in the field of trade and the economic sector is growing since 2000, and American investment has increased. In 1990, India's GDP was 5.6% which reached 8.4% in 2005. US and India are the less dependent on export for their growth. India-US bilateral trade has grown up to 100 billion USD in 2014. India arises as a one of the most important markets and business partner for the USA.
- Both the countries also tie-up for strategic partnership and both are reviving their science and technology agreement for expanding joint activities in innovation technology. Both countries had planned an ISRO-NASA Mars joint working group under the US-India civil space programme. Both leaders are also agreed to ensure collaboration in hydrology and water studies and monsoon modelling.

The spillover of the close cooperation has a clear impact on the defence cooperation of both the countries.

- Defence relations between both countries is on all time high. India and USA sharing their strategic and defence technology. India got a waiver in NSG in 2008, so India can get cooperation for its peaceful nuclear program. The US also supported India for the membership of NSG. Both are enhancing their global Non-proliferation under agreement 123. In August 2008, IAEA Board of Governors approved the India Safeguards Agreement.
- After 9/11 terrorist attack, India offered help for counterterrorism to the US without any condition. From that, point, both countries are committed to counter-terrorism which is a global problem now. Anti-terrorism assistant training division of USA provided training to 1,630 Indian law enforcement officials. The US treasury department is actively engaged and cooperating with Indian authorities responsible for implementing India's FATF anti-money laundering/ terrorist financing action plan.
- Defence trade between both countries has also increased. India- America signed more than 20 foreign military sales. India and USA sharing a strong defence believe, which shows through their joint army practices like Yudh Abhyas and Malabar.

I starts my dissertation with the three hypothesis:

First, *Cordial relations between India-USA are complimentary to their national interest.* This assumption has been tested on two dimensions-multilateral and bilateral. In the multilateral global order where China is rising as one of the dominant force, menace of terrorism is on rise and more importantly conflict within the nation posing a serious challenge to the nations, strategic partnership between world largest and oldest democracy is a win-win situation for both where they can effectively compliment the national interest of each other. Also both the nations needs a strong partner in the war against terror and therefore cooperation in this sphere is a win-win situation for both. There is an urgent need to check the rising influence of China in the Asian region and it can be only possible when both the nations establish a faith and believe on each other.

Secondly, *both the nation are facing similar kind of challenges especially in security dimensions.* Terrorism in the form of religious fundamentalism and cross border terrorism is a new challenge for liberal democracies and terrorist activities in both the nation pose a serious challenge to the security aspects. In past few year right from intelligence sharing to the joint military exercise exemplifies the increasing level of cooperation among the both. However

there are certain differences in the very definition and its nature especially when India raise its concern about the state sponsored terrorism but the recent past official statements and stand of the American government seems that they are very much acceding to the Indian understanding.

Thirdly, *a strong defence mechanism will help India to maintain better border security which also helps to focus on the different field of development.* Security is a vital national interest and the other interest of a nation can be furthered if only that particular nation is able to protect this vital interest. Both the nations has to positioned herself on a strong footing, both externally as well as in the matter of internal security, so that they can further the other aspects of national interest. Emergence of new threats like terrorism and religious fundamentalism force them to rethink their strategy towards border and internal security. Since the phenomenon is not limited to a particular nation, it need both multilateral and bilateral cooperation among the nations. India and America both are facing similar kind of challenges and threat to their goal of holistic development. Therefore carving out a common border and internal security policy is beneficial for both of them in their goal of holistic development.

Suggestions

- India and USA should work more on the confidence building measures so relation between both countries can be long lasting.
- India- US should be try to remove their differnces on the regional issue like Kashmir conflict between India- Pakistan. Mutual respect for the territorial integrity should be ensured.
- Arms deals between both countries should be more reliable and open.technology transfer
- Relation between the both should not be conditioned by external determinants and should be based on mutual trust and belief. .
- America should stop funding to those country who responsible for promoting terrorism.
- Both countries should be try to tie-up strong cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism, and have to share more information.
- Both countries should be work together to prevent use of nuclear weapons by any terrorist group for mass-distraction.
- Both should be try to fulfil their arrms treaty and supply of arms as soon as possible.

- Both should be work together more effecentially to protect enviornment from climate change, and try to convince entire world to cut their carbon emmission.
- Both should be try to use their potential in economic field and try to improve their biletral trade and increase investment for economic development.
- Deligets from the both side should meet frequantly so understanding between both country on different matter can be strong.
- Both should be share their High- technology for the betterment of the citizen of the both countries.
- Cooperation in nuclear sector, specially in the civil nuclear field shold be increase so both countries can be independent in the field of energy.
- Cooperation in the health sector is very important for the both countries, both should be work together to face sudden and unknown deaseas like Ebola. Both should be share more technology in this field so thses thing can be used for the betterment of citizen. Import of medicine should be easy and duty free.

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