

## **Chapter 4**

### **INDO-USA Defence relation**

#### **The cold war and End of the cold war**

World's political structure has changed with the end of second world war as the entire world has changed into two power group. The period of 1939 to 1945 was the witness of a huge change in the world history. During World War II, America and the Soviet Union fought together as allies against the Axis powers. But still, during the end months of the cold war, the relationship between the both partners of war became tense. Americans had long been mistrustful of Soviet communism and worried about Russian leader Joseph Stalin's autocratic, blood-thirsty policy of his own country. While another side, the Soviets disliked the Americans' decades-long refusal to treat the USSR as a sincere part of the international community as well as their late entry into World War II, which resulted in the losses life of tens of millions of Russians. After the war ended, these complaints grew into an overwhelming sense of mutual doubt and hate. Post world war Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe fueled which created fears of a Russian plan to control the world among Americans. Meanwhile, the USSR came to resent what they supposed as American officials, aggressive rhetoric, arms buildup and dominant approach to international relations. In such an unfriendly atmosphere, no single party can be entire to blame for the Cold War; in fact, some historians believe it was predictable.<sup>1</sup>

Nuclear bombs were not the only occupations for the Soviet and the Americans at the start of the cold war. It also must be noted that the American diplomat and Statesman were for more responsible for the one set of the cold war. In 1947 the US administration it funds to Turkey and Greece sending out the message very clearly that the US was prepared to subvert a Soviet ambition to dominate East Europe. This was the birth of the Truman plant, which distinguished between two Worlds of freedom and operations. The Marshall plan, beginning in 1947 according to Bay lies and Smith also reflected the defensive portion of the US in providing aid for European economic recovery. (pant, 2010, p. 38)

The year 1949 was a crucial year for the cold war as this was the year Germany was divided. The issue of Germany decided, therefore, to both campuses. After the war, Germany had been

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cold-war-history>

divided into four zones, under France between the US and the USSR. The Western Power Made in London to discuss the decisions the re-industrialisation of Germany. In this discussion, the three unit was treated as one. This is sure that the division of euro was complete, except for the two cities of Vienna and Berlin, which was still within the Soviet June. The USSR retaliated by announcing a blockade of the city. This was the closest the two side had ever come to a direct confrontation and the outbreak of War was a plausible reality. Even Korean War become the reason of due to which cold war reached to Asia. (pant, 2010, p. 39)

The end of the Cold War has created the opportunity for a significant improvement in the relation to the United States and India. Although India and the United States are the world's largest democracies, their relationship during the cold war year was unstable and frequently troubled. India's policy of nonalignment and its significant military dependence on the Soviet Union was a continuing focus of America distrust. Between New Delhi and Washington in international forums were a frequent source of tension. From the Indian perspective, American military assistance to Pakistan has just obliged South Asia, impeding the evolution of a "natural" regional balance of power in which India, the overwhelmingly large state, would enjoy its rightful position of unchallenged Supremacy. The basic psychological conflict is that India sees itself as an emerging great power with the, is it stage, by the United States, has viewed India as a regional power. Thus, US policies described as giving greater importance to China than to India, as bracketing India with Pakistan, have been a persistent source of discord.

### **Reasons behind cooperation and close relation between India-USA**

It true that end of the cold war has opened new doors for both countries but it was not only the reason to come closer both the countries. In past two decades, many changes have occurred in the world order and the different state has faced kind of troubles, which may not even think during the cold war era. In the cold war period, the ideology of the both superpower and military troop formatted by both superpowers were the only threat to the world peace. But in present scenario many there is many caused around the world which creates danger in for the world peace and humanity. Terrorism, the weapon of mass destruction, the identity crisis in the multi-culturalism world, global warming and environmental issue faced by every country in the world and race of nuclear armament between countries are some issues which make rethink to every country about their policies. Many of the developed countries were sure in the past that they will never go through these problems.

The base of cooperation is not peace conflict between both countries but there is a number of the issue on which both share their opinion and have the option to work together in present and future. Nuclear Non-proliferation and cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, is another area here we can see cooperation between both countries from after 2000. India needs advance technology for its betterment in the field of science and technology and the US need a field for consumption of their military and civil projects. In the field of education, both countries inked many MoU and agreement. Right now 100000 Indian students are studying in the US. So we can find out there is a huge area, where both countries can cooperate and take their relationship in positive ways.<sup>2</sup>

### **INDIA-US defence relation from 2005-16**

In strategic relations, between both countries can be referred as Corporation on the fundamental issues of War and Peace. The perspective of India and the United State or Non-proliferation, regional security and stability in Asia and the regional dynamic in South Asia, these are the things which bound to influence Indo-US relation in the future.

India-US relations reached a new level of understanding when in 1991, both have decided to increase strategic partnership between their defence forces. The kind of strategic dialogue and defence cooperation that is now being envisaged has never taken place in the past between the two countries. In the past, India was particularly sensitive to the perception that Americans either wish to ignore it or to attach unfair restrictions on its legitimate defence needs. Collectively, the various proposals were called the Kicklighter proposals after Lt Gen Claude Kicklighter, who was in Hawaii as Commander of the US Pacific Army. The Kicklighter proposals were drawn from existing Army programmes with other countries. In fact, it was the US Pacific Command which first mooted the possibility of greater cooperation with India in the region. It may be noted in this context that the US Pacific Command is responsible for American security in both the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean regions. The objective of the Kicklighter proposals was to pursue a common policy of gradually strengthening ties towards expanded cooperation and partnership by the end of the decade. Eventually, in the subcontinent defence ties have evolved gradually without so much disturbing the balance of power. In the case of India, defence relations are being virtually built from scratch. Ever since

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<sup>2</sup> [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/122829/2010\\_10\\_StrategicImplications\\_Kumar.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/122829/2010_10_StrategicImplications_Kumar.pdf)

the military dialogue began, the US has been keen to have joint military exercises, particularly in the mountainous terrain. Beginning 1991, the two countries have been having joint military exercises, including joint naval exercises which were held in May 1992. India-US service-to-service cooperation saw joint naval drills being conducted in the early part of 1995. Washington even fielded two nuclear-powered submarines in these exercises. The US has also expressed its desire to practise with aircraft carriers. Besides, the US is also keen to reach an agreement with India for US naval ship repairs to be undertaken at Mazagoan Docks, and making Goa and Cochin permanent port of calls for the US Navy deployed in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. However, it is unlikely that India will accept this.<sup>3</sup>

The luminosity shown by the heads about the possibility of India-US relations has at times been in stark contrast to that of the politicians or the bureaucrats. Some scholars like Selig Harrison have even spoken in terms of the need for an "India-Centred" policy, given a scenario wherein India "will gradually grow into an economic and military power, whatever the US does." As part of India's new military cooperation with the US, the larger question that has been raised is whether India would participate in a structure of "cooperative vigilance" in the region. India is basically looking for high-technology from the US. But it has to try and do this without having to make major concessions in terms of its national interests. There is no need to say that India wants good defence tie with the US, while the US also looking for not disturb the subcontinent's military balance. The relations in defence field have start come closest when the US Ambassador, Frank Wisner, in an interview to Span magazine in August 1995 stated that the US recognises the right of India to have a strong national defence. In other words, the scope of India-US military cooperation have to be recognised, and one does not know at this stage that whether Indian and American geopolitical interests and opinions will converge in the future. (idsaartical)

### **Cooperation in nuclear field**

More than a decade back from now, on 18 July 2005, during the state visit of President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh given a joint statement for an extraordinary deal, in which they announce that United State will support India's access to global nuclear commerce and will help to play India a major role in global non-proliferation efforts as well as

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<sup>3</sup> <https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun-6.html>

accord its civil nuclear program according to the norms of nuclear non-proliferation regime. It was the movement for defining non-proliferation regime, reconstruction its structure wherein perceived 'outlier' was being assimilated into the system through a process that was seen by different section is having the prospect of strengthening as well as unravelling it. Nuclear agreement between India and the United States was initialled during President Bush's official visit to New Delhi in 2006. Under this, India agreed to (i) Separate its nuclear civilian and military facilities, and place its civilian facilities under the IAEA safeguards; (ii) keep its commitment to unilateral moratorium on future nuclear testing; (iii) adhere to the IAEA's additional protocols regarding civilian nuclear reactors; and (iv) refrain from transferring sensitive nuclear technology, including enrichment technology, to non-nuclear states. And finally, India agreed to abide by the guidelines of the NSG and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In return, India would be entitled to an uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel from America, with the right to build a strategic reserve for nuclear fuel. (Jain, B. 2016)

The agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation which was signed between India-USA (called "123 Agreement") was approved by the U.S. Congress on October 1, 2008, the height of an extraordinary three-year effort by the U.S. and India, working together as never before. Approval of the Agreement bolsters our partnership with the world's largest democracy and a growing economic power, provides trade and investment opportunities for the U.S. economy and helps India's population of more than one billion to meet its rapidly increasing energy needs in an environmentally responsible way while reducing the growth of carbon emissions. The U.S.-India 123 Agreement will also enhance our global non-proliferation efforts and reflects a common commitment to share both the benefits of the international system and also the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining, strengthening, and defending it. <sup>4</sup>

Several key objectives were accomplished to bring us to this moment in history. In December 2006, the U.S. Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (Hyde Act), which provides a framework in U.S. law for facilitating civil nuclear cooperation with India. In July 2007, the United States and India concluded negotiations on the 123 agreement, which required approval by the U.S. Congress to be brought into force. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria approved the India Safeguards Agreement on August 1, 2008. Others precondition for submitting the 123 Agreement also took place in Vienna, with the Nuclear

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<sup>4</sup> <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

Suppliers Group (NSG) accord conclusion on September 6, 2008, to grant an exception to its full-scope safeguards requirement to permit civil nuclear supply to India.<sup>5</sup>

The 123 Agreement establishes the legal framework for the U.S. to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with this key strategic partner. The President submitted the Agreement to Congress on September 10, 2008, with the requisite determinations on India's progress on a number of commitments it made in the 2005 Joint Statement, as provided for under the Hyde Act. The U.S. Congress approved the U.S.-India Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy on October 1, 2008 with strong bipartisan support and cooperation. These historic events reflect the transformation of U.S.-India relations and recognition of India's emergence on the global stage. The Agreement was signed by the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and then Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee on October 10, 2008. Its entry into force opens the door for American and Indian firms to participate in each other's civil nuclear energy sector.<sup>6</sup>

In 2008, NSG agreed on an exemption for nuclear transfers to India over the protestations of the governments of Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand. The exemption, which was initiated by the George W. Bush administration and strongly backed by France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, reversed the long-standing NSG and NPT policies barring nuclear trade with states that have not accepted comprehensive international safeguards. (Kimball, D. 2010)

Nevertheless India got exemption from NSG in the year 2008 NSG, now states such as Australia and Japan should resist commercial and political pressures for engaging in nuclear trade with India, at least until New Delhi complies with UN Security Council Resolution 1172, passed in June 1998, which calls on India and Pakistan to stop producing fissile material for weapons, to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and undertake other nuclear risk reduction measures (Sharma. A; 2008). Those NSG governments that have decided to sell nuclear material and reactors to India should clarify that if India or any other state breaks its non-proliferation commitments and conducts a nuclear test explosion for any reason, they will immediately terminate nuclear trade with the offending state. The NSG must address future proliferation risks as well. India and other states in regions of proliferation concern are seeking advanced enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology. As a result, the United States and other NSG states must overwhelm disagreement from South Africa and Turkey and

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<sup>5</sup> <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

<sup>6</sup><https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

adopt tougher guidelines that would bar the transfer of such technology to those states that have not signed the NPT and do not have in place IAEA inclusive safeguards and enhanced examinations under a supplementary protocol. If the NSG is to remain effective and credible, member states must respect and uphold their own rules, avoid actions that feed the nuclear arms race and strengthen their guidelines to prevent weapons-related nuclear technology from proliferation in the years ahead. The US administration is to subsequently help secure the consent of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to treat India as an exception to its current guidelines, following which the 123 agreement would be presented before the US Congress for a vote. It was another step which was taken by both countries to take their relationship in a significant way (Bent on Strategic Embrace. 2008).

The Nuclear Suppliers group reached an agreement plan decision to grant an exception to its full-scope safeguards requirement to permit civil nuclear supply to India on September 6, 2008. This historic achievement brings us closer to realising the important benefits – including non-proliferation benefits – that successful implementation of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative will bring about.<sup>7</sup>

The United States gave a vote of thanks to all the participating governments in the NSG for their outstanding efforts and cooperation in forging this consensus on welcoming India closer to the international non-proliferation regime. As well as the UN also congratulate the people of India on its accomplishments in carrying out the Initiative. India's commitments will strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, and the NSG consensus policy decision has brought us another step closer to realising full civil nuclear cooperation with India, thus helping the world's largest democracy gain access to environmentally responsible energy supplies.<sup>8</sup>

In November 2010, during a visit to India, President Barack Obama announced his support for Indian entry into the NSG and three other multilateral export control groups. At the NSG's 2011 plenary meeting, the United States submitted a "Food for Thought" paper on options for bringing India into the group (HORNER, D. 2012).

On 1 August, 2008, India's safeguards agreement has approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. The Safeguards Agreement provides for appropriate, effective safeguards in perpetuity, based on accepted IAEA safeguards principles while taking into account India's

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<sup>7</sup><https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

<sup>8</sup><https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

unique circumstances. India took pledge to sign and bring into operation an IAEA additional protocol, which will provide IAEA inspectors with additional tools and information for conducting inspections under India's Safeguards Agreement, as well as contribute to the universality of the Protocol and help establish it as the new international safeguards standard – an important non-proliferation goal for the United States, many other NPT States Party, and IAEA.<sup>9</sup>

India has also made a civic strategy to segregate its civil and military facilities, in which 14 reactors, including the 4 presently safeguarded reactors, and other facilities would be offered for safeguards under the treaty. The Agreement is based on INFCIRC/66, the IAEA safeguards system utilised for states, not under NPT full-scope safeguards. The safeguards agreement provides that, once a facility is added to the Annex of the safeguards agreement, safeguards must remain in place until the IAEA and India jointly determine that the facility is no longer usable for nuclear activities. We have made clear to the Government of India that there will be no cooperation on safeguarded facilities. India's forthcoming civilian thermal power and civilian breeder reactors will be positioned under safeguards, the amount of India's nuclear industry subject to such controls will increase over time.<sup>10</sup> This kind of steps, which will take India's more than 65% of reactors under safeguards, it will help India to brought it closer to the non-proliferation mainstream, and the United States believes the India Safeguards Agreement represents an important step toward realising the economic and energy benefits foreseen by the Initiative.<sup>11</sup>

India-US relations turned sour over India's Nuclear Liability Act (August 2010), which holds both the supplier and operator of nuclear reactors liable for any nuclear mishap, thus requiring exporting companies to pay damages to the affected parties. The 2010 India's liability Act puts an obligation on the operator for a nuclear accident, and limits total liability to 300 million SDR (about US\$450 million) "or such higher amount that the Central Government may specify by notification. Operator liability is capped at 15 billion rupees (approximately US\$285 million) or such higher amount that the Indian Government may specify, beyond which the Central Government will be liable. (CRS Report for Congress, 2011)

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<sup>9</sup><https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

<sup>10</sup><https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

<sup>11</sup><https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm>(it is an official site of Govt. of USA)



President Barack Obama, during his visit to India in November 2010, asked India to review and amend the existing Act as it was in contravention of international law and international treaties and conventions. In fact, American companies were reluctant to set up their nuclear plants in India unless the Indian government addressed their concerns by amending its Nuclear Liability Act (2010). Teresita and Howard Schaffer opine, "India's nuclear liability regime remains a serious problem for U.S. companies wanting to build power plants in India, and it is not yet clear that their concerns have been meeting . (CRS Report for Congress,2011).

The USA fully supports the “clean” Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) exclusion for India and speedy application of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement during the Obama Administration. Nothing about the new Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) transfer restrictions agreed to by NSG members should be construed as detracting from the unique impact and importance of the U.S.-India agreement of full civil nuclear cooperation. Efforts of the NSG to strengthen controls on the transfers of ENR are consistent with long-standing U.S. policy that pre-dates the Civil Nuclear Agreement and have been reaffirmed on an annual basis by the G-8 for years. This new guideline reflects a consensus among all NSG members.<sup>12</sup>

During his 5 days visit to the USA in June 2016, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi and President of the United States of America Barack Obama meet at White House. Prime Minister expressed his gratitude to President of United States to support India’s inclusion in Nuclear Suppliers Group and Mission Technology Control Regime. The Delegates had discussed the following matters related to the strategic partnership between the nations and agreed to grab new opportunities. America has promised to support India for NSG group membership<sup>13</sup>.

The American view of the means and ends of its Non-proliferation efforts in South Asia has taken it into the clash with the countries in the region. In this matter, neither a one-sided approach nor a confrontational approach can help. The tactfulness with which the US deals with India, Pakistan and China on the nuclear issue, would have gone through an assessment of their post-Cold War nuclear diplomacy, on the one hand, and its commitment to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation, on the other. In the South Asian context, a "top-down global approach" and a "down up regional approach" is simultaneously required. (Carnegie website)

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<sup>12</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166878.htm>

<sup>13</sup> Agreement sign b/w both country see annexure1

India's missile programme was another controversial topic in the American viewpoint. The medium range Prithvi and long range Agni missile programmes were seen by the US as potential systems that can deliver nuclear weapons. The US considered that Prithvi's prompting the deployment of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent. Continuous pressure had to bore on India not to deploy the Prithvi missiles and to stop the testing of the long range Agni missiles. Even the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members have applied pressure both collectively and individually. In brief, the US looks India as "part of the problem", and "not as a partner" in missile proliferation solution. America remarks any attempt by India to position the Prithvi as a crisis in the South Asian strategic environment. Hence, Washington assumes the MTCR as a key instrument in the battle against missile proliferation.

Under this initiative (agreement 123), India remains outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but assumes important nonproliferation responsibilities and obligations, including separating its civil and military nuclear facilities, accepting IAEA safeguards at its civil nuclear facilities, and signing and implementing an additional Protocol. India has created a robust national export control system, including through harmonisation with and adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines and annexes. Additionally, India has pledged to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and is working with the United States to conclude a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty – a longstanding objective of the international community. Individually, each of these activities helps strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. Together, they constitute a dramatic change in moving India into closer conformity with international non-proliferation standards and practices and form a firm foundation for the U.S. and India to strengthen our efforts in the future to prevent WMD proliferation and to combat terrorism<sup>14</sup>.

It relative basis to treat the issue of ballistic missiles in terms of the South Asian region alone. South Asia does not lie around a geostrategic emptiness, and missiles which have the range to target the subcontinent cannot be ignored. China has deployed hundreds of missiles on its territory and is even reported to have supplied M-11 missiles to Pakistan in the early 1990s. Besides, Pakistan has also been developing the 600+ km range Half-3 missile. Any effort to understand the problem of ballistic missiles in South Asia will also have to take awareness of those missiles which were targeted towards the subcontinent. Missiles installed in countries like China, the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and the Central Asian region become

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<sup>14</sup><https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm> (it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

very important in this situation. Saudi Arabia, for example, has learnt many 2,700-km range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China since 1988, after the MTCR came into effect. The need of the hour to work towards a complete and world-wide regime for the control and management of ballistic missiles ([website, idsa](#)).

It was possibly unrealistic to imagine India to conform to the one-sided stipulations of the MTCR. Besides, as the former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev put it, "If the US sells arms to Pakistan, it should not be surprised why India responds by testing missiles" (Deccan Herald, February 12, 1996). India resists that deployment of Prithvi would depend on the threat perception and the security condition dominant at a particular time. To quote from the Carnegie Endowment Report prepared in 1993 by Selig Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp: "The Indian security perspective is dominated by the perceived threat of Chinese power, both traditional and nuclear, with supposed Chinese intermediate-range missiles emplacements in Tibet and Sinkiang, and by a desire to maintain what New Delhi considers an acceptable safety margin of military superiority over Pakistan."<sup>15</sup>

The U.S.-India Initiative is about civil nuclear cooperation, not about India's strategic weapons program. It seeks to enable civil nuclear cooperation with India, a state that faces real and growing energy needs, has a solid nuclear nonproliferation export record, has an established and widespread nuclear infrastructure, and has made enhanced nonproliferation commitments which strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. India's commitment to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, along with the other steps India has taken under the Joint Statement, made this Initiative achievable.<sup>16</sup>

The NPT allows for nuclear energy cooperation with non-parties that do not have full-scope safeguards, as long as the cooperation itself is under safeguards. And a successfully implemented Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative will create strong energy and economic incentives for India to ensure that its civil nuclear energy sector is properly separated. This Initiative establishes a firm foundation for additional nonproliferation and counterproliferation cooperation, areas we fully intend to advance through the course of our partnership. The United

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<sup>15</sup> <https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun-6.html>

<sup>16</sup> <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm> (it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

States looks forward to a new strategic partnership with India in a way that will provide global leadership in the years ahead.<sup>17</sup>

As active participants in the Nuclear Security Summit process, the United States and India welcomed progress towards reducing the risk of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons or related materials and noted their shared commitment to improving nuclear security nationally and globally. The Prime Minister welcomed the hosting of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit by the United States. President Obama and Prime Minister Modi also welcomed the recent convening of the first bilateral nuclear security best practices exchange, under the auspices of the Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership, as an example of their cooperation on nuclear security. In a further effort to strengthen global nonproliferation and export control regimes, the President and the Prime Minister committed to continue to work towards India's phased entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group. The President reaffirmed the United States' position that India meets MTCR requirements and is ready for NSG membership and that it supports India's early application and eventual membership in all four regimes.<sup>18</sup>

Though India has co-sponsored the move for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and had unambiguously supported the imposition of a verifiable cap on the production of fissile materials, yet differences have surfaced over the method and way of doing this, rather than the objective. Whether the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the fissile materials cut-off will only serve to legitimise the nuclear weapons programme of the nuclear weapon states, will have implications for all the countries in South Asia and for the global non-proliferation regime as a whole. India has opposed that any exemptions and exclusion would only lead to a CTBT that will not be comprehensive, and perhaps even unfair

### **Cooperation to Counter Terrorism**

Terrorism is the main focus point of the emerging strategical policy between India and USA. Counter-terrorism is very important for both the countries. security of their citizens is the

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<sup>17</sup><https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm> (it is an official site of Govt. of USA)

<sup>18</sup> Part of Joint Statement given by PM modi and President Obama on 25 jan 2015.

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all>

primary for the government of the both countries. both are working on capacity building and secret information in the reference. (Tourngbang & Sethi, 2015). Terrorism is a global problem in the present world. More than half of the states of the world is facing this problem, even the USA who was sure because of his secure border that terrier attacks can't make over him, but he is suffering from internal terror attack from last many years. He felt the pain of a major terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, and some consequences of a terrorist attack. Before that, the USA was not so much serious about terrorism, but after 9/11 its view has been changed about this global problem, even after the 9/11, America announced war against terrorism under his leadership.in that circumstances India offer help to the USA in fighting against terrorism. Moreover, following the September 11, attack, the attack on Indian Parliament and 26/11 attack in Mumbai, both India and the USA have begun to share more interest in fighting against international terrorism and looking more elements in Pakistan as the masterminds of mayhem created in India and across the world. (Tourangbam, 2012, p. 93)

During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington in November 2009, he and President Barrack Obama had agreed on the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative. The CCI is aimed at giving both the U.S. and India additional opportunities to work together across a broad spectrum, including transport security, money laundering, counterfeit currency and terrorist financing, maritime, port and border security, cyber security and mega-city policing.<sup>19</sup>

As both had announced in 2010, according to that in 2011, they did submit in which both had shown their concern for the exchange of secret information and data, the basic structure for security, trade and transportation, evaluation of joint necessity, money seizure and cross-border crime. (Tourngbang & Sethi, 2015). In the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, the U.S. and India resolved to deepen collaborative efforts and intensify exchanges, culminating in the signing of the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative (CCI) in July 2010. This landmark agreement made clear the determination of our two governments to combine efforts to combat terrorism and to work closely to ensure the security of our citizens. Programs to exchange law enforcement best practices, hold reciprocal visits of senior-level officials to discuss lessons learned, conduct joint military training exercises, and joining forces in international fora on key counterterrorism issues, demonstrate the closeness of this cooperation.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/India-U.S.-sign-counter-terrorism-initiative/article16207465.ece>

<sup>20</sup> <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/us-india-partnership-fact-sheets>

The State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance training division provided 1,630 Indian law enforcement officials 82 CT-related courses and plans 24 more such courses by 2012. The Department of Defense hosted visiting Indian officers at a variety of its facilities while increasing its outreach on joint exercises, interoperability, and best-practices sharing in the fields of maritime, port security, and military counterterrorism issues. In addition, the U.S. Treasury Department is actively engaged and cooperating with Indian authorities responsible for implementing India's FATF anti-money laundering/terrorist financing (AML/CFT) Action Plan.<sup>21</sup>

The Leaders reaffirmed the need for joint and concerted efforts to disrupt entities such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, D Company and the Haqqani Network, and agreed to continue ongoing efforts through the Homeland Security Dialogue as well as the next round of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism in late 2015 to develop actionable elements of bilateral engagement. The two sides noted the recent U.S. sanctions against three D Company affiliates. The President and the Prime Minister further agreed to continue to work toward an agreement to share information on known and suspected terrorists. They also agreed to enter discussions to deepen collaboration on UN terrorist designations, and reiterated their call for Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai to justice. The President and the Prime Minister also noted the positive cooperative engagement between the Indian and the U.S. authorities with a view to working together to counter the threat of IEDs and to develop counterterrorism best practices.<sup>22</sup>

### **Cooperation in Traditional strategical field**

In the period of 2004- 2016, can see that India and the USA sharing a 'strategical participation', the relationship of both countries is on all time high based on shared values and generally convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives - including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation - are underway. This latter initiative, first launched in 2005, reversed three decades of American non-proliferation policy. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defence framework agreement, with the goal of

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<sup>21</sup> From the Fact Sheet on U.S. - India Counterterrorism Cooperation released on 8 nov 2010 by office of press secretary(white house)

<sup>22</sup> Part of Joint Statement given by PM modi and President Obama on 25 jan 2015.

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all>

expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries engaged in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises and major US arms sales to India were concluded.<sup>23</sup>

Defence relationship has emerged as a major pillar of India-U.S. strategic partnership with the signing of 'New Framework for India-U.S. Defence Relations' in 2005 during India's visit of President George W. Bush, and the resulting intensification in defence trade, joint exercises, personnel exchanges, collaboration and cooperation in maritime security and counter-piracy, and exchanges between each of the three services. The Defence Framework Agreement was updated and renewed for another 10 years in June 2015. As far as defence trade is concerned, it can be said that it is one-sided in the sense that it is India which only purchases defence equipment from the US and not vice-versa. Thus, while India has a trade surplus with the US in general, it is the US which has upper hand in trade in defence equipment. Joint Exercise With the growing Indo-US military to military ties, a joint exercise between the two forces to have grown dramatically. The joint exercise is aimed at achieving a better understanding of each other's capabilities and to develop the ability to operate jointly. Broadly speaking, the two countries conduct four naval exercises annually: Malabar, Habana (naval aspects of amphibious operations), Spitting Cobra, (explosive ordnance destruction focus), and Savex (diving and salvage). These exercises are important vehicles in developing professional relationships and familiarity between the two navies and run the gamut of high-end naval warfare, including integrated air/missile defence, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and naval special warfare. In addition to the annual Pacific Fleet-Indian Navy Executive Steering Group meeting, India and the US also hold regular naval bilateral staff talks, engage in port visits, and conduct personnel exchanges at all ranks. The U.S. Army's engagement with India centres on the annual YUDH ABHYAS exercise. DEFENCE TRADE With the improvement in the bilateral defence relationship, India-US defence trade has seen unprecedented growth. The United States remains committed to being a reliable and transparent defence supplier to India. Since 2002, India has signed more than 20 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases for defence articles and services such as C-17 and C-130J aircraft, TPQ-37 radars, Self-Protection Suites (SPS) for VVIP aircraft, specialised tactical equipment, Harpoon missiles, Sensor-Fuzed Weapons, and carrier flight and test pilot school training. In less than a decade, and starting at zero, we have seen the FMS program grow to a combined total case

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<sup>23</sup> <https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun-6.html>

value of approximately \$6 billion. Defence sales provide the Indian military with capabilities that mutually support both our nations' strategic priorities. Additionally, we view defence sales as a mechanism to enable new training and exchange opportunities between our militaries. The last five years have given us several opportunities to reach a new level of interaction between our militaries through defence trade. The C-130Js delivered beginning in February 2011 are the first U.S. military aircraft to have been delivered to India in half a century and have already been successfully employed to provide critical humanitarian assistance following an earthquake in Sikkim in September 2011. As part of that sale, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) trained Air Force personnel – including pilots, loadmasters, and maintenance staff. Once the C-17 contract is fulfilled, India will operate the second largest fleet of C-17s in the world. The former USS TRENTON, which was transferred to the Indian Navy in 2007 and christened the INS JALASHWA, has helped the Indian Navy expand its amphibious and expeditionary warfare capabilities (Defence report. 2011).<sup>24</sup>

However, though India-US defence relationship has witnessed unprecedented improvements after the end of Cold War and particularly in the 21st century, there are still many issues that create hurdles in the way of strong and friendly defence relationship. The trust deficit between the two countries, India's reluctance to sign the so-called foundational agreements i.e. Logistic Support Agreement, Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation. Another factor that often raises the hackles of New Delhi is Washington's continued military aid to Pakistan. The US despite being aware of the fact that its military aid which is often provided for combating terrorism actually is being used against the interests of India. Similarly, Washington's continued supply of advanced military equipment to Pakistan is not considered to be healthy for the bilateral defence relationship. Indian policymakers, strategists, and analysts are unable to reconcile their perception of U.S. policy on terrorism and its attitude toward Pakistan. Washington's over-eagerness to accommodate Pakistani demands and perceptions accompanied by an inability or unwillingness to penalise Pakistan, despite the harsh reality of Pakistan's continued support for terrorism, remains inexplicable to most Indians. This continued support by the U.S. has emboldened Pakistan to resist demands to

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<sup>24</sup> Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation U.S. Department of Defence November 2011, Preparation of this report/study cost the Department of Defence a total of approximately \$12,000 for the 2012 Fiscal Year.



dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. These issues have to be amicably solved in order to give a boost to the bilateral relationship<sup>25</sup>.

India-USA relation was on an all-time high during the second tenure of the USA President Obama. Mr Barak Obama has visited 2<sup>nd</sup> time in India in January 2015, when he invited by India's newly elected Prime Minister Mr Narendra Modi as a chief guest on India's Republic day celebration. After that Mr Modi had visited thrice as a state guest of the USA in September 2014, January 2015 and in June 2016. All these meetings of both countries delegate can count as a significant step to take India-USA relation on a new high<sup>26</sup>.

The latest agreements come on top of a growing pile of protocols that go beyond defence co-operation to include a "joint strategic vision" for Asia signed in January 2015. American armed forces now hold more joint exercises with India than with any other country. And two years ago India overtook Pakistan as a buyer of American weaponry. It helps that America has the kinds of goods that India's armed forces want as they seek to project power more widely in the Indian Ocean, including long-range patrol aircraft and drones, maritime helicopters, aircraft carrier technology and anti-submarine gear. America has also moved nimbly to accommodate India's plans for strengthening its own defence industry. Aside from half-a-dozen existing partnerships involving such things as jet-engine design and avionics, the two sides have suggested jointly producing fighter aircraft, probably an Indian version of the F-18. (USA/India politics, 2016)

It is over China that Indian and American interests converge most. Mr. Bhaskar says that Americans want India to become more capable and "carry a bigger load". They may seek more than that. Speaking last month in Delhi, the Indian capital, Admiral Harry Harris, who heads America's Pacific Command, described expanded military cooperation with India as "arguably the defining partnership for America in the 21st century". But deepening mutual interests, kind American words and tempting American hardware are not enough, yet, to prod India into an open embrace. For one thing, the possibility has yet to be exposed to the rough and tumble of Indian politics, where the opposition would be fierce. And for all its size and growing strength, India's armed forces remain compartmentalised and tradition-bound.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/10/how-modi-changed-the-india-us-relationship/>

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/10/how-modi-changed-the-india-us-relationship/>

<sup>27</sup> [www.economist.com/news/asia/21697031-pentagon-wooing-india-bride-still-coy-suitable-boy](http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21697031-pentagon-wooing-india-bride-still-coy-suitable-boy) and <https://openev.debatecoaches.org/rest/wikis/openev/spaces/2016/pages/Northwestern/attachments/India%20Allies%20DA%20-%20Northwestern%202016.docx>

New Delhi and Washington had been decided to work further in the field of civil nuclear Cooperation and for the strategic point of view and to make their defence mechanism more impermeable, the inked agreement to access to latest Technology. According to this treaty, both can access each other arms and military technology.<sup>28</sup> To strengthen economic growth and sustainable development; To Promote peace and security in and around the world; To enhance inclusive, democratic governance and respect for universal human rights; To provide global leadership on issues of shared interest. During this visit, the Prime Minister of India and President of United States have signed the 8 agreements related to strengthening economic growth & sustainable development. To improve the collaboration between the nations regarding on Energy Security, Clean Energy and Climate Change through both countries Enhanced bilateral ties for Future initiatives and installing sustainable growth.<sup>29</sup>

The Obama administration invited Prime Minister Modi to address a joint session of Congress, eager to portray the occasion as an opportunity to consolidate bilateral relations. Indeed, this dramatic shift in President Obama's foreign-policy priorities stems from the assessment of three components of American national interests and India's role in their achievement: build strong bilateral security and defence cooperation, make India an important export market for U.S. goods and services, and situate India in the strategic pivot to Asia. President Obama considers vital to American interests concerns building closer security and defence cooperation. Cooperation between the two countries has improved dramatically over the past decade. India conducts more annual military exercises with the United States than any other country. In 2015–16 alone, for example, Washington and Delhi conducted several bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Of course, the U.S.-India defence relationship also depends on the sale of military equipment. India now constitutes the second-largest arms market for the U.S. defence industry, after Saudi Arabia. Sales have totalled nearly \$17 billion in the past five years. Between 2011 and 2014, American arms sales to India exceeded \$13.9 billion. India signed another contract in 2015 valued at \$3 billion. This defence engagement between the United States and India is also growing in complexity and sophistication. Both countries are actively exploring ways to jointly develop and produce joint military projects—for example, research and development of mobile electric hybrid power sources and next-generation protective body suits. These joint ventures have been admittedly of low value so

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<sup>28</sup> Agreement sign b/w both country see annexure1

<sup>29</sup> Agreement sign b/w both country see annexure 2

far, but both countries are moving to develop more sensitive technologies. These technologies include jet engine and aircraft carrier design.<sup>30</sup> The recent signing in principle of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) for sharing American and Indian facilities for refuelling, supplies and spare parts is an important indicator of growing defence cooperation. The creation of the India Rapid Reaction Cell in the Pentagon is the first country-specific cell of its kind and simplifies defence collaboration. India decided in principle this April to sign one of the three foundational agreements. Although LEMOA is a watered down version of what the U.S. has been asking for, the agreement allows the two militaries to use each other's land, air and naval bases for resupply and refuelling. India was eager to point out that this agreement does not apply to troops stationed on Indian Territory and that the logistical support would be considered on a case-by-case basis. This is precisely where defence cooperation has reached its limits. (pib12april2016)

Second, co-development and coproduction of military equipment with the United States certainly appeal to India, but hurdles remain. India has a history of signing ambitious defence cooperation agreements only to see them fall apart. Corruption scandals, bureaucratic inertia and missed deadlines are common spoilers. The recent deal to purchase the French Rafael multirole combat fighter is a case in point. Although the agreement was signed in 2011, India has been engaged in protracted negotiations to lower the cost of the deal and appears to be reducing the fighter count from 126 to thirty-six. More to the point, there is no reason to believe that co-development and coproduction with the United States will not face some of these challenges. India's own attempts at developing indigenous military technology do not offer many examples of success. Take the example of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the development of which was conceived in the mid-1980s and is still incomplete. Rechristened now as the Tejas, India had to sign an agreement with General Electric to manufacture and supply engines for the LCA. (pib12april2016)

It is over China that Indian and American interests converge most. Mr Bhaskar says that Americans want India to become more capable and "carry a bigger load". They may seek more than that. Speaking last month in Delhi, the Indian capital, Admiral Harry Harris, who heads America's Pacific Command, described expanded military cooperation with India as "arguably

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<sup>30</sup> Based on joint statement and agreement signed between both countries. To access these agreement can visit: <https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/USA> ; Embassy of India Washington Website : <https://www.indianembassy.org/> ; or <https://in.usembassy.gov/embassy-consulates/public-affairs>

the defining partnership for America in the 21st century". But deepening mutual interests, kind American words and tempting American hardware are not enough, yet, to prod India into an open embrace. For one thing, the possibility has yet to be exposed to the rough and tumble of Indian politics, where the opposition would be fierce. And for all its size and growing strength, India's armed forces remain compartmentalised and tradition-bound.<sup>31</sup>

During his 5 days visit to the USA in June 2016, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi and President of the United States of America Barack Obama meet at White House. Prime Minister expressed his gratitude to President of United States to support India's inclusion in Nuclear Suppliers Group and Mission Technology Control Regime. The Delegates had discussed the following matters related to the strategic partnership between the nations and agreed to grab new opportunities. America has promised to support India for NSG group membership. New Delhi and Washington had been decided to work further in the field of civil nuclear Cooperation and for the strategic point of view and to make their defence mechanism more impermeable, the inked agreement to access to latest Technology. According to this treaty, both can access each other army and military technology.<sup>32</sup>



<sup>31</sup> [www.economist.com/news/asia/21697031-pentagon-wooing-india-bride-still-coy-suitable-boy](http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21697031-pentagon-wooing-india-bride-still-coy-suitable-boy) and <https://openev.debatecoaches.org/rest/wikis/openev/spaces/2016/pages/Northwestern/attachments/India%20Allies%20DA%20-%20Northwestern%202016.docx>

<sup>32</sup> Agreement sign b/w both country see annexure1

## Challenges

### **Pakistan and China factor in Indo-USA relations:-**

After the end of cold war, India-USA not took too much time to extraordinary progress in their relation. During the cold war and after the Cold War, the world's two largest democracies sustained divided. In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, the two countries argued over nuclear non-proliferation; the U.S. role in the India–Pakistan disputes, especially the question of Jammu and Kashmir; terrorism; trade and finance; regional security in the Middle East and Asia; and multilateral issues. While the U.S. military engagement with Pakistan is deeper than that with India, New Delhi—unlike Islamabad—has not, in any way, undermined the American effort in Afghanistan.<sup>33</sup> Since the partition of 1947, the relations between India and Pakistan had been strained over Kashmir. Many time Pakistan took these matter in UNO and try to make India uncomfortable at world level and ill end of the cold war The US has always support pakistan on this issue. (M.L. sondhi, 2002)

Not only During of the cold war but even after the cold war, America having soft corner and tilt toward pakistan. During the first year of the Obama Administration the United States try to build stronger relations with Pakistan and China without concerning to India's feelings and interests. The assumption of Obama that the road to peace in Afghanistan demanded Indian political concessions to Pakistan, raised up a genuine concerns for India that President Obama was abandoning President Bush's neutrality on the issue of Kashmir. This crisis may also lead Obama to some far-reaching policy changes vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Iran. If Pakistan is unable or unwilling to clamp down on militants operating along its north-western frontier, citing tensions with India as a reason, Obama may be forced to rethink the entire Afghan strategy and might follow the path blazed by India of using Iran for access to Afghanistan.<sup>34</sup> India wants to do Pakistan isolated on global form so, it can put pressure on Pakistan but still America looking its national interst in Pakistan and still helping him. In October 2016, the Obama administration announced that it had approved the sale of up to eight F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan in a deal valued at \$699 million. since 2002, the U.S. has provided \$30 billion worth of aid and assistance to Pakistan<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> <http://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/beyond-the-plateau-us-india-relations>.

<sup>34</sup> <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/indo-u-s-ties-the-ugly-the-bad-and-the-good/>

<sup>35</sup> <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/the-importance-difference-in-the-us-india-and-us-pakistan-relationships/>

### **China factor in indo-us relation:-**

By any standard of evaluation, Nixon's initiative to normalise relations with the China is a major diplomatic coup. He came to office with a clear idea to bring the China into the mainstream of world politics. When the first time the NSC of US discussed China on August 14, 1969, President surprised members by standing that the US had a strategic interest in the survival of China. For Nixon and Kissinger the major problem was to make the state department accept their perceptions of the importance of China in a new geopolitical balance of power game. They felt that the state officials still felt that the chines were probably using the U.S. contacts to get concessions from the Russian. With the government's inability to speak with one voice, and China finding the war saw channel not safe for the fear of leaks to the Soviet Union, Nixon and Kissinger were looking for a new 'safe' channel. They decided to use the Pakistan channel through President Yahya Khan which had been in use ever before. Since India-China war of 1962 (Kamath. P. 57).

Handling China's rise is an vital factor of Indo-US defence relationship. Beijing's power activities has been condemned by many countries in Asia, including India. In fact, many South-East Asian countries concerned of China's hyper-activity have welcomed US presence in the region to offset China's influence. But, things are more complex when one looks at the bigger picture. The US, India and some South-East Asian countries have major differences with China regarding freedom of navigation, especially in the South China Sea over which Beijing claims uncontested authority. But, at the same time, economically, New Delhi, Washington and most of South-East Asia are so inter-linked to Beijing that one can hardly foresee any major conflict.<sup>36</sup> Washington has a huge and strong economic relationship with China, its economic relationship with India involves fewer political problems. President Obama's effort to accommodate China's rise through "strategic reassurance" and partnership on regional and global issues generated deep fear for India about the potential significances of a Sino-U.S. duopoly in Asia.<sup>37</sup>

China remains more important for the United States for a host of reasons. First, there is a burgeoning trade between the US and China, touching the mark over \$500 billion, five times larger than the Indo-US trade. Second, by virtue of China's permanent membership of the UN Security Council, its vote on critically important issues is indispensable for the United States.

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<sup>36</sup> <http://www.orfonline.org/research/indo-us-relations-a-reality-check/>

<sup>37</sup> <http://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/beyond-the-plateau-us-india-relations>

Third, the US debt to China is over 1.5 trillion dollar, making America feel psychologically inferior in financial terms. Fourth, the cash starved America is unable to compete with China in disbursing huge foreign aid and grants to Third World countries.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup><http://www.jstor.org/vlib.interchange.at/stable/pdf/44123126.pdf?refreqid=search%3Ac9c9c1dde7813e2ae801f00d62b55b02>





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