

CHAPTER – 2

India –US relation during cold war (1947-1991)

The Foreign policy of a country much depends on its geographical condition on globe, resources available in its territory, economically condition of the citizen and form of government working there and set of neighbourhood etc. Formal relation between two countries India and USA started after India's independent on 15 August 1947. India's foreign policy which opts by its leader also born by the situation after independence and partition of India. After independence India not only lost its huge part which was most fertile land as Pakistan but also got a neighbour who always prepared to make India in trouble. Relation with China and other neighbouring countries and India's position in world politics are also playing an important role in deciding India's foreign policy. (Bipan Chandra, 2007, ch.12)

The study of India's independent foreign policy undoubtedly begins with the study of Nehru's role in determining it. Nehru admittedly articulated India's foreign policy, but studies on this phase have often exaggerated the role he has played. the present objective is not to belittle his role, but to restore a more balanced perception of India's foreign policy. (Pant, 2010)

Indo-US relation during the Cold War

After India's independence, Jawahar Lal Nehru took oath as a first prime minister of India on 15 August 1947. It was the phase of the cold war. The second world war had ended and cold war has started, due to it, the World has divided into two group one who supports capitalism and was associated with the America and second who supports communism and was allied with Russia. Nehru has understood that all poor countries of Asia and Africa who got recently independence after a long struggle has nothing to lose but they will lose everything if they got assigned with any of the power blocs which trying hard to do military alliances with these newly independent countries. So he affords to pursue an independent foreign policy for India. He realised that given its great civilisation, India could not but aspire to the right to speak in her own voice. The recent, hard-won freedom from the colonial oppression would also be meaningless unless India found expression in the international arena. (Bipan Chandra, 2007, p-147-148)

Nehru has given shape voice in the form of the idea of non-alignment and an organisational cohesion through the non-alignment movement (Bipan Chandra, 2007, p. 148). The most obvious difference between the foreign policies of India and the US is that while India's foreign policy is based on non-aligned but US foreign policy was based on the concept of a series of alliances for the purpose of containing communism. On the contrary, India has adopted a policy of non-alignment. It has cultivated friendly relations with both the blocs. It has avoided siding with either of the power blocs. The US has entered into military alliances with a number of countries and has established a military basis in those countries. India is fundamentally opposed to such a policy. It is the pursuit of such a policy by the US which has been responsible for the many ups and downs in Indo-US relations since India become independent. In 1949, the NATO was formed at the instance to the US. In 1951, the US joined mutual defence pacts with Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. It also entered into a pact with Japan, South Korea and Nationalist China (Rana, 1994).

If we go through the Indo- US relation before independence we can see the US has a soft corner for India and at a different stage of world politics the US has supported India freedom struggle as it believes that India should be free from Britain and it has should be right to decide its internal and external affairs freely (Tiwari SC, chapter1). But after India's independence world scenario has changed and the US has also abandon its policy of isolation and it becomes a super power who act as a leader of capitalist countries in the world politics. So when Nehru gave the idea of non-alignment to the newly independent countries of the third world it was an unexpected step of India for the U.S. Relation of both countries went on bad terms when the U.S. realised that the ethics of Non-alignment against the U.S policies of capitalistic imperialism, as the USA wants to his position continue as a superpower, he opted all the way to prevent the Soviet Union socialist ideology, and its try to spread it capitalistic approach. To their economic improvement USA strongly recommended capitalism and oppose other ideology as it was an economic reality, While India's foreign policy was based on idealism which was more or less tilt toward Russia's policy of socialism. As in the early phase of Indian foreign policy; it was totally governed by the idealism of the national moment and Nehru's thought. Nehru's political ideology was an 'odd mixture' of liberalism, Marxism and Gandhi which has a radical transformative thrust against Western modernity. Nehru supposed the need for a mixture of vanishing point between

the scientific essence of post-enlightenment modernism and the profound lessons of life, which have witnessed the minds of thinkers in all ages and in all countries. Nehru's thought to control India economic was mixed of both ideologies- liberal and sociological. Even due to the basic ideological difference between India-USA, once can see that he ideologically was too much tilt towards Russia's socialist economic policy. (Bose, 1982)

The crucial importance of the Kashmir issue to India and its involvedness were never appreciated by the US and other western power for many years. They also failed to see that in the 1950s Kashmir was more than any other single issue made the Soviet friendship a valuable asset for India. In the matter of Merge of Hyderabad in India, Truman also supported Nizam of Hyderabad and in 1956 during the Goa inclusion in India America also criticise Indian government. (Bipan Chandra, india since independence, 2007, pp. 152-153)

Notwithstanding the difference in some crucial issues and its attitudes to international situation as a whole, there was a general fund of goodwill for America among the Indian people. This was amply demonstrated during President Eisenhower's visit in December 1959. Millions turned out to give thanks greet the celebrated war hero who was described in some welcome banners as the "prince of peace". The election of John. F. Kennedy was welcomed in India. The new president indicated a qualitative change in the U.S. foreign policy, especially in relation to the emerging third world, when he said that neutralism had been a part of America's own history for more than a century, and practice of neutrality by the emerging nations was "inevitable" and not "immoral". Kennedy showed better appreciation of India's policy of non-alignment much to the dislike of Pakistan. The appointment of Kenneth Galbraith as the U.S ambassador was viewed as an indication of the importance attached to India by the new administration. (Bipan Chandra, india since independence, 2007, p. 54)

Indo-US relation in 1960's

The course of Indo- U.S. relation was not smooth all the way to being with the bay of pigs episode (April 1961) evoked much criticism in India including a few politically motivated anti-American demonstration. But the Chinese invasion of India's Himalayan frontiers in the north-west and northeast in October 1962, gave a dramatic turn to the relations between the two countries. (Williams, 1969, p. 24). The debacle of the Indian

army and threatened danger to the nation's security compelled India to turn to the United States for support which soon turned into an appeal for military aid. The ready and sympathetic U.S. response to India's appeal for help in her hour of peril earned the latter's appreciation and gratitude. India-China war marked the high watermark of Indo-U.S. relations. Kennedy's decision to immediately accede to Nehru's pleas for American armaments was influenced by the consideration that India is the only country in Asia which is capable of scrambling for political and military leadership with China. Hence an all-out war between these two great and populous nations and China's victory was most unwelcome and was certainly to have extensive and far-reaching complications. The loss of Indian image also led to a further loss of American interest in Indian affairs. The Nehru era in India ended in May 1964 with the death of Jawahar Lal (Pant, 2010, pp. 102-104).

After Nehru and Kennedy, both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Lyndon Johnson lacked the charisma and dynamism of their predecessors in office. But both were businesslike and competent in their own ways. While the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam was causing great concern in the United States, the worsening relations with Pakistan posed a serious problem for India. The warmth of Indo-U.S. relations generated during the Sino-Indo war had cooled down to a large extent mainly due to the American attitude on Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations in general. The Indian feeling was that the U.S. had been persisting in its pro-Pakistan stance on the Kashmir problem and was trying to put pressure on the Indian government by taking advantage of India's dependence on PL-480 supplies. India's suspicion deepened when President Johnson abruptly cancelled a well-publicized invitation to the Indian prime minister to visit the United States. The outbreak of war between India and Pakistan towards the end of the year deeply annoyed the United States. To demonstrate her displeasure, the U.S. indefinitely suspended all aids to India and Pakistan. In the face of congressional opposition, the United States government also refused to sign a long-term agreement with India under PL-480. The existing agreement had expired in August. The United States released an additional two million tonnes of food between September and December against an estimated overall requirement of eight million tonnes in 1965-66. One outcome of this experience was India's greater determination to avoid dependence on imported food, which accelerated the green revolution that was to make the country generally self-sufficient in food within a few years. Another result was the more vocal and trenchant criticism that the

United State had all along been using PL-480 to influence Indian foreign policy. Indian politician and economists strongly denied that the PL-480 program had any altruistic motives and had been of any real benefit to India (Bose, 1982).

The Indo-Pakistan war ended rather dramatically followed by the signing of the Tashkent Agreement (January 1966) under Soviet mediation. Once again the Soviet Union gained a spectacular diplomatic success and appeared as a friend of India and champion of peace in the Indo-Pak subcontinent, but even that time no initiative was taken by the United State of America to maintain the situation (P.M.Kamath, 1987, p. 84).

The sudden death of Lal Bahadur Shastri immediately after the signing of the Tashkent Agreement, led to the advancement of Mrs Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister, after a short period of forceful political debates and manipulation within the Congress party. Besides her own insecure position in the party, Mrs Gandhi was faced with sequences of serious internal problems. The war with Pakistan followed by a suspension appeal by Mrs Gandhi to President Johnson for the resumption of economic assistance received an only partial response. Anxious to improve and revitalise the relationship between the two countries Mrs Gandhi visited the U.S. where she was warmly welcomed by President Johnson. Her visit seemed to clear much of the misunderstanding between India and culture relations looked better. Though in material terms, Mrs Gandhi's visit has yielded significant result- a \$300 million Indo-American Foundation a billion dollar food programme and an unblocking of the channels through which economic aid may flow—no one here has been ungallant enough to say that Mrs. Gandhi came here just to get food and money. Her visit instead seems to have stimulated the basic humanitarian characters of the American people and a gratitude, particularly by Mr Johnson that the Indian people value pride and self-respect and that the way to establish sound relations with a sister democracy is to recognise that fact. This becomes clear when the visit and what was achieved by it is viewed against the background of the "conditions". Mr Johnson had set for normalising relations with India in the course of his now famous Texas Ranch briefing of Last December. He had then stressed three things: performance, and political affinity. But such hopes were soon belied. Several factors were responsible for the reversal of trend. (Goswami, 1983)

Soon after being elected as the prime minister Mrs Gandhi found her position threatened by the old Congress leadership who strongly disapproved her internal policies and her way of conduct within the Congress party. Her chief rival to the office of prime minister Morarji Desai and the powerful old guard in the Congress, known as the syndicate, who opposed her ascendancy was viewed as pro-western with sympathies for the United States. After the war with Pakistan and the earlier war with China, India's military needed throughout rebuilding and modernization (Goswami, 1983). A strong defence force and the organisation were essential to the nation's security against possible Pakistani and Chinese aggression. But the Johnson administration was unwilling to accede to India's request for resumption of military aids. In other fields of economic assistance also the United States, faced with the mounting cost of the Vietnam war, failed to offer generous help to India. Naturally, India turned more and more to the Soviet Union for its vital military and another basic requirement. To all these factors were added the Vietnam War and bombing on North Vietnam by the United state. India's leaning towards the Soviet Union and its strong criticism of the U.S. role in Vietnam and bombing of North Vietnam caused much resentment in America. India's failure to condemn the suppression of the uprising in Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and others communist countries further undermined the image of India as a neutral country in the eyes of the America. (Bose, 1982)

Indo-USA relation in 1970's

A number of developments in 1970 affected Indo-US relations more adversely than they would have if these relations relation had been base on a higher degree of confidence and trust. But in 1970 the USA instructed to close their culture centre in 5 state capital- Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Lucknow, Patna and Trivandrum in the suspect of a spy. Even the relations between India and the United States took a fall and reached the lowest point during the emergence of Bangladesh and the resultant India-Pakistan conflict of 1971 (Sinha, 1994). To begin with, Richard Nixon was not particularly fond of India or Mrs Gandhi. Nixon, to put it mildly, in the words of Kissinger, "was less liable to Indian claims of moral leadership than some of his predecessors." He viewed their "obsequiousness" to India as "a prime example of liberal soft-headedness." When he paid a short visit to India in 1969 on his round the world trip the reception in no way

matched the one received by President Eisenhower in 1956. Nixon's dislike for Mrs Gandhi was ill-concealed. Her "assumption of moral superiority and her moody silence brought out all of Nixon's latent insecurities" (Bose, 1982, p. 16). The U.S. decision to stop all supplies of military equipment to both India and Pakistan in 1965, Kissinger argues, was "deceptive" because it was injurious to Pakistan as India received its arms from Communist countries and her own arsenal (Bose, 1982, p. 17).

Nixon and Kissinger wished to found U.S. foreign policy on a sober perception of permanent national interest. They now judged India by the impact of its actions, not by her pretensions or by the legacy of 20 years sentiment. Kissinger succeeds in making two things clear. The first one is that both Nixon and Kissinger had tilted towards Pakistan and had a deep-rooted dislike and suspicion for India well before the India-Pakistan crisis of 1970-1971. The second point is that the U.S. attitude to the crisis was dictated by self-interest. The Nixon administration had no doubt that the main motive of India was to be about a total dismemberment of Pakistan and make a dramatic demonstration of Indian predominance on the sub-continent. Both Nixon and more Kissinger did not have the slightest doubt that India wanted total dismemberment of Pakistan; that the Soviet Union was giving support to India's aggressive design motivated by the desire to humiliate Pakistan and embarrass her allies china and the united states; that the indo-Pak war was really a power conflict "in proxy" between the Soviet Union and China; that the preservation of the "china-link" was crucial to American self-interest. Opposed to so many vital self-interests was the professed U.S. commitment to support democracy, free society and human rights- all of which were trampled in East Pakistan and genocide was being committed by West Pakistan army. (Bose, 1982, p. 18)

It is futile to decide whether India had the motives which white house believed she had in 1970-71. No amount of argument and evidence are likely to have any impact on men of Nixon-Kissinger disposition who had pre-judged the crisis well before it actually flared up. However, he has generously admitted that Mrs Gandhi was relentlessly pursuing India's national interest with single-mindedness and finesse. He says that the U.S. could respect her strength, even when her policies were hurtful to America's national interest. But the latter could by no means support India's hegemonic ambitions. Mrs Gandhi was a far too intelligent and earliest leader to make such a misadventure. The other alternative was to destabilise Pakistan and help the establishment of and help

the establishment of Soviet influence there. This also was detrimental to India's national interests. Mrs Gandhi, in spite of India's very friendly relations with the Soviet Union, would never have welcomed that situation. Such proximity with the soviet union would have posed serious international and national problems for Mrs Gandhi. Against the Pakistan-China alliance and the flirtation between the U.S. and China, India had little option left but to lean increasingly on Soviet help and friendship. In October 1974, Henry Kissinger came to India on a short visit obviously to meet the Indo- U.S. relations which had been seriously damaged by the events of 1970-1971. On October 28, he addressed a meeting of the Indian council of world affairs in new Delhi. (Kaul, 1980, pp. 65-70)

After the dust raised by the storm of 1971-72 had settled down, both Indian and the U.S. sought to leave the past behind and build up a more friendly workmanlike relationship. This process was natural and inevitable because, as the leaders of the countries had reiterated time and again, there was no basis cause of the difference between India and the entanglement of their relationship with the web of international power politics. India's national interest was threatened by Pakistan and China. Moreover, India and always felt that the U.S. was more sympathetic to Pakistan. It was American arms that had encouraged Pakistan to be militant in her attitude to India and she had used American arms against her during the war of 1965. Rather, it was India's obstinacy that had stood in the way of satisfactory settlement of the long-standing Kashmir dispute. (Biswal, 2016, p. 155). This had offered an opportunity to the Soviet Union to woo India, encourage instability and extend the Soviet influence in South Asia. Thus, India-Pakistan tension had long-range effects and vitiated Indo-U.S. relations. Viewed in this context the Shimla conference of 1973 between Z.A. Bhutto and Mrs Gandhi leading to the United States (Rana, 1994). The Shimla accord, followed by Kissinger's visit to India in October 1974 and other high-level visit and talks, had a distinct effect on the improvement of Indo-US relations. This was evident in the agreement to establish a joint commission to "explore the possibilities of fostering mutually advantageous cooperation". The joint commission made a very encouraging beginning and undertook a plan for a wide-ranging program to increase trade between two countries to encourage joint ventures between the Indian and U.S. firms in third countries, greater cooperation in such areas as agriculture, energy and natural resources, communications, education and culture (Bose, 1982).

Relations between India and the United States approached on the unfriendly during the 1970s. After Nixon rudely dismissed US\$82 million in economic aid, India closed down a huge United States Agency for International Development program in India. The Indian government also restricted the flow of American scholars and students to India and also closed American cultural centre suspected in spy. India's criticisms of United States strategies in Vietnam and Cambodia increase, and his up gradation of its representation in Hanoi.¹

The process of improvement in Indo-U.S. relations received a setback in June 1975 with the imposition of the emergency by Mrs Gandhi. Though there was no official U.S. criticism of the emergency there was little about American dislike for the step taken by Mrs Gandhi. Many of the bitter opponents of Mrs Gandhi went to the state and spoke vehemently against the imposition of the emergency. They received much publicity in the media. The U.S. government and majority of Americans interested in the subcontinent never had much liking for Mrs Gandhi. To the U.S. officials and conservative sections, she appeared to be a strong lady who was positively pro-soviet and anti-American in her attitude. (Sinha, 1994, pp. 200-202)

In the US presidential election of 1976, the Indian subcontinent did not figure prominently. This was indicative of the low priority given to South Asia in the American concern for world politics, however, the Democratic party platform acknowledges the fact that India had achieved “a considerable degree of hegemony over the subcontinent” which future American policy should accept. The US had reason to hope that India would be successful in her struggle for political unity and economic progress. The Democratic party was in favour of “a low posture policy” in South Asia. The US should participate as a mediator in local disputes only when all the parties agreed on the usefulness of such mediation and the US herself saw the possibility of offering positive assistance. It also lent support to the general Indian belief that Republicans favoured Pakistan and Democrats favoured India. (Bose, 1982)

Jimmy Carter’s victory in the presidential election of 1976 was warmly welcomed in India. he was believed to a liberal with greater sympathies for third world countries. A change for the better in Indo-US relations was perceptible once again. The unexpected debacle of Mrs Gandhi and her party in the Indian general elections of March 1977,

¹ <http://countrystudies.us/india/134.htm>

cause election in the United States and expectancy of closer ties between India and America in the years ahead highest, the new Indian prime minister Morarji Desai, the foreign minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the Janata party as a whole were believed to be more pro-western in their attitude than the preceding government. soon after the Janata party came into power the Indo-US joint commission and its sub-commissions were activated. The US Congress began to show more sympathetic interests in India and indicated a responsive attitude to India's request for assistance from the international development association. In April 1979, Vajpayee and the secretary of state Cyrus R. Vance, at the end of former's visit to Washington, sign an agreement creating a sub-commission on agriculture to coordinate the knowledge and experience of the both countries. (Sinha, 1994, pp. 215-220)

Vajpayee appreciably recalled the contribution made by US institutions and scientists to India's green revolution. The much-publicized improvement in Indo-US relations during the Janata government could not really have stood the test of a close national security. Some of the most important among the issue areas were economic relations, secular energy and security, naval base in Diego Garcia and management of Indo-American educational and cultural exchange programmes. None of these differences were ironed out during the Janata Carter period of friendly relations between the two countries. (Sinha, 1994, pp. 221-230)

President Carter said the United States welcomed India's bold declaration that it would not manufacture nuclear weapons and would refrain from conducting even peaceful nuclear explosions. He said the friendship between the two largest democracies in the world, which had in right earnest respected human rights, was deep and abiding and an era of very constructive co-operation lay ahead of them. He described Mr Desai as a man of courage and conviction. Replying, Mr Desai said he had come to the United States "with a feeling of deep satisfaction that our bilateral relations are so much closer than they have been for some time in the past." ²

² <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pm-moraji-desai-holds-talks-with-carter/article6446146.ece>

Indo-US relation in 1980's

The massive victory of Indira Gandhi's Congress and the complete rout of the Janata and other opposition parties in the general election of January 1980, confounded all political scientists and analysts in India and abroad. Thus the re-emergence of Mrs Gandhi came as a shock and surprise to the United States and most of the western world and a pleasant surprise to the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. The official US reaction was of course discreet. But the press and the public reaction clearly revealed American uneasiness and apprehension. India's refusal to join the chorus of condemnation of Soviet action and her abstention from the overwhelming U.N. vote condemning the Soviet intervention depended on the fear of India's return to a pronounced pro-soviet policy. At the same time, the US decision to offer arms aid to Pakistan to build up the latter's defence against possible Russian aggression alarmed India. Citing experience of the 1965 war when Pakistan had used American arms against India, in spite of American assurance that this would not happen, Mrs Gandhi vehemently voiced her criticism of the US proposal. (Bose, 1982)

The US did not agree with the Indian viewpoint. To the US the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was the first step towards the realisation of a much greater objective. The presence of the Soviet military in force there is a palpable threat to those countries and the sensitive Persian Gulf region from which flows 2/3 of the world's oil exports. Goheen emphatically asserted that a strong reaction to the Soviet threat was "a matter of simple prudence". He tried to assure the Indians that they had nothing to fear from US assistance to Pakistan and friendly relations between China and America. He pointed out that the US government had "deliberately avoided offering either the kind or quantity of arms that might endanger India". The American people and their government genuinely feared that the Soviet march into Afghanistan was only a step for what to their ultimate destination the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The Carter administration at this point was anxious not to antagonise India and in fact endeavoured to remove Indian misgiving without compromising, what Americans perceived their national interests and security. (Bose, 1982)

Opposed to this was India's sincere conviction that the soviet's had no such design. So here was a situation where though both prime minister Mrs Gandhi and President Carter had no intention of widening the rift between their respective countries, they took totally

different views of a situation in the light of their perception of national interests. The issue of nuclear energy and security has been for about a decade a major stumbling block in the way of a better relationship between India and the United States. The latter had been insisting for a long time that India should sign the international nuclear non-proliferation treaty (1968). But both Mrs Gandhi and Morarji Desai refused to be a signatory to the treaty unless the superpowers themselves agreed to implement the conditions which they were asking others powers to fulfil.

India maintained the position that the treaty must be signed by all the countries on a “basis of equality”. The origin of the disputed issue goes back to 1963 when the United States under an agreement to cooperate in the civil uses of atomic energy, started to supply to India enriched uranium for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) for 30 years. But when in May 1974 Indian made a nuclear explosion it caused great consternation in the western world. India’s emphatic and repeated assertion that it was a “peaceful nuclear explosion” and that she had no intention of producing the bomb of using nuclear energy for any other purpose did not succeed in allaying the fear of nuclear proliferation. The U.S. government was under pressure to stop the supply of uranium to India unless she agreed to accept certain safeguards and stipulations and was willing to sign the nuclear proliferation treaty. The indo-American joint communique issued at the end of Henry Kissinger’s official visit to India in October 1974, referred to India’s affirmation that she would not develop nuclear weapons and she would use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only. The meeting between Carter and Desai in 1978 and a series of high-level talks and correspondence failed to resolve the issue. However, the Carter administration, in spite of mounting congressional and political pressure, was unwilling to stop the supply of uranium in violation of the existing agreement. The secretary of state Edmund Muskie pleaded for the sale of 38 tonnes of nuclear fuel to India for its Tarapur reactor. (Mohite, 1995, pp. 82-83)

The Reagan administration took a different view of the issue and was of the opinion that resumption of supply to supply to India will encourage nuclear proliferation and will be an unwise acceptance of India’s adamant that there was no other option but to give the agreement of 1963 a decent burial. A series of high-level talks failed to resolve the problem. The apparently improved and more cordial relations between the U.S. and India was being accorded an important position in American foreign policy in general

and south-west Asia in particular. America, he said, was interested in a “cooperative relationship”, with India because of the latter’s role as “a leader among the developing and non-aligned nations”. Kenney said in 1959, would determine the future of that continent. He sincerely wished to see India win that race with China and was strongly in favour of helping India in all respects. It is quite obvious that Kennedy’s interest in India and his desire to help her were inseparably linked with the national interest of the United States. The worsening of Indo-U.S. relations has been aggravated by the crisis in Afghanistan. The U.S. ambassador to India Harry G. Barnes recently said, exist on the question of Tarapur nuclear power plant; the U.S. military assistance to Pakistan; India’s decision to abstain on the U.N. resolution urging withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan (implying the Indian reluctance to condemn Soviet intervention in Afghanistan) are the points of disagreement between both country. In 1962 the U.S. responded to India’s pleas for military aid against Chinese aggression. But the situation has greatly changed since the early 1970s. Now there is a sort of Pakistan-China –U.S. alliance. In the event of any threat from China, India cannot any longer count on material support from the United States. American disappointment with India’s failure to openly condemn the Soviet action and call for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is unconcealed. Many public leaders have expressed their anger and dejection. Strongly pleading for giving arms aid to Pakistan Henry Kissinger reiterated his conviction that India, in collusion with the Soviet Union wishes to see the dismemberment of Pakistan. Nixon informed Mrs Gandhi in a letter that the U.S. had “chosen to work primarily through quiet diplomacy” (Chadda,1986)

A few factors had in the past and will in the foreseeable future continue to have some influence on Indo-U.S. relations. One of these in the legacy of the U.S. foreign policy of the past three decades and the legacy of the Indian struggle against imperialism. To the United States, the crucial problem in the post-second World War period was containment of communism. The U.S. support for the unpopular dictatorial regimes in Thailand, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan and other places was a part of this general policy of containment. The U.S. attitude to the resurgence of numerous.

An American coach of a worldwide strategic and ideology confrontation against the Soviet Union was unable to comprehend let alone appreciate democratic India's policy of standing aside and head holier than thou forces of Evil on both house." This was followed letter by speculator state visit to the United States Indira Gandhi's July 1982

trip to Washington was a great media success both Reagan and Indira Gandhi visually enjoy the publicity. (P.M.Kamath, 1987)

The individual understanding between Indira Gandhi and United States President Ronald Reagan, established during a series of meetings in the early 1980s, permitted the two nations regularly to begin refining two-sided relations. Indira Gandhi and Ronald Reagan "hit it off well when they meet for the first time at the Cancun meeting in 1981". Whether her visit was equally successful or otherwise, inheritance she had nothing to declare in the accompanying baggage". Most analysis, however, agrees that the Indira Regan Summit had a significant achievement to boast of both sides agree to stop barking at each other in an unseemly manner and habitual display of mutual disagreement at every turn. Upon his return to New Delhi after the Indira Regan Summit investor Harry Barnes went out to his way to put into practice the new policy of projecting the positive. The Indira Regan summit head the net effect of substantial improvement in clearing negative perceptions in Indo-us relation (Jain, 1988)

The Reagan administration reviewed its policy to India and decided to enlarge areas of cooperation, particularly in the commercial and scientific field, as a means of responding Soviet impact in the region. Washington also looks upon New Delhi's status as the most important regional power in South Asia in a highly favourable condition. For her part, Gandhi feels that India was not able to stop United States arms sales to Pakistan, but better communication with the United States could open other areas of collaboration that could advantage Indian interests. Indira Gandhi's highly successful 1982 state visit to the United States was followed by a series of high-level interactions, including the visits of Vice President George Bush and Secretary of State George Shultz to India. In addition, in 1982 the two sides settle down their clash regarding supplies of fuel and spare parts for the nuclear power plant at Tarapur. In 1984 the United States decided to increase technology transmissions to India.³ But Indira Gandhi's tragic death in October 1984 marks the end of a chapter in Indian politics and public affairs.

Rajiv Gandhi was quite different from his mother, he doesn't seem to suffer from any ideological hangup, not strong personal preference or prejudice seem to twist his pleasant manner. He was very keen to get the world across especially among the industrially advanced Western countries that India had embarked on liberalisation drive

³ <http://countrystudies.us/india/134.htm>

and will encourage large scale and Rapid modernization of India's Technology and managerial base. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Reagan meet to each other in June 1985 in the state of Indo-us relation. Both show a positive attitude during the meeting, the youth new leader was seen in the United States as unencumbered by the ideological angularities and inherited anti-Western bias so so characteristic of the Asian-African people and a majority of their leaders. Rajiv Gandhi is the new economic strategy of seeking growth through decontrol De-licensing and economic liberalisation coupled with positive incentives to the private sector with a view to in cute larger investments was extremely well received in the United States. There is a few optimist who even detects welcome portends radical betterment in Indo-us relations in the near and long term future (P.M.Kamath, 1987, chapter 8).

The new enthusiastic trend in relations between New Delhi and Washington continuous with the 1985 and 1987 visits by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Washington. Similarly, as the United States developed its gratitude to see India's role in South Asia as a force for stability, Washington supported New Delhi's step in Sri Lanka in 1987 and in Maldives in 1988. In the mid- and late 1980s, the United States secretary of defence and the Indian minister of defence visited for represented an unsure but emergent program to support in the field of military technology and other defence. In 1988 the USA and India confirmed a cohesion to provide United States technology for India's light combat aircraft program and also permitted to transfer technology for the F-5 fighter plane. Collaboration between India and the United States in different scientific fields followed the signing of a two-sided agreement on scientific and technological exchanges in 1985. Civil technology transfers also enhanced, and in 1987 India obtained a Cray supercomputer for agricultural research and weather forecasting and acknowledged the stringent United States safeguards to preclude military uses (B.K. Ahluwalia, 1985, pp. 139-149). Additionally, economic liberalisation actions cemented the way for better trade and United States investment in India. In 1988 the improved economic environment resulted in the conclusion of a deal for a Pepsi-Cola plant and the signing of a bilateral tax treaty. In 1989 American asset in India touched US\$1 billion⁴.

⁴ <http://countrystudies.us/india/134.htm>

The government of both countries had shown a different view on international issues like Afganistan, Middle East, Central America and Cambodia, in the 1980s. The American policy of favouring Pakistan and on the nuclear proliferation issue was unchanged. India was consistently disagreed with the American policy to provide advanced military weapon and technology and other support to Pakistan till 1980. While the USA was continued forcing India to sign on NPT, even the USA warns India to abstain from developing a ballistic missile capability by following to the restrictions of the Missile Technology Control Regime, in May 1989, when India successfully tested its intermediate-range ballistic missile Agni. India rejected these appeals on the grounds that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not based on equality and the United States-sponsored Missile Technology Control Regime discriminated against nonnuclear states, so India had a right to develop such technology and that. (India: Foreign Policy & Government Guide, Volume 1, 2001)

Administrative and private-sector were not totally agreed to foreign contribution in the economy, infrastructure problems, bureaucratic red tape, and legal problems remained challenging obstacles to the significant Indian-United States economic cooperation. In the late 1980s, India had differences with the United States on improving its legal protection of intellectual property rights, opening its markets to American service industries, and liberalising its foreign investment conventions. (India: Foreign Policy & Government Guide, Volume 1, 2001)

End of cold war and change in world order

The end of the cold war was one of the most unanticipated events in world affairs. When the USSR collapsed most historians and Scholars of international theories were taken it by surprise. In 1990, with the collapse of USSR, cold war rich to its end and world order has been rebuilt. know in the world only one power has left and the world becomes unipolar from bipolar. India's policy of nonalignment and its significant military dependence on the Soviet Union was a continuing focus of America distrust. Between New Delhi and Washington in international forums were a frequent source of tension (Pant, 2010). But after the end of cold war in 1990, the two largest democracy has had the opportunity of a new start. As an outcome of the end of the cold war, Indian began exploring also other possibilities. Slowly, New Delhi, take on measures to recover their relations with the United States. More importantly, the Indians largely abdicated their

contemplative opposition to American strategic, economic, and diplomatic policies, evincing a new openness to the pursuit of mutually beneficial endeavours. While strong-minded to avoid becoming a counter in U.S. efforts to hold back China, the Indians realised that a closer relationship with the U.S. could help them fill the emptiness left by the Soviet Union's fall and also balance against rising Chinese power. In 1991, India also goes through various economic reforms which also attracted the USA. The United State saw India is a big emerging market. It was in fact both India's largest foreign investor and its largest trading partner in 1991 the United State expanded its military contacts India. The United State was also efficient to bring Russia into the Democratic inflexion. With the cold war over, Airbus a number of development and forces pushing the United State and India to co-operate. Why is some diverging interest continued to trouble the India-US relationship, one heard more and more references to cooperative engagement, strategic operations and other promoting development coming out the both Washington and New Delhi in the 1990s.

The U.S., for its part, was no longer coercively to view India in light of the latter's friendship with the Soviets and could re-evaluate Indo-U.S. relations on their own merits. Thus, the massive structural shift that resulted from the end of the Cold War foreclosed India's old Soviet-centric strategic policies and drove it to consider an approach more amenable to cooperation with the U.S. The shift also enabled the U.S. to be more receptive to this new orientation.

In the early 1990s, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and his finance minister, Manmohan Singh, faced a stark choice. They could seek a short-term solution to India's financial crisis through multilateral loans, or they could try to address the deeper economic problems. Rao and Singh opted for the second approach and decided to use the crisis to make fundamental changes in India's economic growth strategy (Bipan Chandra, 2007). They directed, for all practical intention, India's atavistic commitment to "import-substituting industrialisation" and the labyrinthine regulatory system that it had spawned. Instead, they chose to move India toward more market-friendly economic policies. Key aspects of this approach included adopting a structural adjustment regime, reducing tariffs and agricultural subsidies, loosening industrial regulations, and paring down India's massive public sector. Individual leadership has also played a major role in facilitating enhanced Indo-U.S. ties. Various Indian and American leaders have made significant contributions in this regard. For instance, the decision by Narasimha Rao

and Manmohan Singh to break with India's autarkic development strategy and begin moving toward market reforms facilitated the growth that has made India such a valuable economic partner for the U.S. Even though these market reforms were triggered by the economic crisis emanating from the Gulf War, it still took considerable foresight and political courage for Rao and Singh to launch a policy that represented such a major departure from the past. This is particularly true given the entrenched interests within India that opposed any break with previous policy⁵.

Even, we can feel change deeply in the post-cold war ideology of Indian foreign policy, during the cold war period wherever, India was highly influenced by the Russian socialist thought, in post-cold war its change and India moved toward realism from idealism. With the end of cold war, India start abandoned Nehrusim, which was a major change in its policy to which took India forward to globalisation and to save its vital national interests. During the Cold War period, India's relations with the US and the east while the Soviet Union were viewed in a zero-sum context. But after post, cold war era Indians leaders had felt that Indian military strength and liberalised economy should be the basis of India's national interest and its regional leadership. So now India tilt towards capitalism or economic realism which resembles the basis of the foreign policy of USA. (M.L. Sondhi, 2002, pp. 18-22)

Indo-US relation in 1990's

The United States has been highly supportive of India's efforts to transform its formerly quasi-socialist economy through fiscal reform and market opening, beginning under the Narasimha Rao government in 1991, when India took steps to reduce inflation and the budget deficit, privatize state-owned industries, reduce tariffs and industrial licensing controls, and institute incentives to attract foreign trade and investment. By mid-March 1994, Indo-US relations had touched the lowest level in the 90s, the same was established during the Nixon Administration in 1971 during the Bangladesh war. Against this background, the then Prime Minister of India, P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Washington, DC, in May 1994⁶. This summit between Prime Minister Rao and President Bill Clinton surprised many. It was as a result of negotiations between the

⁵https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Kapur_Transformation_of_U.S._India_Relations.pdf

⁶ <http://countrystudies.us/india/134.htm>

two that all open criticism of India's human right record was withdrawn. Similarly, the pressures created by other security-related insecurities were also relaxed. The US promised flow of funds into Indian industries, particularly in the fields of power and infrastructure development. India was recognised as one of ten major markets for American trade and investment. 1995 saw the visits by the then Energy Secretary, Hazel O'Leary, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and Defence Secretary William Perry in quick succession to promote bilateral Indo-American trade and improve relations generally⁷

However, Narasimha Rao also made certain important security related concessions to the US. he said that India would not create any problems for the US in its effort to extend the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely at the 1995 New York Conference. Rao had given an assurance to go slow on the missile programme of India. After the return of Prime Minister Rao from his visit to Washington, DC, India conducted a test of the Prithvi missile in June 1994. However, subsequently, there were neither any tests of the Agni nor of the Prithvi. The intermediate-range missile, Agni, was, in effect, shelved by stating that it was a technology demonstrator and the experiment was successful. The US officials, in their testimony before the South Asian Affairs Committee, had stated that India's Agni project was in "a period of suspended animation", while the project on Prithvi was in "a period of hibernation".⁸

After the Prime Minister's return from the working summit with Bill Clinton, there was no looking back. It was an upward march for Indo-US relations. In the economic field, the US emerged as the largest investor in India mainly in power, infrastructure and many other industries. The second term of the Clinton Presidency that shows a greater consistency in improving Indo-US bilateral relations than his first term. During the second term of Clinton, both countries show their concern to fight together against the terrorism as USA experience domestic and international terrorism till 1997.⁹

But India's nuclear tests in May 1998 seriously damaged Indo-American relations. President Clinton imposed wide-ranging sanctions pursuant to the 1994 Nuclear

⁷<https://www.idsa-india.org/an-feb-2.html>

⁸<https://www.idsa-india.org/an-feb-2.html>

⁹<https://www.idsa-india.org/an-feb-2.html>

Proliferation Prevention Act. The United States encouraged India to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) immediately and without condition. The U.S. also called for restraint in missile and nuclear testing and deployment in both India and Pakistan. The non-proliferation dialogue initiated after the 1998 nuclear tests have bridged many of the gaps in understanding between the countries. However, India has yet to sign the CTBT, agree to a fissile material production moratorium, or define its intentions on acquiring a nuclear deterrent clearly. U.S. sanctions on Indian entities involved in the nuclear industry and opposition to international financial institution loans for non-humanitarian assistance projects in India remain sources of friction. As a result of the tests, President Clinton imposed wide-ranging sanctions on both countries, mandated by the Arms Export Control Act. Many of these sanctions gradually were lifted through Congress-Executive branch cooperation in 1998-2000. The remaining nuclear sanctions on India and Pakistan were removed on September 22, 2001.(Outlook India)

However, in the Indians' view, Clinton's actions during their country's 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan largely atoned for his earlier policy. Indeed, American actions during the Kargil conflict helped begin undoing the deep distrust of the U.S. that Indian leaders had acquired over the previous several decades. To explain, India discovered in the spring of 1999 that Pakistani forces had breached the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir in a sector called Kargil. The Pakistani positions enabled them to threaten Indian lines of communication into northern Kashmir. As a large-scale Indian counteroffensive began to beat back the intruders, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif travelled to Washington in July and asked Clinton to help him devise a solution to the conflict. Clinton refused to cooperate until all Pakistani forces had retreated back to their side of the LoC. (htt9)

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) coalition government led by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, which came to power following the March 1998 parliamentary elections, supported a modest pace of economic reform. In April 1999, the BJP government resigned following the loss of a confidence vote, 270-269. In October 1999, the BJP government regained power following national elections. A BJP-led multiparty alliance won about 300 of 545 parliamentary seats, prompting analysts to forecast a period of more stable government. In November 2001, Vajpayee met with President

Bush in Washington to discuss the outlines of expanding U.S.-India cooperation.(CSR 2002)

Relationship in the 2000s

Rapidly expanding U.S.-India economic relations were a major focus of President Clinton's March 2000 five-day visit to India. During his visit, South Asia represented a major U.S. initiative to improve cooperation across a broad spectrum, including economic ties; regional stability; nuclear proliferation concerns; security and counter-terrorism; environmental protection; clean energy production; and disease control. Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee agreed in a vision statement to institutionalise dialogue between the two countries through a range of high-level meetings and working groups on the various areas of cooperation, capped by regular bilateral "summits" between the leaders of the two countries.

Economic ties were a major focus of Clinton's visit, during which U.S. companies signed agreements on \$4 billion in projects with Indian and Bangladeshi firms. Clinton also announced \$2 billion in government financial support for U.S. exports to India through the U.S. Export-Import Bank. To further expand bilateral economic cooperation, the United States and India agreed to establish working groups on trade; clean energy and environment; and science and technology. U.S.-India agreements also were signed on environmental protection, clean energy production, and combating global warming. The President also lifted sanctions on some small U.S. assistance programs, including a U.S. Agency for International Development initiative to provide technical assistance to strengthen Indian financial markets and regulatory agencies. On the social welfare side, U.S.-India cooperation agreements were signed on efforts to combat polio, tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS, as well as the trafficking of women and children in South Asia (CSR Report, 2002)

During his 10-day visit to the United States in September 2000, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress and was the guest of honour at a state dinner at the White House. During the course of the prime minister's visit to Washington, U.S. officials announced \$900 million in Export-Import Bank financing to help Indian businesses purchase U.S. goods and services. U.S. companies also signed agreements to construct three large power projects in India, valued at \$6 billion, as part

of increased energy cooperation between the two countries. On September 15, President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee signed a joint statement agreeing to cooperate on arms control, terrorism, and AIDS. When Vajpayee revisited the United States in early November 2001, he came at a time of heightened tensions in South Asia but also during a time of warming Indo-U.S. relations in spite of the close U.S.-Pakistani cooperation during the war in Afghanistan. Vajpayee used the occasion to express his concerns that if the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan were perceived as “slackening” then extremist forces in Pakistan could be bolstered. Recent years, however, have brought a sea change in U.S.- India relations, which was reflected in India’s swift offer of full support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism following September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on New York and Washington.¹⁰

During the tenure of the George W. Bush administration, relations between India and the United States were seen to have blossomed, primarily over common concerns regarding growing Islamic extremism, energy security, and climate change. George W. Bush commented, "India is a great example of democracy. It is very devout, has diverse religious heads, but everyone is comfortable about their religion. Even "described George W. Bush as "being the most pro-Indian president in American history." (htt10) In the December 2004 during the tsunami, the US and Indian navies cooperated in search and rescue operations and in the reconstruction of affected areas. The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continues to grow, while significant two-way investment also grows and flourishes.

In late 2009 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the White House as President Barack Obama's first official state guest. The influence of a large Indian-American community is reflected in the largest country-specific caucus in the United States Congress, while between 2009-2010 more than 100,000 Indian students have attended American colleges and universities. In November 2010, President Barack Obama visited India and addressed a joint session of the Indian Parliament, where he backed India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (Karl, D. 2013).

¹⁰ The full official detailed of president Clinton is published by the embassy which can access by https://www.indianembassy.org/pdf/october_2000.pdf

Between 2004 and 2014 Western *think-tanks*, especially in the US and UK, failed to foresee the swing in electoral voting patterns of the growing middle-class and anticipate the scale of political change in India brought about by improvements in basic education and freedom of the press. According to Michael Kugelman, South and Southeast Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre, the US was unprepared to meet new challenges in India because of its inability to keep pace with the transformations.

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